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With the continuing growth of online shopping in the UK, there has been an equivalent rise 
in the numbers of van fleets to complement demand. This steady increase has led to an 
acknowledged need in the industry sector to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of at-
work road safety initiatives. Key to the design, implementation and evaluation of such 
initiatives, and to creating a workplace culture of driver safety, is a greater understanding of 
the behaviours and attitudes to risk of professional van drivers and how to monitor, assess 
and consider ways of influencing these proactively and effectively.  The current study sought 
to investigate driver attitudes and behaviours to risk within a major retail online delivery 
service in which I am employed, Tesco Dot.com, as part of a wider set of interventions 
designed to inform the company workforce of developments, policy and practice in this area. 
Researching from an insider practitioner-manager perspective, I used a longitudinal case 
study approach to explore the role of innovative technologies for driver safety, allied with 
concurrent workforce development and training programmes.  Using a mixed methods 
approach to data collection and analysis, I combined qualitative data from staff interviews 
and quantitative data from internal data sources, together with reflections on my changing 
role and developing influence within the team, to build up a rich picture of the challenges of 
fostering innovation and change from the inside, particularly in a discrete part of a complex, 
rapidly changing retail industry.  As a result of ongoing evaluations, I formulated a number 
of medium and longer-term recommendations about the early implementation of company 
strategies, including recruitment and retention for drivers, strategies for addressing barriers 
and enablers to the rollout of proposed technologies, and formulated proposals for 
organisational reconfiguration to embed a culture of driver safety more securely within the 
company workforce. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In this chapter l review how my professional knowledge and the way in which I understand 
my work have been fashioned over many years.  I describe the influence of this development 
on my decision to undertake this Work Based Learning Doctorate project and how it came 
to be formulated.  I also introduce and explain the structure of this Work Based Learning 
Doctorate thesis and my associated practice. 
Working as a driver safety practitioner for many years, I have gained a comprehensive and 
in-depth knowledge relating to practical training and the strategic development of teams, as 
well as processes and policies that seek to create change within the workplace.  Here I 
outline some of the factors that have informed this understanding, prompting my interest in 
developing these skills further within the company I am currently working in.  I started work 
at Tesco Dot.com in 2005 at a time when I was already studying for a work based learning 
degree in driver education.  As my role within the company changed from an external 
contractor to an employee training manager, so my degree shifted focus and I finally 
obtained a first-class honour in BS Occupational Road Risk in 2010 and was awarded 
‘Student of the Year’.   
Gaining my degree gave me the knowledge, confidence and status to raise queries I had 
relating to the operation at Tesco Dot.com and I started to communicate concerns about the 
robustness and structure of some of our legal compliance processes and procedures to my 
line manager.  In response he asked me to conduct a review relating to health and safety, 
driving standards, law and operational effectiveness both on the road and within the 
company with the aim of identifying improvements that could be made.  I was particularly 
interested in shift structures, route planning and fuel-efficient driving.  This request provided 
the opportunity to combine my academic interests and workplace-related professional 
knowledge to pursue the focus that would become this Work Based Learning Doctorate 
project. 
Carrying out the Work Based Learning Doctorate in relation to this review allowed me to 
gain insights, as both a researcher and a practitioner, into the processes and events that 
could either facilitate or complicate the goal of improving this particular area of driver safety 
at Tesco Dot.com.  It enabled me to consider how far the company had come in protecting 
the safety of its drivers, how it could further consolidate and improve these safety record 
achievements, as well as the role I could play to support and, in part, determine these goals 
as an agent of change working within the organisation.  Having spent most of my 
professional life working within the world of professional driver education and providing 
consultative services to several areas of industry, in the first five years I was sceptical that 




Tesco, Britain’s biggest retailer, would be able to embrace the ideology and methodology 
required to reach a best practice level of safety within a rapidly growing driver population.  
This thesis charts the shift in this scepticism starting with the beginning of the research in 
2010; a journey that has also been one of self-discovery as outlined in this investigation.  
1.1  The Aim of this Study 
My main aim in this study is to investigate selected processes of innovation and change 
within Tesco Dot.com and it’s my sphere of influence, particularly in relation to the delivery 
of strategies for workforce development and specifically about company training 
programmes designed, among other things, to improve driver safety and eliminate risk.  I 
will explore and document key aspects of a journey of organisational, professional and 
personal change that l embarked on over approximately the last eight years (2008 to 2016).  
I capture and analyse the impact of changing relationships within core areas of Tesco 
Dot.com, focusing on a particular case, which considers the nature of innovation and 
change from the perspective of someone actively involved in the task of finding ways to 
initiate, support and steer that change, including during phases of uncertainty and major 
organisational change Smith (2016). 
To a large extent the case study presented in this research is the evaluation of my own work 
practice and is bound by the methodologies that I have developed from within this setting, 
meaning that I assume the role of both researcher and the subject of research, rather than 
taking a third-party perspective.  Given that my roles and responsibilities have also changed 
as the case has unfolded, this is also, to some extent, in relation to the development of my 
own sense of agency as I have moved towards a position of greater managerial 
responsibility.  Accordingly, I intend to document some of the organisational and personnel 
changes that have taken place, which have repositioned me from a situation of comparative 
isolation within the case described to being a more valued member of a team, assessing it 
from within.  I also outline my increasing influence outside the organisation in terms of 
external consultancy to the wider industry and the support I have provided to developing 
countries via Eastern Alliance for Safe and Sustainable Transport (EASST). 
The case study will look at the systems and processes that l have helped introduce within 
Tesco Dot.com, exploring the methodology behind their design and the impact they have 
had to date on the personnel and operation of the company.  I investigate a range of specific 
and more generic issues and questions ranging from the feasibility of change in relation to 
internal and external factors, to the goals, impact and measurement of change, and the 
sustainability of change. 
  




Questions that guided my initial thinking included the following: 
• Could a positive change in behaviour be achieved? 
• Could operational costs be reduced, and safety standards raised? 
• What was the impact of the Driver Safety and Compliance team? 
• Why did we introduce telematics into the Tesco Dot.com van fleet, what were the 
subsequent challenges we faced due to the data collected, and what was the 
response of the drivers? 
• How do you embed change? 
• What were the internal challenges faced by a rapidly growing business in an 
environment that is perceived as unregulated? 
1.2  31 Years in Road Safety 
Since leaving secondary school in 1979, l have found myself constantly drawn to the field 
of training and development, not through academia, for example through teaching in the 
compulsory and post-compulsory sectors, but through practical hands-on training within the 
working environment.  My working life started at age 16, some 38 years ago, with the Royal 
Mail, which demanded an early 4 a.m. start as well as a determination to learn new skills 
while combating the elements.  Unfortunately, l sustained an industrial injury resulting in 12 
months of hospitalisation.  This, however, was the catalyst to my single-minded 
determination to never give up on a task once I had accepted the challenge.  I first adhered 
to this motto when I learned to walk again, which also led me to start practising karate in 
order to regain the strength, coordination and balance in my legs.  I have found that 
unintentional major events in my early life helped mould my character, developing clarity 
and doggedness to identify what is required to embed change and the fortitude to help 
develop and mould positive adjustments. 
Working as I do currently, after a long and varied career, within a large multi-national 
company such as Tesco, l have been faced with many challenges with regard to my 
determination to keep on what I see as a ‘correct path’, that is, one that helps people reach 
their goals with commitment and integrity.  Tenacity has been a close friend to me over the 
years, but I recognise that self-determination alone will not guarantee success.  A 
combination of skills, knowledge and beliefs are required to enable a person to set and 
achieve goals, and skill sets are developed from an understanding of one's strengths and 
limitations, together with the belief in oneself as capable and effective.  The personality job 
fit theory postulates that a person's personality traits will reveal insight as to adaptability within 
an organisation Gagne (2005). 




For instance, I first developed the ability to teach and train others in 1982 with my 
involvement in the martial art of Karate-Do-Shotaki, firstly as a trainee, then moving on to 
becoming an instructor within a local club and ultimately moving to Newcastle to train at the 
world renowned Chowa Karate Academy under the tutorage of Mitsusuke Harada.  This 
activity was the first to inspire me to research a subject by examining its history and in this 
case its religious dimensions (Japanese Shinto), together with its cultural influence on 
Western thinking and behaviour, particularly in the US Funakoshi (1973). 
This was my first real exposure, albeit subconscious, to the process of reflecting on literary 
knowledge (often in translation) and imparting this to others firstly in theory and then in 
practical application.  This, in turn, led to a wider subsequent interest in training, assessing 
and the accreditation of individuals’ abilities.  The personal learning that l was able to extract 
from this period of my life was that the desire to fulfil one aspiration will undoubtedly take 
you on a journey that at times you will have little or no control over and that may produce 
other unexpected outcomes.  Due to my Karate-Do-Shotaki training I took decisions that 
would make fundamental changes to my life, such as where l lived.  The training also caused 
more perceptual changes such as my view of society and my part within it.  On reflection, it 
cemented the underlying values that have moulded my approach to my professional work 
and the ethics that fortify my approach to this work (which I touch on throughout the project).  
This short intervention in my life started to shape the attitude and approach that helped 
frame my development as a trainer. 
My fundamental starting point in this project, derived from and tested in the workplace, is 
that for effective change to happen you must think systemically as well as individually.  This 
thinking takes place in relation to the task or output, and at times, though with care and tact, 
requires acting on the courage of your convictions to challenge the status quo.  You must 
first reflect on the group and what helps it to function effectively to allow the kind of 
improvement and change to take place that is both accepted and aspired to by the broader 
workforce. My efforts to gain acceptance and recognition of this tenet have been key for 
understanding my development as an agent of change. This issue came into sharp focus 
when l first joined Tesco Dot.com and introduced a pre-employment driving assessment for 
our drivers.  The response from management was: ‘Why? As long as they have a licence 
then they can drive our vans.  It’s not necessary’.  The focus appeared to be on the smaller 
picture and on the needs of individual drivers in isolation.  The fact that company data 
showed that van damage and prosecutions were growing at an exponential rate was 
deemed of little or no consequence.  There was hence an initial barrier of communication 
or at least a clash of perspectives and basic assumptions, which I would need to negotiate 




and continue to work around as I progressed in terms of my role and potential influence 
within the company.  
The ability to communicate across multiple levels, working on a one-to-one basis or in a 
group situation, by motivating, consoling and mentoring simultaneously, is a skill in its own 
right.  One of the contributory aims of this project was to explore the extent to which I was 
able to move from a position of relative outsider within the management structure, with a 
circumscribed capacity to influence others (especially upwards and sideways), to one where 
I am increasingly acknowledged as having the skills and experience to input into enhanced 
evaluation and decision-making activities at a more strategic level.  
1.3 Driver and Vehicle Safety Agency Approved Driving Instructor 
Having sketched some of the wider strategic issues, here I touch on some key aspects of 
learning and training, the understanding and questioning of which has been a constant 
theme throughout my life.  The movement in my thinking is important to grasp as it has 
influenced the kind of instructor I became early on in my career and later at Tesco Dot.com.  
I have been working in the industry of professional driving instruction and development for 
over 30 years, developing my skills and experience from working as a sole trading driving 
instructor starting my own business in 1985, through to the development of my own 
consultancy company, Roadwise Training and Consultancy in 2000 and then joining Tesco 
Dot.com in 2005.   
When l left full-time Karate training and qualified as a driving instructor I was able to develop 
my existing skills and reflect on their influence on my teaching in related, professional 
contexts.  I was able to bring a new dimension to that of a traditional driver trainer by utilising 
my Karate instructor skill set, such as the approach of using incremental steps to achieve a 
positive result, but not moving forward until the student is capable and competent at each 
stage. The success of this strategy has been supported in the work of Schon in The 
Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (1991). 
Competency-based learning or competency-based education and training Burke (1989) is 
a pedagogical approach more often used when developing concrete skills rather than 
abstract, theoretical learning.  It is usually situated in the work context and it differs from 
other approaches in that the unit of learning is extremely fine-grained.  Rather than deliver 
learning through a course or a module-based curriculum, every individual skill/learning 
outcome, known as a competency, is one single unit.  Learners work on one competency 
at a time, which is usually a small component of a larger learning goal.  The student is 
evaluated on the individual competency and only once they have mastered it do they move 




on to others.  After that, higher or more complex competencies are learned to a degree of 
mastery and isolated from other topics.  Another common component of competency-based 
learning is the ability to skip learning modules entirely if the learner can demonstrate they 
already have mastery.  This can be done either through prior learning assessment or 
formative testing. 
For example, people learning to drive (DfT, 2008) using manual transmission might first 
have to demonstrate their mastery of the rules of the road, safety, defensive driving, and 
parallel parking and so on. Then they may focus on two independent competencies: using 
the clutch and brake with the right foot along with shifting up and down through the gears.  
Once the learners have demonstrated they are comfortable with these two skills the next, 
overarching skill might be finding first gear from full stop moving into a slow roll followed by 
sudden stops, then shifting up and downshifting gears.  Because this is kinetic learning, the 
instructor would likely demonstrate the individual skill a few times, then the student would 
perform guided practice followed by independent practice until they can demonstrate their 
mastery (Spady et al., 1977).  In my experience, all too often driving instructors mistakenly 
think that explaining the steps involved verbally by telling the learner how to correctly 
perform a skill or procedure is enough to promote adequate learning and that any 
deficiencies in learning or demonstrating the competencies required are due to the learner, 
not the method.  
Over time l became aware that l had an ever-deepening awareness of the kinds of effective, 
individually tailored methods of teaching and learning needed to enable drivers to achieve 
and maintain a high standard of safety, and a corresponding dissatisfaction with alternative 
methods such as working through a specific training programme irrespective of the 
individual needs of the student.  I introduced an assessment of these skills using 
competency-based learning, allowing my students to achieve the highest standards, 
reflected both in the qualifications they attained as well as the qualifications awarded to me 
by the Driving Standards Agency.  In addition, I received training contracts from local 
authorities and NHS ambulance trusts to work with their employees (see section 1.4).  The 
agencies commented that this training and the informational material supplied produced a 
high-quality product.  Furthermore, they described how the training not only developed 
competency within their existing frameworks, but that I had begun to influence change within 
the organisation as the resulting benefits of my methodology became tangible over time. 




1.4 Training Consultant 
My first major step into management was in 2000 when l successfully tendered for the award 
for providing and developing driver training services within Kent Ambulance NHS Trust.  
This was my first experience of collaborating with chief executives and working with the 
development of strategies and costings.  It was during this six-year period between 2000 
and 2005 that l was actively involved with county councils and large fleet-training 
companies, undertaking a similar consultative role.  In addition to this, l undertook an active 
role in St John Ambulance, both as a member and a driver trainer.  
On reflection, this was where l discovered how unwieldy and fragmented large organisations 
could become and the underlying conflict between maintaining high levels of perishable 
skills and fiscal accountability, particularly in the private sector.  I was able to analyse the 
needs of a training department with regard to strategy and planning, and the positive impact 
that this would have on both the company and the public that it served.  Insurance 
companies now widely recognise that higher standards of driving are a fundamental 
contributor to the reduction of accident rates, improvement in fuel economy and reduction 
of carbon emissions (Roadsafe, 2012).  
Whilst conducting this work I concluded that to effect positive change within an organisation, 
you must persuade departments and managers that may have different agendas that the 
proposition that you are bringing to the table is beneficial and worth them investing in, as 
substantiated in (Fisher et al., 2011) Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving 
in.  This would often lead to a conflict of interest either through existing perceived edicts 
being challenged or a proposition being created whose potential benefit the company 
managers were either unable or unwilling to see. 
Organisations whose internal workings I have become familiar with tend to foster an 
ingrained way of thinking and behaving, so-called ‘mental models’ (Senge, 1990) which are 
reflected in micro-managing, a concept that Tesco in my experience would appear to have 
as part of its DNA.  I am aware that a successful, large company such as Tesco would feel 
that it has the skills and knowledge already existing within the company, so would 
instinctively be sceptical of ideas perceived to originate from an external source.  If you are 
perceived as an outsider coming in with new ideas, effecting change can be very difficult. 
When l originally embarked on my final project in 2011, my proposed study within the context 
of my own organisation, Tesco Dot.com, was entitled The Role of Risk Databases in Safety 
Training for Professional Van Drivers.  I envisaged a project where the implementation of a 
single new technology and system of monitoring would act as a sufficient frame to explore 




the kinds of interest in facilitating organisational change and its associated work based 
learning strategies that were my central and ongoing concerns.  On reflection during the 
initial stages of the project, l realised that the Tesco Dot.com database, an off-the-shelf 
product supplied by DotNetNuke was not, in essence, a risk indicator, but a storage facility 
for tracking training events and historical data relating to our drivers.  As such it was unlikely, 
by itself, to provide the scope for the more radical and more involving inquiry I had in mind. 
The existing database did fulfil certain expectations, including our director’s desire to fulfil 
corporate accountability and the legal responsibility that is duty of care, charting adequate 
training to undertake the job role.  However, the database, as I came to discover, was not 
fully fit for purpose and certainly did not meet my own initial expectations. Upon 
investigation, I found that it lacked the ability to amalgamate data streams and internal 
reports associated with our drivers’ behaviour to form an overall score or picture to support 
interventional or targeted training.  A second and equally important product of such a risk-
profiling model would be the development of better training and support for the drivers. 
Therefore, the kind of systemic and evidence-based training programme it had the potential 
to support was well below what I had envisaged. 
Risk management software works by identifying the risks associated with a given set of 
assets and individuals, seeking to mitigate or eliminate these risks Karolack (1995).  The 
risk management database in operation at Tesco Dot.com, which should have been linked 
closely with compliance management and optimally designed to lower the overall risk and 
security implications that the organisation faces, did not in practice fulfil these vital functions.  
Consequently, the database, as my colleagues and I discovered, lacked credibility as a 
decision-making and auditing tool.  Its lack of functionality included data entry and collection, 
given that some of the content itself had become corrupted or omitted over time and had 
not been audited.  The fact that the organisation did not audit standards in relation to risk 
management databases provided me with an opportunity to undertake a service 
improvement while carrying out a piece of work based research.   
With this in the forefront of my mind, and with support from Middlesex University and my 
advisor, l decided to construct a case study concentrating on the introduction of information 
technology and innovation designed to improve and change the behaviour of Tesco 
Dot.com drivers.  This study would focus on the initial stages of the implementation.  I had 
chosen by then to move from a stage-by-stage conception of the innovation process to a 
more dynamic, continuous approach in which the variables involved are sequenced and 
analysed through time (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990).  




1.5 Tesco Dot.com and My Changing Roles in the Company  
Throughout Tesco Dot.com’s remarkable expansion over the last 23 years, increasing from 
one van to 5,500 delivering to 1.7 million customers per week, the senior management team 
has analysed its processes and developed innovative management solutions to allow the 
business to grow in a robust, controlled and sustainable fashion.  The guiding principle has 
been to ensure that profitability was achieved while ensuring that Tesco Dot.com’s 
employees were fully consulted and able to operate in a safe environment. At the end of 
2004, however, van damage had reached a level of over £5,000 per van per year (a total of 
£10 million).  It was clear that prompt and decisive action was needed to reduce the 
exposure of Tesco Dot.com staff (outreach workers) to occupational road risk, whilst 
executing a business plan to reduce and bring under control the spiralling costs of running, 
maintaining and insuring the van fleet.  
In 2005, at the same time as l joined the company, a consultation process regarding the 
employment, training and development of drivers, initiated by the senior management team 
in conjunction with the trade unions, was undertaken.  The output of the consultation was 
an action plan that clearly defined the policy and strategy that would allow radical changes 
to take place throughout the business to improve driver safety and legal compliance, without 
unnecessary delay or misunderstanding by participating major stakeholders.  This 
fundamental move laid the foundations for the development of Tesco Dot.com’s in-house 
driver safety team and the resulting development programme that radically changed the 
focus and commitment that the company had towards its van drivers.  
Tesco Dot.com is now in a position to reap the rewards from its investment in its staff and 
operational hardware.  The company can now move forward and grow on a more stable 
footing, but the struggle to maintain and improve behaviour and safety standards remains 
ongoing, requiring the support and development of a carefully crafted combination of highly 
trained and motivated staff and of cutting-edge technology such as telematics data tracking 
and in-cab cameras.  Tesco Dot.com is now recognised by both Government agencies and 
our industry sector to have benchmarked and raised the bar in managing the occupational 
road risk of its outreach workers, and Tesco Dot.com’s strategies and processes are those 
to be aspired to, both in the UK and beyond.  
Tesco Dot.com was set up in 1984 in order to respond to what was then forecast to be a 
growing demand for online ordering from customers and home delivery of purchases. This 
was a prescient investment because two decades later, the number of vans on the road in 
the UK delivering online purchases had risen dramatically.  Vans are the fastest-growing 
traffic segment in the UK, with 70% growth in road miles over the last 20 years, compared 




to 12% for cars and 5.5% for lorries. Data from the Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders (SMMT) also shows that in 2016, a total of 4,007,331 vans were in use on UK 
roads, a 4.3% increase from the previous year.  A continuing increase in demand for online 
deliveries has been a key to this inexorable growth and vans now cover around 45 billion 
miles across the UK each year (SMMT, 2016). 
Organisational and economic consequences of this increase in road traffic include the 
impact on road safety management and associated costs.  After 21 years of operation, in 
2005 Tesco Dot.com had incurred an escalation in accident damage costs (approximately 
£10 million) and realised that action was needed to reduce this outlay. The company was 
spending over £10 million on van damage alone on its fleet of 1,200 vans, virtually off-setting 
any profitability within the company.  As part of the company’s strategy to improve road 
safety, reduce or eliminate risk and improve profitability, I was employed in 2005 as a 
consultant driver trainer to support and develop an internal staff training team.  A significant 
part of my role was to help move our drivers away from the image and mentality of the ‘white 
van man’, with its acceptance of risk as part of the job, to that of being risk-aware, safe and 
professional employees, delivering great customer service while driving to a high standard. 
Currently, I am the company’s occupational road risk manager and it is now my 
responsibility to structure the strategy and policies of Tesco Dot.com with regard to this 
area.  As a comparatively new company, trading for only 21 years, increasing from a single 
van to its present 5,500 vans and an annual turnover of approximately £2 billion, the 
structure of the organisation is constantly evolving.  My responsibility is to continually 
monitor Tesco Dot.com’s on-road operation for legal robustness.  Moving to larger seven-
tonne vans in 2015 caused a major impact on the company, resulting in a comprehensive 
redesign of all training material for more qualified drivers. This also required my registering 
Tesco Dot.com in 2015 as a Continued Professional Competence company with the Driving 
Standards Agency.  This has been a major undertaking for me professionally as well as 
being a big move for the company.   
As explained, however, I was initially recruited as a trainer, although within six months l 
started to become my line manager’s strategic advisor regarding the safety of our drivers 
and vans. While within Tesco Dot.com there were retail skills and knowledge in abundance, 
there was no tangible knowledge within the leadership team regarding occupational road 
risk.   
 




I have been responsible for entering the company for several awards and have been a major 
contributor to the following: 
• RoSPA Managing Occupational Road Risk 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013 
• European Road Safety 2010 (large organisation) 
• Prince Michael of Kent International Roadsafe Award 2010 
Tesco Dot.com is positioned as the biggest online home shopping company in the world, 
boasting 49% of the UK market, delivering to over 1.7 million active customers (as 
mentioned previously), with 50 million orders a year (731,000 per week), and 15,000 drivers 
covering over 120 million miles per year with our home delivery fleet of vans. Tesco Dot.com 
now has an annual turnover of £2.8 billion. It should be noted that the work we have carried 
out within Tesco Dot.com associated with these awards has been above and beyond what 
is legally required of the company.  Rather than such awards, the driving force of our work 
in this area has stemmed from adopting systems compliant with the duty of care outlined in 
the Health and Safety at Work Act. 
One of the challenges for me has been to introduce systems and processes which drive up 
standards while changing mindsets at both strategic and operational levels.  That is, to shift 
perceptions within the company that such systems are onerous and unnecessary, and to 
alter the industry standard perception which, at its most stereotyped, suggests that anyone 
with a car licence can drive a van, that van driving is easy and that the supply of drivers will 
always outstrip demand.  Within the industry of online shopping and the delivery medium of 
vans there lies a toxic fusion of, on the one hand, the desire of companies to meet the 
immediacy of online shoppers’ expectations and, on the other, their desire to grow at an 
exponential rate through more vans and more drivers with little regard to environmental or 
safety impacts.  That said, since l joined Tesco Dot.com our drivers have covered over 800 
million miles and have not caused one blameworthy fatal road traffic crash, a fact in which 
my colleagues and I take great pride.   
The journey that l have undertaken with Tesco Dot.com has afforded me an illuminating 
insight into the difficulties and dilemmas of embedding change in one of the country’s 
biggest employers.  As previously explained, part of my study will be to reflect on and 
analyse the range of roles and responsibilities I have undertaken that have helped to 
contribute to this positive and, I hope, sustainable improvement in risk management and 
organisational performance by embedding a culture of road safety into the company.  In the 
following section, I outline some of the wider political, economic, social and technological 
factors that have shaped the context in which I work. 




1.6 Political, Economic, Social and Technological Factors  
1.6.1 Political 
In 1990 the World Health Organisation ranked road death as the ninth greatest killer in the 
world, predicting that it would be the third by 2010.  The Dyke Report (2001) evidences the 
UK Government’s joint strategy with the European Union to reduce road death in general 
by targeting high-risk road user groups.  One of these groups includes at-work drivers, who 
account for 1 in 3 road deaths in the UK (2010). 
The road haulage industry in the UK is closely monitored and controlled by both EU and UK 
driving regulations, with reference to all large goods vehicles weighing over 3.5 tonnes.  
These clearly state driving and rest times applicable to the driver and the behaviour of a 
transport company.  However, the industry of operating light vans in the UK (2.2 to 3.5 
tonnes) is regulated under UK domestic driving hours (Transport Act 1968, DVSA review 
2016), which states shift lengths, implies best practice and is rarely enforced.  A self-
employed van driver can potentially drive as many hours as they like. 
1.6.2 Economic 
As a consequence of the rapid expansion of internet shopping in the UK over the last ten 
years, goods purchased are delivered predominantly via light van fleets, the number of 
which are present on the roads having grown by 53% during this period.  A new and rapidly 
expanding van driver population has received no additional driver training or up-skilling. 
Over 4 million vans are being driven by car drivers with potentially little or no professional 
regard to their own driving skill level or behaviour. 
Given that this growth in activity has taken place so far within a largely unregulated industry, 
questions must inevitably arise as to the impact this expansion in van delivery, including 
light van delivery, will have on the risks and incidence of road death and injury, both for the 
workforce and the general population. 
1.6.3 Social 
With the sudden increase in the van population in the UK, the growth in traffic has had a 
negative impact on society.  As the majority of deliveries are to domestic addresses the 
increase in local traffic, particularly on housing estates, has greatly expanded.  There is also 
a perception that van drivers are aggressive road users. 
1.6.4 Technological 
Over the last ten years, there has been a huge investment in the technology involved in the 
Tesco Dot.com van fleet.  The vans themselves are sophisticated eight-speed automatics, 




with equally technologically advanced braking and stability systems.  The drivers are 
supplied with an integrated computer that functions as a satellite navigation device, 
customer service point and mobile phone. 
1.7 Tesco Dot.com’s Expansion and the Need to Reduce Road Risk  
From its inception, Tesco Dot.com has been considered as a bolt-on to an existing store 
operation, encroaching into the store backyard areas that were never designed with van 
manoeuvring, parking, delivery marshalling and loading in mind.  This background had a 
discernible effect as the business grew, having an ever-greater negative impact on the 
safety of both store personnel and Tesco Dot.com staff.  The constant positive growth led 
to the development of Tesco Dot.com only stores, stand-alone operations, which have been 
built to avert the impact on traditional store operations.   
1.8 The Challenge of Reducing Van Damage 
In 2006 it was clear that we had no method of data collection to challenge the driver’s 
account of an accident.  Figure 1 shows the aftermath of a company-related, non-injury 
accident dating from 2010, without the influence of alcohol or drugs, so of little or no interest 
to the police.  This incident caused a major road closure in London for seven hours, resulting 
in criticism from the Metropolitan Police and focusing the need for the introduction of 
telematic data capture via our provider Microlise, as a pilot in our South London operation.  
This, in turn, caused a great deal of negativity and suspicion amongst the drivers.  
 
Figure 1 Van crash in South London (closed for seven hours, but with no serious injuries), 
2006.  Source: Internal Tesco report 




At this time the management team had little or no knowledge of what was happening at the 
ground level of the business. This had several serious and unanticipated consequences.  
Control of the rapidly growing van fleet had been lost; there was little or no awareness of 
the condition and safety of our vans.  Misguided efforts were made to comply with legalities, 
but the lack of coordination across the estate linked with the detachment of the office led to 
over-complicated processes being devised at local levels that were impossible to track 
centrally.   
Three separate books, logs or photocopied sheets were used to cover and track: 
• Who was driving the van? 
• When the driver was active 
• Mileage covered  
• Damage that the driver or a third party may have caused to the van during that journey 
• Any faults reported to the maintenance provider 
• Whether the van had the correct equipment on board 
Most of these records were either lost or not filled in: the law states that these documents 
are kept for three years for inspection by the appropriate authorities, such as the police, in 
the event of a prosecution or enquiry. 
1.9 Consequences of Poor Working Practice 
In addition to not completing a daily log, drivers did not check their vans for roadworthiness 
each day.  We were unable to track a van at any given date and time, meaning that we 
could not confidently declare who was driving when this information was requested by the 
police or the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency for endorsable offences under the Road 
Traffic Act (HMSO, 1988). Common offences included: 
• Speeding 
• Driving away from the scene of an accident 
• Dangerous driving 
• Careless driving 
• Dangerous parking 
• Not wearing a safety belt 
• Using a mobile phone when driving (DfT seat belt and mobile phone use survey 2014) 
This led to a memorable day in 2005 when a court bailiff arrived at our head office in Welwyn 
Garden City to collect unpaid fines generated from notice of intended prosecution requests 
from police forces as a consequence of our drivers’ poor behaviour.  Unfortunately, no one 




within Tesco Dot.com was aware of any fines that had to be paid, as a result of our own 
poor internal reporting processes.  This became a benchmark in our lack of awareness and 








Figure 3  Result of poor working practices, 2006, Source: Internal Tesco Dot.com 
investigation 
 




1.10 Compliance with Existing and New Legislation 
When I joined Tesco Dot.com, we were unaware of our drivers working an illegal excess of 
driving hours because we had no knowledge of the correct working hour structure of a van 
driver, as this is dissimilar to the framework considered normal or safe for staff based in 
stores.  Organisational lack of awareness of legal compliance problems was exacerbated 
by a prevailing ethos that demanded deliveries had to be made, including if this led to a 
driver working through the night and into the early hours of the following day. ‘Who would 
know?’ and ‘does it matter?’ were questions that were not discussed when the key and 
sometimes only concern was making the delivery.  The consequences of such unanswered 
questions had yet to be understood by managers Karolak (2003).  This was not a good 
position for the company and its leadership team to be in, especially after the introduction 
of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CPS, 2008), which raised 
the real possibility of custodial sentences for company managers and drivers convicted of 
driving-related offences.  At this time the importance of basic equipment, good assessment, 
training and validation of our outreach workers had still not been registered by managers 
within Tesco Dot.com. 
This changed with the introduction of Excellent Delivery 1, an in-house training day in 2008 
attended by all drivers for a four-hour, up-skilling session designed to educate and develop 
our team as new operational programmes went live in Tesco Dot.com.  This training has 
subsequently been repeated annually in order to refresh the skills of our more permanent 
staff and to introduce new drivers. 
Until the introduction of the Driver Safety and Compliance Team in 2006 and its ability to 
provide a trusted high standard of training, Tesco Dot.com could not be confident in 
accurately ascertaining the status of our vans, for example whether all the vans went out on 
their evening deliveries and if they had returned safely to the store.  For instance, one 
winter’s evening the intervention of a member of the public was required to raise the 
company’s awareness that one of our drivers had been found unconscious in his van in the 
middle of a field late at night.  The store was totally unaware that he had not returned from 
his route.  In another worrying incident a manager (seven months pregnant) undertook a 
delivery route assisted by another member of staff.  She drove off with her passenger 
propped up on an upturned green tray, with a bald tyre and no filler cap, passing directly by 
a Vehicle Operators Service Authority traffic inspector, while spilling fuel all over the road.  
After being stopped by the inspector, the van was taken off the road.  The inspector then 
condemned the entire fleet of vans as unroadworthy, thus closing down the local operation 
completely.  




1.11 Costs to the Company  
The true economic impact of van damage and related costs in 2004-2005 to a fleet 
consisting of approximately 1,200 vehicles was a bill of over £5.9 million (approximately 
£5,000 per van per year), with a further £4.9 million to third parties, totalling £10.8 million.  
At the time van costs were not tightly controlled or monitored but were run on an open book 
basis, collated centrally and only reviewed annually as they were expressed as end-of-year 





This would be visible in the fleet team’s annual report, a position that no business could 
sustain.   
By 2016, however, we had a cost of £15.2 million for a fleet of 5,500 vans, making an 
average cost per van of £2,763: a reduction in overall van damage of 45% (12.6 pence per 
mile). While the ideal would have been, and is, to incur nil costs per van per annum, the 
overall steady improvement in reduction of van damage (Figure 4) suggests that the actions 
and interventions relating to driver safety that I was involved in implementing over the 
intervening period may well have contributed to this encouraging trend.  How, in what seems 
to have been in a context otherwise resistant to change and new ideas, was it done? My 
project seeks in part to address this question by bringing to bear my self-reflective 
understanding of the case and the various sources of data on which this is based.  However, 
let us look first in further detail at some of the other financial and related challenges that 
Tesco Dot.com was facing. 
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1.12 Labour Turnover 2005 to 2009 
To compound our operational problems, labour turnover was running at an estimated 40%, 
a significant, if at that time hidden, cost to the business.  
As shown in Figure 5, it appears there was a pivotal moment in mid-2005 where the turnover 
of drivers seemed to drop considerably compared with increasing recruitment. This 
coincided with the inception and development of the driver training team, which has been 
linked to a marked positive impact on labour turnover.  Unanalysed subsequent data 
indicates that this trend continues to the present day.  
 
 
Figure 5  Depicting growth of drivers to over 8,000 and drivers leaving the company 
reducing to 5%, Source: Internal Tesco Dot.com report 
The impact of the driver safety and compliance manager (DSCM) is depicted in Figure 6 
where the constant increase in van numbers is clearly offset by the rapid fall in van incidents.
 
Figure 6  Number of accidents (involving personal injury and or vehicle damage) over the 
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1.13 Improving Operational Safety 
An unfortunate result of the continued growth of Tesco Dot.com has been the congestion in 
backyard areas of Tesco stores during key strategic operational times of the day.  The safe 
marshalling and loading of vans is an ongoing problem (Figure 7) and this is exacerbated 
by the need for vans to be plugged into a safe electrical supply to achieve proper 
temperature reduction in the fridge and freezer sections of the van. The problem becomes 
critical during the Christmas trading period. 
 
 
Figure 7  A common sight during the morning loading of vans, (2010),  
Source: Internal company report 
A comprehensive review of the safety of backyards was undertaken in 2010 by the DSCM 
team (refer to Figure 8 and Figure 9 where risk can clearly be identified), but in certain 
locations, the congestion in this area is still a concern.  In addition to loading the van, the 
backyard is the area where cleaning and maintenance of the vehicle are usually carried out.  
The safe overnight parking of the vans had become an additional concern, with vandalism 
and, particularly recently, the theft of catalytic converters at a cost to the business. 






Figure 8  A typical Tesco Dot.com loading area in 2010, growth had compromised safety, 





Figure 9  The difficulty of providing a safe working area at key periods of the day, 2010.   
Source: Internal company report 




1.14 Project Structure 
This Work Based Learning Doctorate research uses a case study in order to further 
understand how the behaviour of delivery drivers and their management teams can change 
people’s perception of driver safety, therefore influencing a reduction in road risk.  The 
project will explore the effectiveness of a wide range of management initiatives and whether 
comprehensive risk management policies and processes are associated with beneficial 
safety outcomes. 
My first chapter is a broad introduction to this question.  In Chapter 2 I will go on to review 
relevant information and knowledge relating to the case study, which will include law and 
industry standards as well as published literature.  Chapter 3 explores the methodology that 
I have chosen, outlines the case study and describes why I have chosen to carry out this 
investigation from the position of a workplace professional practitioner researcher.  The 
main data collection avenues I have employed are:  
• Questionnaires 
• Interviews 
• Company records 
• Road safety reports 
• Government reports 
• Company driver safety database 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the findings and expands on this data, while Chapter 5 outlines 
recommendations that have arisen from the case study that could be directed towards my 
line manager, Tesco Dot.com or the industry as a whole.  Chapter 6 provides a space for 
reflection in which I consider what I have learned as a result of this research and I assess 
to what extent this has developed me as a professional practitioner and whether it has 
enhanced my effectiveness within Tesco Dot.com.  
1.15 Summary  
Given that compliance is essential for the safe and accountable running of a business, I 
identified that the issue at stake was the disconnect between compliance management and 
operational management. Neither compliance or operational management were working 
well on their own when I started working at Tesco Dot.com and these two different parts of 
the organisation were certainly not mutually supportive of each other.  I was in an interesting 
and perhaps unique position to identify this disconnect as I came into the company as an 
outsider.  The job I was initially given did not reflect what I saw as being required by the 
company, and my knowledge of the legislation (compliance) as well as of the best practice 




in driving and safety (operations) enabled me to see the problem and bring this to light in 
ways that other stakeholders were unable to. 
This, reinforced by my recent academic studies, equipped me with some of the necessary 
knowledge, expertise and motivation to undertake a work based case study such as this 
doctoral investigation.  At the same time, I entered this project with a sense that it might be 
complex and hampered by setbacks as well as achievements, and this thesis demonstrates 
how these elements all unfolded in practice.   




Chapter 2 - Review of Relevant Knowledge and Information  
2.1 Introduction 
Through this literature review l intend to explore the two main elements that affect an 
embedded research practitioner in this particular case study: organisational change and the 
safety management and legislation that affects, regulates and governs Tesco Dot.com.  The 
objective of my case study is to explore the complex relationships that develop and evolve 
when endeavouring to change and influence behaviour within the workplace.  I intend to 
review literature that relates to four key areas: firstly, texts that are relevant to a company 
operating a fleet of 3.5 tonne vans complying with the relevant legislation; secondly, 
literature about the development of driver safety and compliance within a business; thirdly I 
will examine texts that help depict the systems and processes l was influential in installing, 
which in turn will develop understanding in this research of the impact these new 
approaches have had on the business; finally, I will also review work that provides a 
conceptual framework for the group behaviour witnessed in the case study.   This fourth 
area has been carried out by researching innovative methods for changing the behaviour of 
large groups of drivers. 
There are many well documented examples of organisational change ranging from NHS, 
ICI and Jaguar cars for example. 
Having been practically involved in the implementation of organisational change, I can see 
many similarities with my research and the literature published on the subjects. 
I undertook a wide-ranging review of four key themes, reading several publications on each: 
• Fatigue (34) 
• Telematics (29) 
• Influencing (25) 
• Leadership and Organisational change (42) 
Having read extensively the literature linking the four key themes relating to the cycle of 
knowledge, the practical challenge faced when implementing change and development in 
the work place and subsequent methodologies adopted to resolve the situation is replicated 
when implementing processes and polices based on Government reports, Legislation and 
HSE best practice. 
From the eleven authors that have published on the subject of organisational change since 
2012, Bolman (2017), illustrates how leaders often plunge mindlessly forward without 
understanding the real world and (Axelrod and Axelrod, 2017) what happens when 




organisation development consultants take theoretical models to work the next day.  Both 
of these interpretations resonate well with me in the real-world functionality of an 
organisation the size of Tesco.  Other, more established authors that have researched 
organisational change are explored in-depth below. 
2.2 Theories and Frameworks of Organisational Change 
2.2.1 Context, Content and Process 
As discussed in the previous chapter, when I first joined Tesco Dot.com the kind of change 
that I expected to contribute to was predominantly planned and developmental (Iles and 
Sutherland, 2001: 14).  As became evident to me, if not others, the nature of this change 
was harder to predict and plan; it was emergent and episodic as the organisation tended to 
respond in a reactive way to unfolding events relating to driver safety issues (Iles and 
Sutherland, 2001: 14-15). 
There are a plethora of models (and associated literature) for understanding organisational 
change ranging in type, school of thought, and relative degree of rigour (Cameron and 
Green, 2015). Todnem (2013) observed that the literature in this field is, ‘mostly lacking 
empirical evidence and supported by unchallenged hypotheses concerning the nature of 
contemporary organisational change management’ (p.369).  While latterly there has been a 
move to develop more evidence-based models of change (Goetsch and Davis, 2014), often 
the choice of selecting such models will be determined by a range of factors including 
pragmatic ones (Axelrod 1997; Axelrod et al., 2017).  That is to say: which model(s) will 
most effectively help to guide thinking and action in any given, particular situation?  Which 
model(s) will be best suited to achieve my project goals? (Armstrong and Taylor, 2014). 
In order to help me make sense of innovation and change within the dynamic scenario (and 
my changing role within it) found in this case study, I could have chosen a range of models 
that are relevant.  For example, I could have drawn from the fields of total quality 
management, soft systems, complexity theory and organisational development (Iles and 
Sutherland, 2001).  Within my own context, and as a sole research-practitioner constrained 
by the level of resources available to me, I felt that the priority lay in understanding the range 
of pressures and demands being placed on my role and on the multiple priorities competing 
for time within this situation.  This would also be aligned with the kinds of personal and 
professional values I espouse.  I therefore chose to explore the literature relating to two 
relatively well-evidenced ‘broad brush’ models for understanding and managing 
organisational change (Armstrong et al., 2013).  Each focus on a particular level-
organisational or individual at which change occurs, although there is a degree of overlap 
between them.  




These models are as follows: 
• Content, Context and Process Model (CCP) (organisational change) 
• Innovation Research (individual change) 
Looking at the literature bringing to bear two perspectives on different relational levels would 
enable me to deliver on the aims of my project, which was to look at a case relating to 
change both within my company and within me as an agent of that change.  The first model, 
CCP, which originally developed within the business sector several decades ago, seemed 
particularly relevant to my context given that there was a complex set of drivers and 
stakeholders involved, including regulatory and legal drivers as discussed later in this 
chapter.  The model offered a potentially useful perspective for understanding the context 
of Tesco Dot.com, which in some ways was unique, or at least had unique features about 
it, such as the introduction of new technologies and the opening up of a new type of 
technology-mediated consumer delivery.  Much of what I was learning on the job had few if 
any precedents in other sectors and if they did, they needed to be understood within a 
specific context. 
The second model again offered a range of different types of theory, including some of the 
cardinal points of reference in this field such as Rogers’ (1983) work on the diffusion of 
innovations, which I will discuss.  Many of these models are developed from psychology 
and sociology and often interface with business functions such as market research and 
business start-ups (Iles and Sutherland, 2001: 56).  Due to the fact that the innovation in 
question here is still on-going and that its gestation period had been fairly complex, I decided 
to opt also for another relatively recent model by (Van de Ven et al., 2007), which looks at 
innovation as something occurring over time.  In this way innovation is seen as enacting a 
kind of journey whether this is smooth or otherwise, like in this case study as the route had 
some unpredictable as well as predictable destinations and stopping-off points.  Therefore 
Van de Ven et al.,’s  ‘innovation is journey’ metaphor seemed to resonate with my sense of 
life and career forming a kind of trajectory.  In addition, de Ven’s work, like that of others in 
this field, depicts ‘innovation in practice’. This also resonated with what I have learnt 
throughout life and that (to my mind) wisely cautions against the still widespread assumption 
that an innovation journey can be controlled, or at least controlled by managers.  
2.3 Theories of Innovation 
Whilst undertaking my project it has been difficult to find robust, well-evidenced literature 
derived from large organisations.  However, work undertaken by (Andrew Pettigrew et al., 
1991) provides many clear insights into the dilemmas faced by several large organisations 
and their ideas have been tested in the private and public sectors, including the UK National 




Health Service.  In their influential book Managing Change for Competitive Success (1991) 
Pettigrew and Whipp set out three dimensions of change: 
• Content (or the ‘what’-objectives, purpose and goals)  
• Process (or the ‘how’-implementation)  
• Context (or the ‘why’-the internal and external environment)  
 
 
Figure 10 Example of Pettigrew and Whipp's, Managing Change Model, 2005.   
Source: IIes and Cranfield 
When reviewing the literature, I came across a large selection of texts of varying quality 
relating to businesses and organisational change within large companies similar to the work 
carried out by Pettigrew (1985a) and Martin (1992).  In recent years, large-scale 
organisational change  (LSOC)  processes  have become an increasingly popular area of 
investigation in the fields of organisational behaviour and organisation development (for 
example: Boeker, 1997; Bremer, 2012; Buchanan, and Badham, 2008; Burke, Cooper and 
Antoniou 2015; Casway, Deszca and Ingols, 2015; Gersick et al., 1973; Myers, Hulks,  and 
Wiggins, 2012; Grieves, 2010; Poole, Ven, and Dooley, 2000; Senior and Swailes, 2012). 
Despite the prevalence of such investigations, relatively little is understood or agreed on 
about the nature and measurement of LSOC Lewis (2011) and Kezer (2011).   




There are myriad different yet related names and definitions of large-scale change, 
processes such  as: 
• Transformational change 
• Revolutionary change 
• Major change 
• Fundamental change 
• Radical change 
There appears to be a lack of agreement on how to define this type of investigation.  As a 
result, efforts to integrate various change theories and processes, although relatively 
infrequent, have become increasingly desirable (Van de Ven et al., 2000). Therefore, in 
order to formulate a more comprehensive model for examining the phenomenon of change, 
more emphasis on the integration of established approaches seems warranted.  
Traditionally, studies into large organisations have been shaped by the assumption that 
there is a clear beginning and an end to organisational change and development. Therefore, 
such studies are often preoccupied with the intricacies of narrow changes rather than 
holistic and dynamic analysis of an ever-changing bigger picture. In other words, there has 
been a concentration on the micro to the detriment of the meso and macro level. 
Stemming from this common and over-simplistic view of organisational change, achieving 
change requires sometimes massive adjustments to the structure and ethos of inter-
organisational planning and relationships (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990).  The management 
and managerial skills needed to affect such shifts certainly do not fit readily with the concept 
of rational processes and top-down directives and are likely to engage a broader range of 
managerial and people skills.  These skills were lacking at times in the overall spread within 
the company I researched, as I demonstrate more recent authors (Caldwell, Herold and 
Fedor, 2004; Campling and Haigh 1999; Hardy, 1996; Hickman, 2009; Johnson, 1987; 
Kaplan, 2013; Lindsay and Lindsay, 1997; Norman, 1977;  Pfeffer, 1994; Smith, 2016; 
Hickman, 2010; Hardy, 1996; Kaplan, 2013; Johnson, 1987; Caldwell, Herold and Fedor, 
2004) have expressed the view that the idea of process which combines rational, political 
and cultural elements has real power in explaining organisational community and change. 
An example of an organisational change in the workplace is shown in the research 
conducted by Sir John Harvey Jones who was working in the rapidly changing economic 
conditions facing ICI in the late 1970s.  It was in this context that he had to help win support 
for a new company strategy (Pettigrew, 1985, 85b).  During this period Sir John Harvey 
Jones, this time working with BP, reduced the levels of management from fourteen to five.  




This change created a significant improvement in the level of communication within the 
company.  Securing a better understanding of how the environment was changing formed 
a key part of the management of strategic organisational change in private sector settings 
such as Jaguar cars (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991).  This research conducted by Pettigrew 
and Whipp showed a better understanding of how the wider environment is a key part of the 
management of strategic change in the private sector, as demonstrated in their study with 
Jaguar cars and BP, where the overall holistic view of the organisation needed to be taken 
into account.   
Sir Robert Roy Griffiths’ report in 1983 argues that the differences that exist between private 
and public sector organisations have been much overstated; this message was repeated in 
(1991).  Supporting this theory, Ackroyd, Hughes and Soothill (1989) and Merchant (2007) 
argue that public services have sufficient in common to be treated as a relatively 
homogeneous group, both in their management style and typically where managers have 
been recruited from the ranks of professionals from external private companies.  They argue 
that management style and understanding facilitate successful organisational change.  
Neither a company CEO, board nor Government Minister can evoke change without a top-
to-bottom and more importantly bottom-to-top empathetic commitment to change Mintzberg 
(1983). 
The organisational life cycle metaphor used by (Kimberly and Miles, 1980) with the concept 
of organisational ‘stages’ provides another device for understanding change.  However, its 
fatalistic conceptualisation of when the moment of change can occur and how to get people 
on board has been seen as according too little space for the possibility of internal strategic 
choice, revitalisation and turnaround: 
Turnaround management involves taking an organisation that has been buffeted 
by the vagaries of diminished resources and setting it on a new course. With rare 
exception, organisations are turned around only after internal and organisational 
consequences of decline are so pervasive and severe that consensus on the 
need for drastic action has grudgingly emerged (Whetten, 1988 p 13-38). 
Crisis literature, however, suggests that local variability was in part explained by the 
possession of managerial and political resources.  This further leads to such concepts as 
‘turnaround management’ and group revitalisation: 
Crisis literature debates the effect of plunging organisations into unfamiliar 
circumstances, jolts can legitimise unorthodox experiments that revitalise them, 
teach lessons that reacquaint them with their environments, and inspire drama 
celebrating their ideologies (Meyer, 1982: p 515-537). 




Something that resonates clearly with me with regard to the work undertaken over the last 
11 years is the concept of organisational culture (Deal and Kennedy, 2008; Kanter, 1985; 
Pettigrew, 1976, 1979, 1985a; Schein, 1985).  Pettigrew (1982) in particular argues that any 
receptive context for change depends on a supportive organisational culture (see Figure 
11). 
 
Figure 11 Shaping Strategic Change, Pettigrew, 1982.   
Source: Pettigrew. A, Ferlie, E. and McKee, L. 
Mogan (2006) suggests the use of energy as a metaphor for making sense of the concept 
of ‘organisational endeavour’.  He references its scholarly origins in anthropology and 
sociology and suggests its characteristics of elasticity.   
In a similar vein (Quinn et al.,1997) take an ironical view of how the concept has been 
exploited and sometimes misrepresented ‘on the management scene’ as arriving, ‘like a 
typhoon blowing in from the Far East’ (pp. 531-551). This concept relates closely to 
corporate interest since the late 1980s Morgan (2006) in the cross-cultural comparisons 
between Japanese and Western cultures. 
 




2.4 Rogers’s Diffusion of Innovations  
2.4.1 Diffusion 
Innovation research is an established field in its own right.  It explores the propensity of 
individuals towards change and implementing new ideas, products or processes and 
suggested that these inclinations differ.  Here I focus on only one model and definition of 
diffusion, perhaps the most cited, propounded by Rogers in 1981. A seminal definition of 
diffusion is clearly given in the book Diffusion of Innovations (1981) by Everett Rogers where 
he states: 
Diffusion is the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain 
channels over time among the members of a social system.  It is a special 
telecommunication, in that the messages are concerned with new ideas.  
Communication is a process in which participants create and share information with one 
another in order to reach a mutual understanding.  This diffusion implies that 
communication is the process of convergence or divergence as two or more individuals 
exchange information in order to move towards each other or part in the meanings that 
they give to certain events (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981: p 386). 
Pettigrew and Whipp’s model explore the social and cultural factors involved in facilitating 
or hindering change (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993).  By contrast the unit of analysis in 
Rogers’s work is the individual or individual unit/organisation.  Rogers also pays 
comparatively more attention to the characteristics of the innovation itself. 
2.4.2 Properties of Diffusion 
Rogers found that there are a number of properties of an innovation, particularly a 
technological innovation, which are likely to promote its success.  These are: 
1) Relative advantage: the degree to which it is perceived to be better than the 
existing technology – ‘is it better than what we have already?’ 
2) Compatibility: the perceived ‘fit’ of the innovation with existing structures, 
procedures and values – ‘can we introduce it without causing too many problems 
for the status quo?’ 
3) Complexity: the degree of difficulty involved in learning about and putting into 
practice the innovation – ‘can I learn how to use it quickly and easily?’ 




4) Relatability: the extent to which an innovation can be tried by potential adopters 
without significant investment of time or resources – ‘will it take a lot of time and 
effort to put into practice, outweighing the benefits?’ 
5) Observability: ‘the degree to which outcomes resulting from the adoption of an 
innovation are visible – ‘can we show to all concerned that it works?’ 
Systematic evaluation of Rogers, five factors have shown that complexity, together with 
relative advantage and compatibility, are the three attributes which statistically show a 
significant correlation with adoption (Kapoor et al., 2014). 
We know that according to Rogers decisions about an innovation are usually either derived 
from collective working (group consensus, many people) or authority (top down, few 
individuals). Within an organisation certain individual who drive through the innovation are 
termed 'champions' who may or may not exercise authority or power. Champions seek to 
establish a 'critical mass' for the innovation ('I'll do it because everyone is doing it'). A 
limitation of Rogers' model, however, is that it assumes innovations are positive and merit 
adoption and that champions are beneficent: they may well become saboteurs down the 
line if they object to others implementing their ideas in ways they do not like. Moreover, not 
all resistance to change is necessarily irrational.  Rogers has also been criticised for not 
adequately addressing the complex cultural and other organisational dynamics which can 
affect the implementation of an innovation. Models such as Van De Ven take a more 
nuanced view of these factors. 
2.4.3 Van De Ven’s Process Models  
As mentioned above, the Pettrigrew and Whipp (1993) model is concerned with more of a 
wider organisational and cross-organisational focus, whereas Rogers (1981) concentrates 
on the individual unit or organisation as his point of enquiry.  Rogers’s work also focuses 
attention on the initial stages of innovation and its implementation and adoption (Van de 
Ven and Rogers, 1988).  Latterly, researchers interested in the processes of innovation 
have explored different ways in which the innovation ‘journey’ can be conceptualised as 
something unfolding over time with varying degrees of predictability depending on a number 
of factors Van de Ven (1993).  These include scale (the size of the unit of change or 
innovation) and the type of implementation strategy used (its mode). Van De Ven (2007), 
one of the most widely cited authorities in the field of innovation studies applying this 
processual lens has observed that: 
  




A common set of issues are encountered while the innovation journey unfolds in the 
development of a wide variety of new technologies, products, programme and services.   
These issues challenge the belief that managers or entrepreneurs can increase their 
odds of success by developing and practising skills in learning, leading, relating and 
cycling through the innovation journey (p. 39). 
 
Figure 12 Van De Ven's Process Theories of Organisational Development and Change, 
1988.  Source: Van de Ven 
The above Figure 12 summarises four main types of theory of organisational development 
and change. Arrows and lines represent likely sequences among events, not causation 
between events.  It shows two analytical dimensions that are useful for classifying 
developmental progressions in the four ideal-type process theories: the unit and mode of 
change.  The categories ‘life-cycle’, ‘teleology’, ‘dialectical’ and ‘evolution’ provide four 
internally consistent accounts of change processes in organisational entities. Where and 
when do these theories apply as explanations for the development of organisational 
entities?  To address this question, it is useful to emphasize four distinguishing 
characteristics in the preceding discussion of the four theories.  In each theory: (a) process 
is viewed as a different cycle of change events, (b) which is governed by a different "motor" 
or generating mechanism that (c) operates on a different unit of analysis and (d) represents 
a different mode of change.  Figure 12 provides a metatheoretical scheme for illustrating 
and distinguishing the four ideal-type theories in terms of these four characteristics.  I will 
now discuss these distinguishing characteristics.  




2.4.4 Cycles and Motors of Change  
As the cells of Figure 12 illustrate, in each theory the process of development is viewed as 
unfolding in a fundamentally different progression of change events and is governed by a 
different motor:  
1) A life-cycle model depicts the process of change in its entity as it progresses through 
a necessary sequence of stages.  An institutional, natural, or logical programme 
prescribes the specific contents of these stages. 
2) A teleological model views development as a cycle of goal formulation, 
implementation, evaluation, and modification. This sequence is based on adaption in 
response to learning.  It emerges through purposeful social construction among 
individuals within the organisation or entity.  
3) In dialectical models of development, conflicts emerge between entities (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995). Through this conflict, in which both parties produce opposing views 
or actions that respond to one another, the creation of a third way, or a synthesis, 
occurs. This synthesis then becomes the thesis for the next round of dialectical 
generation.   
4) An evolutionary model of development consists of a repetitive sequence of variation, 
selection and retention events among entities in a designated population. Competition 
for scarce environmental resources between entities inhabiting a population 
generates this evolutionary cycle. 
There was a certain sense of commonality found in Van De Ven’s work where, he claims, it 
changes the commonplace view that managers can control the innovation process and that 
they are solely responsible for its success.  Instead, the finding suggests that innovation 
managers should be held accountable for increasing the odds of success by developing 
and practising skills in learning, leading, relating and cycling through the journey of 
innovation Milgram (2009). 
In his work, Van De Ven draws some interesting conclusions and parallels that I have found 
myself when working within Tesco Dot.com.  For example, he comments that some of the 
gestating events are sufficiently large to shock certain attentive entrepreneurs into launching 
an innovative venture by developing a proposal for obtaining funding.  Ocado would be a 
good example of this as the UK’s first online-only grocery home delivery service. 
In Van De Ven’s model, soon after work begins in the development of the proposed venture, 
the process proliferates into a diversion cycle exploring new directions.  This changes goals, 
allows for learning by discovery, raises holistic leadership and builds new relationships.  I 




recognise this series of actions from my work over the course of the last 11 years in which 
a huge innovation journey has taken place in response to the magnificent strides in 
technology and working practices that have developed and become second nature within 
the business, (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). 
A metaphor used in Van De Ven’s work is helpful in suggesting ways to increase the odds 
of manoeuvring the innovation journey from concept to implementation.  He describes taking 
on innovation like entering an uncharted river; most people cling to the riverbank, afraid to 
let go and risk being carried along by the river’s current.  At a certain point, some people 
are willing to jump in and trust that they can manoeuvre the river.  Whilst going with the flow 
of the water’s current, they begin to look ahead and guide their own course onwards, 
deciding which route looks best, steering round boulders and snags, and choosing which of 
the many channels and branches of the river they prefer to follow.  Because some have 
developed skills and practice traversing various river currents, falls and obstructions, they 
manoeuvre the river more adeptly than others who have not learned to swim well. While this 
increases their odds of success, one ultimately cannot control the river O’Reilly (2005). 
2.5 Management Styles 
There is a vast quantity of literature focusing on management styles and I will be 
concentrating on two areas mentioned in the previous chapter: innovation and change. 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1993) provide a way of understanding the impact of leadership at the 
organisational and strategic level when managing change. They write: 
Leading change moves the organisation forward; create the right climate for change; 
coordinating activities; steering. Set the agenda not only for the direction of the change, 
but also for the right vision and values p 65-76. 
Meanwhile, Rogers (2003) depicts leadership and influence at the individual level from 
within the context of leading innovation (Miles, 1975; Pfeffer, 1992).  Leading Innovation is 
an application-oriented learning experience in which participants learn how to use their 
natural leadership abilities and characteristics to encourage and drive bottom-up innovation 
(Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee, 1992), so that there is room for ideas and personal growth 
across the organisation, while once a direction of innovation has been decided upon, then 
people are led through it in a top-down approach (Adair, 2008; Brown and Posner, 2001). 
These main themes of leadership run parallel throughout my project (Hannagan, 2001).  
Pettigrew and Whipp (1993) have established that leadership is critical to initiating and 
sustaining change (Hall and Barrett, 2007).    Leaders do this by creating a receptive climate 
or context (Goffin and Mitchell, 2016), coordinating activities, steering the change and 




helping the organisation clarify its vision and values (Fisher and Patton, 2011). Change 
management is improved by developing managers' leadership styles and engagement with 
other staff and stakeholders. (Van de Ven et al., 2000; Scott, 2015), this helps form the 
structure of the organisation as it reorients (Lawrence, Lenk and Quinn, 2009). 
Rogers (1981) gives a clear insight when looking at the micro-practices of leadership.  He 
points to the importance of certain individuals and their roles and behaviours in the 
innovation process.  Key to the process are opinion leaders (Bass and Stogdill, 1990).  
These are the people whose opinion exerts most influence on colleagues' predisposition to 
embrace or resist an innovation (Bjugstad et al., 2006).  Opinion leaders are not necessarily 
the ones with formal power (though they often are) who suggest the innovation or who lead 
it, Fletcher (2004), but their acceptance must be won if the rest of the organisation is to go 
along with the adaptation (Kimberley and Miles, 1980).  Other key individuals are the 
advocates or champions of change who drive forward the thinking or the early 
implementation process (Guba and Lincoln, 2016; Hickman, 2009).  If successful in gaining 
the support of opinion leaders and in convincing others, they help build up a critical mass 
and then ideally (Bugajska et al., 2011), they back out and leave the late implementation to 
others (Iles and Sutherland, 2001). 
My study focuses on the early to middle implementation stages of the innovation process, 
as I did not get to the stage where the innovation was embedded Albrecht (2006). Some of 
the reasons for this were technical/resource issues, but other reasons were due to human 
behaviour, including the leadership buy-in and the role of opinion formers (Kouzes and 
Posner, 2006, 1995).  Change management is improved by developing managers' 
leadership styles and engagement with other staff and stakeholders (Bass and Stogdill, 
1990).  Of particular relevance in the current context are the concepts of laissez-faire, 
democratic and autocratic models of leadership Lewin (1939) and transformational 
leadership (Bass and Riggio, 2006). Autocratic leaders take decisions by themselves 
without consulting the team (Cameron, Sutton and Whetten, 1988). They impose these 
decisions and demand obedience. Democratic leaders assume an active role in decision-
making but will involve team members (Eagly and Johannesen‐Schmidt, 2001), although 
they will accept responsibility for ensuring decisions are implemented and that intended 
outcomes are achieved. Laissez-faire leaders take very little involvement in decision-making, 
leaving this to others Martin (1992). They rely on the team’s motivation and capabilities to 
get the work done (Kouzes and Posner, 2006, 1995).   While each style may have its 
strengths and limitations depending on context (Cummings and Worley, 2008), the 
preference in modern market and service-oriented organisations is for the democratic model 
as it is more likely to encourage openness and a culture of empowerment and achievement 




Kasper (2002). Since the 1970s there has been increasing interest in the notion of 
transformational leadership (Bass and Riggio, 2006) which focuses on blending these and 
other approaches to develop the leader-follower relationship in ways that foster improved 
morale and higher levels of motivation through communicating a shared vision (Sarros and 
Santora, 2001). 
2.6 Research on Driver Safety 
2.6.1 Overview of Road Transport Growth 
In recent years, road traffic crashes (RTCs) have been a growing global problem according 
to the World Health Organisation (Time for Action, 2009).  Over 1.2 million people die each 
year on the world’s roads and between 20 and 50 million suffer non-fatal injuries.  In most 
regions of the world this epidemic of road traffic injuries is still increasing.  Although the UK 
has historically enjoyed an overall good road safety record, there was an underlying concern 
within industry, road safety organisations and the Department of Transport that the current 
situation required action to prevent an escalation of road-related death and injury (Yin and 
Nie, 1993).  A report was commissioned by the Department of Transport and delivered to 
the British Government Dykes (2001).  Its findings were clear: at-work road death and injury 
were rising and in response to this control measures would need to be found and 
implemented.  
Dykes’ (2001) report stated that in that year 320,283 people were involved in road traffic 
incidents.  Just over 3,400 individuals were killed and nearly 40,000 injured.  In 2000 the 
UK Government had published a report Road Safety Strategy Tomorrow’s Roads: safer for 
everyone.  In this document, the Government produced a group of ten-year targets, which 
include a 40% reduction in the number of people killed or seriously injured in road accidents; 
a 50% reduction in the number of children killed or seriously injured; and a 10% reduction 
in the slight casualty rate.  More up-to-date statistics show in 2012 that 1,774 were killed 
and 23,039 were seriously injured.  This shows that the Government is on target to reach 
its goals set out in 2000 with a 52% and 57% improvement respectively. 
Road accidents sustained at work represent between 20% and 40% (WHO, 2014) of work 
fatalities in most industrialised countries, yet little data on occupational road accident risk 
factors have been published (Fort et al., 2010).  Road crashes are now the most common 
cause of work-related serious injury (a life-changing event), death and absence in the UK.   
According to the UK Trades Union Congress (TUC, 2004), traffic collisions while at work 
are the single biggest cause of employment-related fatality in the UK.  The TUC quote 
statistics that show the annual cost of workers killed or injured on the roads is £3.5 billion.  




In 2012 the estimated cost of welfare as a result of road traffic accidents was £15.1 billion 
(DfT Reported Road Casualties Great Britain 2012, Road traffic statistics).  
2.6.2 Driver Fatigue  
It is estimated that the total value of preventable reported road accidents in 2014 was 
(estimated to be) £16.3 billion, statistics from (HSE, 2014), an increase of 11 per cent 
compared with the same estimate made in 2013 (not considering inflation) (DfT, 2014).  This 
sum encompasses all aspects of the valuation of casualties, including the human costs, 
which reflect pain, grief and suffering; the direct economic costs of lost output and the 
medical costs associated with road accident injuries (Danna and Griffin, 1999).  The figure 
includes an estimate of the cost of damage-only accidents but does not allow for unreported 
accidents (DfT, (2014: p 6). 
Research conducted by the charity Brake (No date) states that fatigue is a major contributory 
factor to crashes in the UK, with too little sleep radically affecting driver attention, awareness, 
reaction time and ability to control the vehicle (Allen, Piecyk and Piotrowska, 2016).  Yet in 
2015, government figures recorded fatigue as a contributory factor in just 4% of road 
fatalities and 2% of all road casualties (Chai et al., 2017).  However, these figures are 
believed to be a very significant under-estimation because fatigue is hard to spot; unlike 
alcohol and drugs, police cannot test for tiredness (Gastaldi, Rossi and Gecchele, 2014).  In 
fact, research commissioned by the Department for Transport in 2008 found one in six 
crashes resulting in death and injury on motorways and A roads were fatigue related (DfT, 
2008, 2009). 
Crashes caused by drivers falling asleep typically involve vehicles running off the road or 
into the back of another vehicle (Alaiakbari and Moridpour, 2017; Stutts et al., 2003). They 
tend to be high-speed crashes, because drivers do not brake before crashing, so the risk of 
death or serious injury is high (Stasi et al., 2012).  Even if tired drivers do not fall asleep, 
they still pose a danger and research suggests driving tired can be as dangerous as drink 
driving (Wylie et al., 1996). There has been significant research conducted regarding driver 
fatigue, although the majority of these investigations have been carried out on long distant 
lorry drivers (Brodie, Lyndal and Elias, 2009; Broughton et al., 2003).  Despite the fact that 
the haulage industry is heavily regulated, unlike the vans used in companies such as Tesco 
Dot.com, there are clear similarities that can be established (Lal and Craig, 2001).  It is 
crucial to consider this data since driver fatigue causes thousands of road accidents each 
year (Wolińska et al., 2017; Shi, Tang and Wang, 2017).  




Sleepiness reduces reaction time (Owen, King and Lamb, 2015), a critical element of safe 
driving (Phillips, 2015).  It also reduces vigilance, alertness and concentration so that the 
ability to perform attention-based activities (such as driving) is impaired (Zhang, Wang and 
Fu, 2014).  The speed at which information is processed is also reduced when tired 
(Strahan, Watson and Lennonb, 2008).   
The quality of decision-making may also be affected.  Literature on this topic can be divided 
into several main groups: 
• Excessive hours 
• Lifestyle 
• Drink and drugs 
It is not possible to calculate the exact number of sleep-related accidents, but research 
shows that driver fatigue may be a contributory factor in up to 20% of all road accidents and 
up to one quarter of fatal and serious accidents (Thiffault and Bergeron, 2003).  These types 
of crashes are about 50% more likely to result in death or serious injury, as they tend to be 
as a result of high-speed impacts because a driver who has fallen asleep cannot brake or 
swerve to avoid or reduce the impact (Bass and Riggio, 2006).  It is clear that drivers are 
aware when they are feeling sleepy and so make a conscious decision about whether to 
continue driving or to stop for a rest (Gharagozlou et al., 2015).  It may be that those who 
persist underestimate the risk of actually falling asleep while driving.  Or it may be that some 
drivers choose to ignore the risks (in the way that drink drivers do) (Li et al., 2017). Crashes 
caused by tired drivers are most likely to happen Brake (2015): 
• on long journeys taking place on monotonous roads such as motorways 
• between 2am and 6am 
• between 2pm and 4pm (especially after eating or taking even one alcoholic drink) 
• after having less sleep than normal 
• after drinking alcohol 
• if taking medicines that cause drowsiness after long working hours or on journeys 
home after long shifts, especially night shifts 
  




Furthermore, research carried out by Massimiliano (2013) concluded that: 
According to the sub-categorization of the fatigue concept of (May and Baldwin, 2009), 
this paper examines the passive task-related (TR) effects of highway driving. The main 
aim of the study is to evaluate the separate relative importance of each effect in the 
fatigued state. 
The analysis is based on results from driving simulator experiments (conducted at the 
Transportation Laboratory, University of Padova), widely adopted in recent years for this 
kind of study. The aim of the research is better comprehension of driving fatigue 
phenomena, which can affect methods and/or equipment intended to reduce the risk of 
accidents and to enhance driving safety p 218-224. 
I found that the results of the Gastaldi Massimiliano study mirrored some of the common 
problems emanating from the effects of fatigue found within my own company. 
 
 
Figure 13  ‘found in my company as illustrated in the flow chart model (figure 13) of driver 
fatigue of (May and Baldwin 2009) included in the study’. 
In an Australian study Murry (2003) of fatigue involvement in work and non-work-related 
road traffic casualty crashes found that heavy and light trucks were likely to be involved in 
fatigue-related crashes. Work-related fatigue-involved crashes tended to occur around 
dawn whereas work related non-fatigue crashes occurred in peak hour traffic. 
  




Research undertaken in some EU member states indicates that driver fatigue is a significant 
factor in approximately 20% of heavy commercial transport crashes Phillips (2015).  The 
results from various surveys carried out at different times, show over 50% of long-haul 
drivers have at some time fallen asleep at the wheel (Mittal et al., 2016).  One of the most 
important findings concerning the causes of all fatigue-related crashes is that peak levels 
at night are often ten times higher than daytime levels (Barr, Popkin and Howarth, 2009).  
French research into lorry driver working times and habits showed that risk levels vary with 
three key factors as regards the general problem of fatigue (HSE, 2002).  These are that 
there is an increased risk of crashes: at night (see also the Polish study by Zużewicz and 
Konarska (2011)), the greater the length of the working day, and also with irregular working 
hours.  They found insomnia most often occurs in truck drivers, drivers older than 35 and 
those with a BMI above 28.  Only every third driver had one full-time job, but the number of 
work hours of drivers has no influence on insomnia and daytime sleepiness (Alsibai and 
Manap, 2016).  Drivers with insomnia more frequently pose a threat to road traffic, whereas 
daytime sleepiness does not result in respondents posing the same threat Banks (2008).  
Drinking coffee has no impact on insomnia and daytime sleepiness, but this may be the 
result of the number of cups respondents drink during the day (Stasi et al., 2012).  
Experiments by (Lenné, Triggs and Redman, 1997) conducted in the early afternoon 
revealed that these variables reached higher values than those in the morning (circadian 
rhythm effect).  An Australian study (Murray et al., 2003) of fatigue involvement in work and 
non-work-related road traffic casualty crashes adds detail to this information, as they found 
that work-related, fatigue-involved crashes tended to occur around dawn whereas work-
related, non-fatigue crashes occurred in peak hour traffic (Boufous and Williamson, 2006).  
Finally, according to previous studies, as the duration of a driving task increases, driving 
performance decreases (Otmani et al., 2005; Thiffault and Bergeron, 2003) and a peak in 
driving impairment occurs between 20 and 30 minutes of driving (Thiffault and Bergeron, 
2003). These findings suggest that a proposed simulator design can reproduce the onset 
of the driver fatigue phenomenon and how it first manifests itself.  A general examination 
of the results can be made by highlighting some main findings common to the response 
variables (Filtness and Naweed, 2017).  The results are clear-cut and support several 
hypotheses regarding the concept of driver fatigue Yin (2009).  The results concerning 
effects produced by the monotony of the environment are also interesting. Although the 
influence on the response variables of a monotonous environment was not statistically 
significant, from a qualitative point of view, the differences between driving performance 
observed in the ‘varied’ and ‘monotonous’ conditions show that environmental stimuli can 
interfere with driver alertness (Walker, Richardson and Green, 2000).  This is a problem 
that at this point must be addressed in greater depth.  




As expected, in the afternoon driving through a monotonous environment impairs 
performance in comparison with driving through a varied environment; in the morning, the 
opposite occurs (Box and Bayliss, 2012).  This is explained by assuming that in the 
morning, when the circadian effect is absent, a varied environment may distract drivers.  
However, this effect, not supported by statistical analysis, needs to be further analysed in 
future research (BBC News, 2007). Developments should include better definition of the 
level of monotony or variety in the environment (Fletcher, Petersson and Zelinsky, 2005; 
Zhao et al., 2012) and deeper analysis of drivers’ characteristics, including age, gender 
and driving style (Taubman-Ben-Ari, Mikulincer and Gillath, 2004). 
2.7 Van Driving: The Odd Man Out 
The road haulage industry in the UK is closely monitored and controlled by both EU and UK 
driving regulations referring to all large goods vehicles weighing over 3.5 tonnes.  When 
operating a vehicle of this weight, the company and a nominated individual are beholden to 
the Traffic Commissioner and the Operator’s Licence (Driver Vehicle Services Agency, 
2006).  However, the industry of operating this licence clearly states driving and rest times 
applicable to the driver and the required behaviour of the transport company. 
Light vans in the UK (2.2 to 3.5 tonnes) are regulated under UK domestic driving hours, 
which state shift lengths, imply best practice and are rarely enforced.  A van driver can 
potentially drive as many hours as they like.  As a consequence of the rapid expansion of 
internet shopping in the UK over the last 15 years, goods purchased are being delivered 
predominantly via light van fleets that have grown in number by 53% during this period.  At 
present, there are approximately 4 million vans on UK roads supporting an industry with a 
turnover of £215 billion, contributing £35 billion to the economy.  When you superimpose 
the fact that this rapid expansion has taken place within a largely unregulated industry, a 
prognostication can be made that the expansion of van use will inevitably fuel an escalation 
in road death and injury to both the workforce and the general population.  
2.8 Driver Safety Behaviour 
Road casualty statistics in the UK show that a large proportion of road casualties are 
accounted for by people who are in some way driving for work, so interventions to improve 
work-related road risk (WRRR) could have considerable impact and have been taken very 
seriously within Tesco Dot.com. 
I am aware that there are many different forms that interventions focused on WRRR can 
take.  Although there are many providers who can carry out this activity, there is a lack of 
understanding about which interventions are the most effective and to what degree.  




Following extensive searches, I am aware of 63 studies between 1999 and 2011.  The main 
areas covered in this research are: 
• Driver training 
• Group discussions 
• Incentive schemes 
• Publicity 
• In-vehicle recorders (Telematics and CCTV) 
• Organisational approaches 
2.8.1 Driver Training 
Traditionally, the first and often the only line of defence when attempting to reduce fleet 
driver accidents has been through practical in-vehicle driver training.  Driver training has 
proved to be one of the most contentious topics in road safety for well over half a century. 
A recent Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) review concluded that there was no 
evidence that pre-licence training had any measurable effect on crash risk, and many of the 
reports of the effectiveness of post-licence training are largely anecdotal. 
2.8.2 Group Discussions 
One method that has aimed to raise safety consciousness and thereby bring about 
behavioural change is the use of group discussions and workshops among employees. This 
method has not been widely used as a WRRR intervention but is one that would seem to 
offer promise.  
2.8.3 Incentives  
The road traffic system operates largely on the principle that bad behaviour should be 
punished, but good behaviour goes unrewarded.  The corporate fleet environment is one 
where there is the possibility of redressing this balance and many studies have been carried 
out to look at the effects of incentives or rewards on driver behaviour and accident rates 
(Reason et al., 2001).  
2.8.4 Publicity  
A review of US work covered a range of procedures, such as promise cards, performance 
feedback, pledge cards and safety reminders.  However, there is no hard evidence in the 
literature that the interventions described above are effective in improving WRRR.   




2.8.5 In-Vehicle Data Recorders (IVDRs) or Telematics 
The traditional solution for improving driver behaviour has been to have one-to-one 
coaching.  This method is effective at the time but there is usuallly a marked drop-off in the 
driver’s ability after a few months and it is also extremely expensive.  A more contemporary, 
cheaper and more consistent method of improving and mantaining driver behaviour is via 
the use of telematics.  Telematics is a device that monitors the driver’s activities such as the 
timestamp of their driving and the speed at which they are travelling.  Telematics also stores 
the situation, for example, when the driver applies the brake etc.. Having this data available 
if a vehicle undergoes any accident provides detailed information so that a forensic team is 
able to get a much clearer understanding of what happened during the incident. The use of 
telematics at Tesco Dot.com has been revolutionary in the context of monitoring driver 
behaviour and route planning.  The data collected is structured in a standard format based 
on: speed, acceleration, braking and cornering. 
In-vehicle data recording systems have come into widespread use in recent times in 
occupational settings.  They were widely referred to originally as ‘black boxes’, partly 
because the early versions were quite large, but mainly because the original use, as in 
aircraft, was to collect data in the period immediately before a crash.  When it comes to hard 
evidence, the picture is a familiar one of potential not being recognised.  The opportunity to 
collect and use real-time data in real-world situations should not be lightly dismissed. 
For automobile insurance firms, telemetric analysis represents a valuable and growing way 
to identify the risk associated with each driver (Baecke and Bocca, 2017).  The pricing 
decisions of an insurer are best accounted for if they are made considering behaviour 
instead of traditional measures such as the driver’s gender and age, place of residence and 
car model to set the premiums offered.  These traditional criteria provide a fairly low 
predictability of the risks taken by a driver while on the road. As a consequence, the interest 
in insurance telematics, i.e. usage-based automotive insurance where data on driving 
behaviour is collected by means of telecommunication, has grown at a rapid pace during 
the last few years.  The total subscriber base is expected to reach 85.5 million by 2018.  
Decisions made on such factors can eventually lead to increased premium or reduced 
liability for unsafe or reckless drivers and can also help in transitioning the burden to the 
policies that lead to increased liability (Golias, Yannis and Antoniou, 2002).  
As of yet, the largest market participants have collected data by the use of in-vehicle sensors 
accessed through an on-board diagnostics port.  Recently, however, several insurers and 
telematics service providers have started looking towards smartphone-based solutions.  
Thanks to the large number of embedded sensors, smartphones are able to provide insurers 




with rich driving data.  Collecting data by the use of smartphones is also generally cheaper 
and less logistically demanding than using vehicle-based sensors.  In addition, smartphones 
have proven to be excellent platforms for providing the user with driving feedback and 
allowing for advanced user interaction.  This is expected to increase both overall driver 




Figure 14  An example of how Telematics work 
San Jose State University carried out a study; the dataset provided for their project by AXA 
has 50,000 trips from anonymized drivers.  A small and varied number of false trips (taken 
by someone other than the driver being studied) were attributed to each driver Green (2004).  
The goal of the project was to try and understand different driving signatures so as to be 
able to identify trips that were not made by the driver being studied.  This would show 
whether patterns and probable driving styles can be charted.   
There are numerous predictions concerning how integrated telematic systems will become 
in the motor vehicle market (Cole and Londal, 2000; Richardson and Green, 2000; Green, 
Flynn, Vanderhagen, Ziomek, Ullman, and Mayer, 2001; Frost and Sullivan, 2002).  
Although such predictions tend to be a bit optimistic, widespread use of telematics is already 
taking place.  Telematics can have significant benefits, allowing drivers to make better use 
of their time and to support driving in a variety of ways.  However the concern is that some 
tasks when performed under pressure can pose a significant risk to drivers and other road 
users.  There is a growing body of evidence that the use of telematics is associated with 
crashes.  For several years the National Police Agency of Japan has been reporting data 
on crashes associated with navigation systems (Diabat and Govindan, 2011). The National 




Police Agency statistics are interesting because they specifically identify phone and 
navigation systems as causal or contributing factors in crashes, a connection that is made 
apparent by the narratives provided by the drivers involved in these crashes.  Drivers might 
say something such as, ‘I started to enter information into the navigation system and was 
looking at the display.  When I looked up, Mr. ***’s car was in front of me and I could not 
avoid it.  I do not know how I got so close to his car’.   
Other evidence comes from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
research (Wang, Knipling and Goodman, 1996), several studies by Jane Stutts at North 
Carolina (Stutts, Reinfurt, and Rodgman, 2001; Stutts, et al., 2003); Stutts and Hunter, 
2003), recent UMTRI research as part of the SAVE-IT project (Eby and Kostyniuk, 2003; 
Thulin and Gustafsson, 2004).  Surprisingly, distraction-related crashes tend to be relatively 
more likely during the daytime, in good weather conditions that are usually favourable to 
safe driving.  When compared with all other crashes in which the driver is not impaired by 
alcohol or fatigue, rear-end collisions of all types tend to be much more common.  To sum 
up, the crash literature makes three key points:  
1) Telematics can be a contributing factor to crash levels.  
2) In crashes where telematics use is a contributing factor, drivers become so 
engrossed in the in-vehicle task that they lose sight of the driving task.  
3) Crashes associated with telematics use are relatively more likely to occur in benign 
conditions (in good weather on good roads).    
2.8.6 Organisational Approaches 
All previous interventions have been concerned directly with change at the employee level 
in an organisation.  A recent major shift in research emphasis has been from placing 
emphasis on how individuals respond to interventions, to how the wider organisation as a 
whole plans interventions (Iles and Cranfield, 2004).  
2.9 Methodological Issues  
One obvious feature of changing practices in the last decade has been the shift from single 
to multiple interventions, in which organisations are encouraged to adopt ‘proactive multiple-
strategy approaches’, which have been very successful within Tesco Dot.com.  Such 
strategies, however, inevitably lead to methodological problems when it comes to 
researching the benefit of multiple interventions as it becomes impossible to distinguish the 
unique impact of initiatives when they are implemented in combination with others.  This 
reinforces the advantage of my approach as an inside research practitioner who is able to 
analyse the situation but can understand its various aspects through embedded knowledge.  




Another research trend in the last decade is concerned with the investigation of attitudinal 
and behavioural factors associated with crashes.  The rationale for this activity is that if it 
can be shown that self-reporting measures are predictive of crash involvement, then they 
would provide a richer and more informative outcome measure than the mere counting of 
crash frequencies.  There are many inherent problems with this approach, and it has 
achieved only limited success to date.  A realistic assessment should be that the prospect 
for developing proxy measures for fleet accidents at present looks challenging. 
Since 1999, there have been six independent reviews of the literature; all six experienced 
difficulty in finding well-controlled evaluation studies.  If one adopts the not unreasonable 
criterion that an evaluation study should assess whether an intervention has brought about 
a statistically reliable change in crash rates, then the results are meagre in the extreme.  
Only four interventions met this criterion, three were in the same investigation, and all were 
conducted more than a decade ago.  
2.10 Accident Rates Amongst Van Drivers 
Incident data in relation to Light Commercial Vehicles (LCVs) is limited (European 
Parliament, 2009) and information that is available is held in STATS19, the UK’s database 
of reported incidents.  A limitation of STATS19 is that it only holds details on incidents that 
were reported to the police.  Incidents involving vans have reduced both in number (down 
29%) and the rate per billion miles driven (down 42%), despite the number of vans 
registered increasing over the same period up 29% (RAC). 
 
Figure 15  UK Van and Light commercial fatal road accidents statistics, 2016.   
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Figure 16  UK Van and Light Commercial Fatal Road Accident Statistics, 2016.   
Source: Department for Transport 
2.11 The Impact of Overweight Vehicles on Safety 
Despite the high standards of some company-owned van fleets, vans as a road user group 
suffer from a lack of legal compliance.  From drivers, vehicle owners and managers, 
statistics show that there is overall a poor understanding of individual and collective 
responsibility.  The Driver Vehicle and Standards Agency (DVSA) operates a targeted 
approach to all its vehicle enforcement, including checking vehicles for being overweight.  
Vans stopped by (DVSA, 2015) show an 89% overloading rate and 50% of vans suffer a 
first-time MoT failure rate. 
It is incumbent upon those running van fleets to protect the public safety and to fulfil their 
duty-of-care obligations to their employees.  As we have seen in this chapter, driving is often 
the biggest work-related risk that their employees face.  To put this in context, police officers 
and firefighters in the UK are less likely to die in the line of duty than they are on their journey 
to work each morning.  This road risk extends, of course, to all road users, whether 
professional drivers or not.  By training those who drive for work in roadworthiness and safe-
driving practice, employers extend that greater safety into the wider community. 
Van overloading is a concern, possibly caused by the lack of regulatory controls and low 
cost of entry to van operations (TfL, 2007).  Roadside checks show that vans are regularly 
overloaded and official data suggests that a concerning proportion of vans are not well 
maintained (Brake, n.d.). These can be important factors that lead to accidents (Poznan 
School of Logistics, 2010). 
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2.11.1 Definition of a Van 
Although the British Government is clear in the definition of the various categories of 
vehicles through taxation and operational law, these definitions are further complicated by 
the various industry groups that operate and work with vans.  This makes the investigation 
of van data and activities particularly difficult to investigate. 
2.11.2 DVLA’s Vehicle Body Types Definition  
DVLA records a body type for each registered vehicle.  These body types relate to the 
physical construction of the vehicle, but not the way in which it is currently being used (FTA, 
2015-16).  For the purposes of this project, a van is defined as a vehicle dedicated to moving 
freight or providing a non-passenger service that weighs no more than 3.5 tonnes (gross 
vehicle weight). 
2.11.3 Legal and Regulatory Contexts 
There are several main streams of legislation or government policy enforced by the HSE 
that impact a van fleet that operates under a 3.5 tonne weight limit, i.e. a Light Commercial 
Vehicle (LCV).  The problem with this legislation is that it refers to ‘driving hours’ as well as 
time working and time on duty.  Unfortunately, a 3.5 tonne LCV does not have to be fitted 
with a tachograph device, like in larger vehicles, that would record driving time and other 
driving-related activity.  This lack of information on actual driving time, amalgamated with 
HSE recommendations and existing Tesco policies, has created a complex situation and 
continued the toxic mix of overlapping rules and regulations affecting a management team 
with little or no knowledge of the needs of an LCV logistics operation. 
A fundamental portion of the legislation that an LCV fleet is free from is due to the fact that 
drivers do not have to hold an ‘Tacho card’ controlled and implemented by the Traffic 
Commissioner’s office.  Although we are not covered by this area of legislation that would 
directly control and affect a distribution operation using vehicles over 3.5 tonnes, it is the 
lack of clarity furnished by operator’s licence confines that leaves a van operation effectively 
out of scope from the DVSA and lacking clear and effective controls. 
The legislation that does cover an LCV fleet is GB Domestic Driving Rules.  




2.11.4 The 2016 Health and Safety Sentencing Guidelines: How Have 
Things Changed for Companies? 
On 1 February 2016, the new sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences came 
into force.  They direct the courts to consider sentencing offending organisations via a 
step-by-step approach.  This primarily examines culpability, the seriousness of harm 
risked and the likelihood of harm, which is divided into a number of different scales within 
various categories.  In light of a number of preceding Court of Appeal judgments 
expressing the same view, the guidelines then require an assessment of turnover in order 
to set a starting-point for a fine that is intended, ‘to bring the message home to the 
directors and shareholders of offending organisations’, as stated by the Judge in the 
environmental prosecution of Thames Water.  The majority of the other sentencing steps 
relate to the consideration of increasing or decreasing the level of fine according to a 
range of factors.  There are similar guidelines for the sentencing of individuals for health 
and safety offences, with a stronger focus on the risk of a custodial sentence for those 
found guilty of serious breaches. 
Ever since the Sentencing Council proposed these new guidelines, the health and safety 
industry has anticipated a revolutionary impact on the levels of fines compared to those 
that have historically been handed down for simple health and safety breaches committed 
by corporate entities.  Although we are still in a ‘budding’ phase, we can begin to analyse 
the influence that the guidelines have had on the courts to date and we can also consider 
the extent to which they may affect future sentencing trends. 
2.11.5 The Guidelines in Practice 
February 2016 heralded a new era in sentencing for health and safety offences.  On the 
eighth of the month, ConocoPhillips (UK) Limited became the first very large organisation 
to be convicted and sentenced under the new regime, although the hearing actually 
commenced prior to the date on which the new guidelines came into force.  The company, 
which has a turnover of £4.8 billion, pleaded guilty to three breaches of relevant health 
and safety regulations for a series of uncontrolled and unexpected gas releases at one of 
its offshore installations (HSE, 2016). 
Although nobody was injured as a result of the breaches, due to communication 
breakdown workers were sent to investigate the incident while there was still gas present.  
When sentencing, the Judge commented that the risk of death or serious injury would 
have been extremely high had there been a gas ignition.  In applying the guidelines, this 
may have been regarded as a ‘Harm Category 1’ case due to the seriousness of the harm 




risked and the high likelihood of harm.  Although the company had procedures and 
safeguards in place, the Judge noted a failure to properly identify and control risks.  The 
level of culpability, in this case, may have been classed as ‘medium’ as systems were in 
place, but they were not sufficiently adhered to or implemented. 
Independent analysis of the guidelines shows that in sentencing, the starting-point for a 
fine could be £1.3 million, with a range of £800,000 to £3.2 million to accommodate 
mitigating or aggravating features.  In mitigation, the company pointed to its high level of 
cooperation with the HSE as well as significant investment in new systems designed to 
prevent recurrence.  When considering the company’s billion pound turnover, it is also 
worth noting that the company, in fact, made a pre-tax loss of £85 million.  The fine that 
was actually imposed by the court was £3 million, which equates to £1 million for each 
offence. 
A number of cases heard weeks before the guidelines came into effect also illustrated the 
prescriptive and uniform approach to be adopted by the courts.  Four different Crown 
Courts imposed fines of £1m or more against large companies for health and safety 
breaches (all of which followed early guilty pleas) as shown in the following table. 
Table 1  Recent Health and Safety Fines, HSE Enforcement in Great Britain 2016 
 






Level Of Fine 
Imposed 
 
C.R.O Ports London 21 January Arm injury £25m £1.8m 
Balfour Beatty Civil 
Engineering 
25 January Fatality £8.8bn 
(group turnover) 
£1m 
National Grid Gas 25 January Broken leg £3bn £1m 
UK Power Networks 
(Operations) 
26 January Fatality £1bn £1m 
 
2.12 Corporate Considerations 
The culpability of a defendant company remains the most decisive factor in determining 
the appropriate level of fine to be imposed by the courts.  Therefore, the importance of 
achieving high standards of compliance with health and safety legislation has never been 
greater for organisations.  Those companies found to have committed deliberate breaches 
of, or who have flagrantly disregarded, the law or even those that fall far short of the 
appropriate standard will be subject to the largest fines.  This means that it is crucial for 
organisations to be able to demonstrate that they have robust safety management 
systems in place that are properly invested in and implemented. 




In light of the guidelines’ focus on company turnover, fines for large and very large 
companies that are guilty of committing health and safety offences are going to increase 
significantly.  Arguments about which corporate accounts should be considered by the 
court will be significant.  Such battles will be especially pertinent when dealing with groups 
of companies and joint ventures consisting of distinct incorporated (or even 
unincorporated) entities.  This should be of concern to a company as large as Tesco. 
2.13 The Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) 
The Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) previously Vehicle Operator Services 
Agency, VOSA, is the government agency that carries out driving tests, approves people to 
be driving instructors and MOT testers, carries out tests to make sure lorries and buses are 
safe to drive, carries out roadside checks on drivers and vehicles, and monitors vehicle 
recalls.  I have developed a good quality working relationship with the two main areas 
covered by the agency: 
• Vehicle and driver safety 
• Driver Instructor training and testing 
2.13.1 Van and Driver Safety 
The journey that Tesco Dot.com has taken to improve driver and van safety has been wide-
ranging.  There have been many challenges along the way, some of which are still to be 
fully understood and seamlessly integrated into our business to date.  (The Road Vehicles 
(Construction and Use) Regulations 1986). 
2.13.2 Drivers’ Hours 
The ‘GB domestic rules’ on drivers’ hours as contained in the Transport Act 1968 apply to 
most goods vehicles that are exempt from EU rules (separate rules apply to Northern 
Ireland).  There are several key components to the legislation that have caused Tesco 
Dot.com significant and fundamental challenges to comply with, which are explored in the 
project undertaken here.  
2.13.3 Acts of Parliament 
• GB Domestic Driving Hours 
• Management of Health & Safety at Work Regs, 1999 
• Corporate Manslaughter, Corporate Killing Act, 2007 
• Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 




Although the 1974 act is thorough and in-depth, the main sections that affect Tesco Dot.com 
are General Duties of Employers to their Employees (Health and Safety at Work Act 1974): 
• Section 2: Duty of Care to Staff 
• Section 3: Duty of Care to Others 
• Section 7: Employee’s Duty of Care 
• Section 37: Management of Duty of Care 
2.13.4  Evolvement of Light Goods Vans 
In the UK, road safety and the relationship between industry, transport, community and the 
economy have always been close but not always wholly collaborative.  The development of 
transport in the UK from horse-drawn vehicles, to the railways and more recently to the road 
network, has been a highly regulated process.  Regulations and legislation have been used 
equally to provide a level of public safety but also to support the development of industry, 
with the expectation that wealth would be generated for the nation as a whole because of 
improvements in transportation.   
2.14 Van Growth 
2.14.1 Is Van Growth Sustainable? 
LCV travel has seen unprecedented growth over the last 20 years, with a 5.5% growth last 
year to 44.9 billion miles and a total growth of 69%.  This is also linked with an alarming 
5.5% growth in travel on rural roads, which are statistically the most dangerous.  This is 
compared with a 20-year growth of 3.8% in HGVs (DfT, 2014:.2). 
The phenomenal growth in vans supporting the economy, now reaching 4 million units 
covering just less than 50 billion miles a year, is being offset by a huge negative growth in 
‘B’ car licence holds (the minimum requirement to drive a van).  Over the last 20 years, the 
proportion of young people with full driving licences has decreased, from 44% of 17 to 20-
year-olds in 1995/97 to 31% in 2013.  This has impacted massively on the ever-diminishing 
pool of drivers that you can recruit from (DfT traffic estimates 2014, p. 4). 
Cairns’ research published in 2005 reported on modelling work that suggested that 
internet home delivery of groceries would reduce car traffic for grocery shopping by as 
much as 70% implying that home delivery could be a benefit to traffic rather than a 
challenge by substituting fewer vans for many cars.  This was a number often quoted 
within the industry but has proved to be an overestimate.  Research carried out by the 
Department of Transport in 2015 showed that the number of shopping trips and the 




distances driven for that shopping has reduced by only 14% and 19% respectively since 
2002 (Allen, Piecyk and Piotrowska, 2016). 
In 2013, 72% of British adults shopped online, up from 53% in 2008.  It might come as no 
surprise to learn that Britain has the highest rate of online shopping in Europe .  Intuitively, 
you would think this has led to a big rise in home deliveries and hence van use.  But so far, 
we have scant research to demonstrate this is the case.  Over the last decade the number 
of heavy lorries on British roads has actually fallen, whereas the number of LCVs or vans 
has risen dramatically: up from 2.5 million in 2002 to 3.3 million in 2012, a period during 
which we saw a severe recession (Clarke et al., 2014) the number stood at 4 million in 2017.  
In the same period, Tesco Dot.com’s van fleet has grown by 450% from 1,000 to 5,500 
covering over 120 million miles per year.  In fact, around one in ten of all vehicles on Britain’s 
roads are LCVs and according to Department of Transport figures, the number of LCVs is 
set to double by 2040. 
It is of obvious concern to us that there is a known direct link between slow speeds and 
an increase in emission of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulates from diesel engines. 
Vans constitute 15% of London traffic and a higher proportion of diesel vehicular traffic; 
this is why we invested in larger payload vans for our London operation.  The current 
estimate of premature deaths in London alone due to poor air quality from all sources is 
9,400 annually (in 2010), with traffic as the biggest contributor (Walton et al., 2015). 
Vans are the fastest-growing traffic segment in the UK, with 70% growth in road miles over 
the last 20 years, compared to 12% for cars and 5.5% for LGVs. 
In 2016, the total number of UK online deliveries was 2.7bn, of which the majority, 1.8bn, 
were business-to-consumer. 
2.15 Conclusions 
Many driver safety initiatives involve several key stakeholders both within and external to 
the organisation.  In many ways, the lack of communication between stakeholders such as 
the organisation, insurance companies, government departments and training providers 
creates a toxic mix of secrecy and self-interest.  For long-term sustainable change to take 
place in an organisation such as Tesco there needs to be a balanced blend of comparable 
strategies.  Change innovation focusing on driver safety has to be driven by a leadership 
style that promotes the concept of champions within the workforce.  Key stakeholders also 
have to be brought together so that they will ultimately facilitate sustainable safety 
improvements.  The data collected through telematics as expressed in recent research by 
(Beake and Bocca, 2017) had clear similarities with the disconnect within Tesco Dot.com 




between data collection and acting on that data.  This has a similar dimension to studies in 
leadership, organisational change, influencing, telematics and fatigue. 
In isolation I can see clear similarities between the research and what I have evidenced 
within the workplace.  The nub of the problem is to find a harmonious blend of management 
style, process and policy focusing on a real-world approach to driver safety and reducing 
risk.  This with the constant friction between profit and risk. 
It is important to bear in mind that the absence of strong evidence of effectiveness does not 
mean that effectiveness has not been achieved.  There have been many case studies in 
recent times that have claimed impressive gains in improving Occupational Road Risk 
through the implementation of large-scale programmes.  However, it is known that some 
unsuccessful case studies go unpublished and this, combined with the fact that such large-
scale programmes tend to be multifaceted, means that such success stories can contribute 
little in the way of understanding about the effectiveness of different intervention 
components.  
Without a return to ‘classical’ evaluation, work to improve Occupational Road Risk can only 
be on an ad hoc and less than efficient basis.  There are of course commercial and practical 
issues that remain to be overcome when trying to persuade industry to engage in evaluation 
studies.  Companies may not wish to invest time and money in such studies if they perceive 
that holistic approaches are not beneficial. 
The fundamental finding from reviewing the literature as outlined in this chapter has been 
that it is accepted that there are commercial and practical issues in trying to persuade 
industry to engage in evaluation studies.  The main conclusion of the project is that there is 
a pressing need for more and better-controlled evaluation work if a more thorough 
understanding of Occupational Road Risk issues is to be achieved.  This being said, there 
has been a significant reduction in accidents, prosecutions and running costs throughout 
the period of my research.  There are many commonalities between existing research and 
what I found when conducting my research, particularly in the areas of leadership, 
organisational change, influencing, telematics and fatigue. 
 




Chapter 3 - Methodology 
I have chosen to undertake a case study of innovation and change for my final project.  I 
have drawn on a range of qualitative and quantitative research methods, which could 
be described as a pragmatic, mixed-methods approach Yin (2009b).  Specifically, the 
data collection and the analysis methods and tools employed in this research include 
quantitative data analysis derived from company-related activities and interventions, as 
well as thematic analysis of written and other types of documents and interviews with 
staff.  In carrying out this case study I position myself as an insider researcher-practitioner. 
3.1 Case Study Approach 
My project methodology lies within the profile of the case study by Yin (1993) as 
described. Such contemporary understandings of case studies have highlighted their 
function in terms of an in-depth exploration of a particular context often, but not invariably, 
using a range of qualitative research methods, which have a sociological inflexion.  Case 
studies are typically contrasted with survey research, which does not engage with 
context and processes to the same extent or in the same depth. (Yin, 1993) divides case 
studies into two main types serving different purposes: the critical case, which challenges 
the status quo, or which provides potentially unique counterexamples to existing 
knowledge and practice; and the revelatory case study, which sets out to gain fresh 
insights into a given topic.  The present approach seeks to embody the latter, given 
that the field it explores i.e. innovation in road traffic safety and its implications for 
workforce planning development within a complex regulatory environment, is relatively new, 
and there are few comparative studies with which to place it in contrast.  To pursue the 
driving metaphor, this is a relatively new roadmap for professional knowledge and practice. 
Cases can also be undertaken as single studies or as multiple cases across sites.  As 
implied in the previous chapter, my position within the organisation in which I am situating 
the research provides me with detailed knowledge of, and access to, a particular context 
over a period of time, a context that is still unfolding.  As an individual insider-researcher 
limited to one setting, albeit in shifting roles over time, my position and resources to some 
extent dictate a single site study, with the strengths and limitations this implies for 
generalisation and validity-issues I return to later. 
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An argument could be made for adopting an alternative approach to understanding the 
nature of innovation, which relies more on snapshots, vignettes, or what has happened 
over time.  Examples of this kind might include experiments or quasi-experiments, such 
as those designed by (White and Sabarwal, 2014) to evaluate a given intervention, or a 
cross-sectional study of knowledge and practice at one, given point in time (Meng et al., 
2012).  Such alternative approaches might well capture valuable data about individual 
‘cases’ of work-based innovation but these would not by themselves constitute a case 
study in Yin’s (1993) sense of the term, which implies something more processual in nature 
based on a deep understanding of context: that is the resources, capabilities, culture 
and politics of the organisation (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). Much of what I have been 
learning and doing within my organisation has been in response to changing strategic 
goals and significant shifts in the culture of the organisation, including in relation to the 
culture of road safety becoming increasingly embedded in the everyday thinking of Tesco 
Dotcom.  I have seen and contributed to many individual ‘cases’ or scenarios in the 
workplace, having had privileged access to the underpinning mechanisms and drivers of 
decisions that have been taken and the consequences of their implementation.  I have had 
ample opportunity to delve beneath the surface of the organisation’s behaviour, enabling 
me to detect patterns emerging.  At the same time, as an actor within the process, I have 
had few presumptions about what might happen, and often it has only been after the 
event that the true nature of what has unfolded, and its implications for further strategic 
action (including my contributions), have become clear.    
This chapter is sub-divided into several sections.  First, I will briefly review the 
methodologies traditionally used by practitioner researchers and carry out an analysis of 
possible approaches for work-based projects.  I will define and frame my selected research 
methodology, human factors and the qualitative data collection techniques I have 
employed throughout my research.  I will also investigate and make transparent the 
advantages and disadvantages of a case study in relation to workplace researcher activity.  
In addition to this, I will fully explore ethical issues related to my project in the case study 
as a whole (Appendices 6 and 7). 
3.2  Methodologies Employed by Practitioner-Researchers 
Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is the branch of philosophy that studies the 
nature, methods, limitations and validity of knowledge and belief.  The word derives from 
the Greek words epistēmē, meaning 'knowledge', and λόγος, logos, meaning 'logical 
discourse'.  The primary question to address is: ‘What is knowledge?’ 
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According to the positivist paradigm of knowledge, phenomena can be classed as either 
objective or subjective.  From the point of view of a positivistic researcher, science is 
a systematic way of building knowledge about the world and the means of understanding, 
predicting and controlling it, through the use of testable explanations and predictions.  One 
of the goals of this approach is to generate testable theories. 
In this paradigm, a scientific theory is regarded as complete in itself, in the sense of 
encompassing all that can be known or understood about given phenomena. Classic 
examples of positivist research would include the observation of individual behaviour 
within carefully controlled laboratory settings.  In contrast, an alternative paradigm 
embodied in the naturalistic approach aims not so much to predict and control, placing 
behaviour into pre-defined categories, but to focus on how it is that individuals behave in 
their usual settings in order to better understand situations and people as they engage in 
experience (Lincoln and Guba, 2016).  This approach based on observation and reflection 
of behaviour ‘in action’ is one of the aims of my research, which is why I am using mixed 
methods. 
The positivistic approach normally seeks to collect and accumulate large quantities of data 
with the intention of making generalisations.  My case study is based on a pragmatic 
concept, as will be evidenced towards the end of the chapter.  I feel that there will be a 
harmonious combination of both to realistically generate resolutions and development 
benefiting both the company and the drivers. 
3.3 Phenomenon of Study 
 
A phenomenon is the appearance and awareness of things occurring, or manifesting 
themselves, in experience.  It can be described as a concept as it appears to and is 
constructed by the mind, as distinguished from a noumenon, or the posited ‘thing in itself’. 
The phenomenon of the study is literally what the study is about. Pattern (2002) states: 
 
The key issue in selecting and making decisions about the appropriate 
[phenomenon] is to decide what it is you want to be able to say something about at 
the end of the study. Do you want to have findings of individuals, families, groups or 
some other phenomenon (Pattern, 2002: p 229). 
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Figure 17  Case Study Research Approach 
 
 
Working closely with, and active in, the subject matter as a professional practitioner, I 
have embarked on a journey of professional work-based research, the phenomena of 
interest being individuals, structures and processes.  Data collected will be centred on 
interviews, documents and observations. 
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My analytical strategies will invoke the use of constant comparison, keyword analysis and 
thematic analysis (Appendix 24).  This will be an exploratory Yin (1994) piece of work to 
gain an insight into an internal company issue that will have wider implications within the 
industry as a whole.  My approach was described by Yin where he suggests that: ‘A case 
study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenology and context are not 
clearly evident’ (1994: 13). 
3.5 Understanding the Case Holistically 
Tesco is Britain’s largest private employer, employing more than 420,000 people both in 
the UK and the EU.  It is constructive to make direct comparisons with other organisations 
of a similar size in order to better understand the complexity of management structures 
on such a large scale. 
It is with this in mind that I have been drawn to the process models developed in the 
1980s by (Andrew Pettigrew and Richard Whipp,1993), as outlined in Chapter 2.  Their 
model arose out of their empirical research into why some companies in the UK performed 
more competitively than others and were better able to embrace and manage strategic 
change.  According to the model there are three essential dimensions of strategic change, 
which are Content, Context and Process (Figure 3.4). These dimensions roughly translate 
as: 
• The content or the ‘what’ of change (objectives, purposes, goals) 
• The organisational context of change (internal and external environments) 
• The process or ‘how’ of change (implementation). 
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Figure 19  Understanding strategic change, reproduced from  
Iles and Cranfield, 2004 
Strategic analysis typically begins by looking at the dimension of content.  This covers the 
components of the organisation’s strategy: e.g. financial, technological, marketing, human 
resources and governance.  It includes key objectives, built-in assumptions and 
expectations, targets, the sources of drivers of strategic change, and methods and rules of 
evaluation.   
The analysis then moves on to the dimension of context. This refers to ways in which the 
organisation is configured. The context can be divided into two categories: 
• Internal context includes the organisation’s structure, culture, distribution of power, 
micro-politics and internal capabilities. 
• External context includes wider elements of the organisation’s environment, 
including the economic, political, legal and social contexts in which it operates. If the 
external context changes, the internal context must respond concurrently. 
After analysis and discussion of content and context comes the dimension of 
the process, the practicality of how individuals, groups and organisations 
embrace (or resist) change over time (White and Sabarwal, 2014). Process 
issues, it is argued, acquire particular significance in large organisations where, 
‘energy and capabilities which underpin [service change] cannot be conjured 
up over a short period of time through the pulling of a single lever’ (Pettigrew, Ferlie 
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and McKee, 1992). Moreover, in organisations of various types in the history of the 
private and public sector often has a prominent role in people’s thinking: ‘The past 
weighs a heavy hand in determining local perceptions, and layers of competence 
emerge only slowly to enable and protect champions of change’ (Ibid.: 275). Gilkey 
writes that: ‘‘According to this model, the astute manager is constantly scanning all 
three dimensions and will see to it that a management team is created that ensures 
that all dimensions play their due part in strategic decision-making and that no 
single dimension dominates thinking’ (Gilkey 2014: pp1044-1052) 
Like other models which adopt a holistic perspective, the Content, Context and Process 
Model (CCP) requires as much attention to the interrelation of its constituent parts and 
furthermore their relation to the whole, as it does to the individual components themselves.  
Again, like some other holistic models, such as The Fifth Discipline (Senge, 2006), CCP is 
best considered as an ‘umbrella’ approach to leading, managing or influencing change 
rather than as a prescriptive template.  The model can also complement and incorporate 
other qualitative and quantitative change management tools and methods.  At a basic level 
it can serve as a diagnostic checklist; more comprehensively, it can be used to design, 
monitor and assess a change management intervention or programme, or to help inform 
quasi-experimental before-and-after studies.  In this instance, I will be looking at its value 
as a diagnostic tool. 
CCP was largely developed through case studies, particularly longitudinal ones, i.e. those 
which follow up people and events over time, repeating interviews with key players. My 
case study will be largely prospective, collecting new cross-sectional data over time. 
Although this activity has lasted several years and inevitably, I have been reviewing 
progress retrospectively the longer it continued. 
Case studies typically observe phenomena over time without manipulating them.  
However, I have had to intervene, often significantly.  While this makes it even less likely 
that I can generalise from the case and identify causal relationships (i.e. this happened as 
a consequence of that) the trade-off is in the richness of the contextual content and process 
picture that emerges from this data.  This case study aims to result in what the researcher 
Geertz (1973) calls ‘thick descriptions.  These are a means of providing the cultural context 
and meanings that individuals and groups place on their behaviour, words, and decisions 
and so on.  Thick descriptions provide sufficient context so that someone outside the culture 
in question is able to make sense of the behaviour, words, and decisions taking place and 
so on. 
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A case study will afford me an opportunity to undertake an intensive analysis of my 
contribution to the development of both the driver safety team and its interaction with the 
driver population as a whole.  It is my expectation that on observing behaviours l will be 
able to offer the company some short and long-term recommendations that should support 
the team and produce a higher degree of driver retention.  This will hopefully produce ideas 
and opportunities for development and innovation. 
The focus of the case study is the relationship between the aspects of the company that 
affect driver safety within Tesco Dot.com and me.  The case study has allowed me to 
combine ideas and preferences to help form and frame the projects, offering a broader 
approach to social research in my position as an embedded action researcher. 
I have had a great opportunity to study my relationship within a work environment and my 
influence, or lack of it, on the wider business operation.  I intend to investigate in detail the 
effects of strategic decision-making by the leadership team on the wider workforce 
employed by Tesco Dot.com and its inherent impact on the driver population.  There is a 
natural interconnection with processes and relationships within social settings that I intend 
to explore.  As stated by Yin (1994), the case is a ‘naturally occurring’ phenomenon.  It 
exists before the project and continues to exist after the research has finished. 
I have found that many working practices are sustained by an inbred philosophy that 
‘this way is the best way as that is how we have always done it’!  Within a developed 
company you should apply a strong mantra of ‘plan, do, and review’.  Regrettably, the 
‘review’ element of this cycle is largely neglected, as it is usually perceived as the possible 
revelation of failure.  This means that often the same mistakes are replicated with alarming 
regularity. 
I am mindful that great care must be taken for me not to fall into the trap of making my 
own assumptions, based on ‘l know best so surely l must be correct’.  Great effort will be 
required not to bias the data collection to artificially generate the desired conclusion.  To 
accomplish a well-balanced case study, I will need to be methodically disciplined in my 
approach to data collection as well as having to adhere to my planned approach.  I will 
keep an open dialogue with my colleagues to help me maintain an equilibrium throughout 
the project.  I intend to use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data in my 
methods to help build context and depth. 
Although it was not my intention when I initially undertook this activity, I have found 
myself developing the framework of a longitudinal case study.  This runs parallel with me 
finding an approach that avoids forcing answers to satisfy my questions in a neat cause 
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and effect application.  I am aware that not all questions will be satisfactorily answered, if 
at all.  This framework is an in-house study involving Tesco staff only and focuses on the 
van driving population, concentrating on the relationships and social processes adopted 
through time.  This case study allows me to focus on the instances of a particular 
phenomenon, providing an in-depth account of events, processes, experiences and 
relationships within the workplace.  What can be learned from the journey of development 
and innovation is  that I  can sustain further development within the company and 
industry as a whole  by focusing on the ‘case’; there may be insights and opportunities 
gained with wider implications for van safety that may not have come to light using different 
traditional methodologies. 
For an understanding of any particular facet or function of any process or procedure 
within the workplace, particularly in a large organisation, each action point or process has 
to be studied in the context of its relationship to, and impact from, other processes or 
actions within the business as a whole; nothing is ever ‘stand-alone’.  This project offers 
an excellent opportunity to investigate in detail the impact of company decisions on the 
driver population and to support this end I will carry out a holistic approach to the case 
study. 
I would like to explain why some outcomes came to be, so lessons can be learned and 
improvements made to the business in the future.  One aspect could be the driver 
retention investigation and impact on the company’s position on: 
• Advertising 
• Recruitment/process 
• Development training 
• Pay 
• Driver experience / qualification 
It is clear to me that some of the findings will be hard to generalise across a wide range of 
companies that employ vans in their fleet. This is due to the fact that there are countless 
variables within all operations that determine how structures and procedures are 
developed and implemented.  Therefore, it will be difficult to make sweeping statements 
and recommendations from a single case study.  Having little control over high-level 
decision making within Tesco Dot.com, my final case study project is a personal analysis 
of whether the policies and strategies have had an effect or impact on the now 17,000 
drivers employed within Tesco Dot.com, a seemingly large number but which equates to 
4.8% of Tesco’s total workforce. 
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The poles below are not mutually exclusive, more a case of ‘more this, less that’.  I will be 
looking both at relationships and outcomes and at times my research may take me down 
the avenue of isolated factors, as a prelude to joining the dots and discovering the bigger 
picture in Chapter 5. 
Table 2  Case Study Research Characteristically Emphasised 
 
Depth of study Instead of Breadth of study 
The particular Instead of The general 
Relationships/processes Instead of Outcomes and end 
products 
Holistic view Instead of Isolated factors 
Natural settings Instead of Artificial situations 
Multiple sources Instead of One research method 
The case study particularly lends itself to social settings within the workplace, specifically 
invoking inductive logic. 
Table 3  Structure of Case Study following the discovery route 
 
Discovery-led 
Description Describes what is happening in the case study setting 
 
(e.g. events, processes and relationships). 
Exploration Explores the key issues affecting those in a case study 
 
setting (e.g. problems and opportunities). 
Comparison Compares settings to learn from the similarities and 
 
differences between them. 
Theory-led 
Explanation Explains the causes of events, processes or relationships within 
the setting. 
Illustration Uses a case study as an illustration of how a particular theory 
applies in a real-life setting. 
Experiment Uses a case study as a testbed for experimenting with 
 
changes to specific factors (or variables). 
 
I will be selecting particular aspects of the Dotcom operation that should illuminate the 
journey of development and impact on driver safety. 
I am explicit in my choice of subjects as there exist detailed data, both quantitative and 
qualitative, supporting robust analysis and investigation of van driver safety. 
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I have had circumscribed choices about which aspects of Tesco Dot.com I have been able 
to research.  Being effectively sponsored or commissioned by the company, there was 
little latitude afforded to me on the flexibility and scope of my case study.  On starting the 
case study, I was employed in the position of occupational road risk manager and soon 
found that my original subject of investigation had limited merits.  I am now the driver safety 
manager and in consultation with my new adviser felt that a case study on the 
effectiveness of the company to improve driver safety was a more noteworthy objective. 
The reader of this case study should be able to make an informed judgement regarding 
whether findings, themes and conclusions resonate with their own industry or operation.  I 
am aware of the effects of social research as documented by Milgram ( 2009), notably 
the finding that people may be influenced by those they perceive in authority to do things 
which might otherwise conflict with their ethical values.  I will be attentive to this potential 
risk throughout the project (Brent and Dent, 2012). 
3.6 The Observer Effect 
People are likely to alter their behaviour when they become aware that they are being 
observed in social science, unlike chemicals in a laboratory environment.  It is only natural 
that people can: 
• Display embarrassment 
• Disguise normal practice, behaviour and be defensive 
To overcome the effect researchers are generally advised to: 
• Spend time on site, so that researchers become part of the furniture 
• Have minimal interaction with those being observed 
For people working day-to-day in the environment that I was researching it was important 
for me to be seen as a regular visitor and almost part of the fabric to help circumvent 
drivers’ managers feeling embarrassed or disguising their normal day-to-day behaviour. In 
most eventualities I was able to observe without any undue involvement with those I 
was observing.  However, on occasions where health and safety or company breaches 
took place, I was duty-bound to make an intervention.  This being said, my interventions 
may have been made from a distance without confronting the individual directly. 
 
In my own context, adopting a neutral observer role was not a viable option.  This meant 
taking due note of the personal and political pressures that would most likely be brought 
to bear on someone in my job role within the company.  That is to say, I was aware of 
these tensions as inherent in the chosen method. 
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3.7 The Nature of the Case Itself 
My career within Tesco Dot.com started in 2006 and continues to the present.  During this 
period, l have been instrumental in forging policies and processes that have benchmarked 
the company as a pioneer in van driver safety and best practice.  This journey has not been 
an easy assignment and has been both challenging and rewarding.  The constant 
introduction of new procedures and processes and their compliance, or lack of it, are of 
particular interest to me. 
The development of the new safety strategies has been problematic as their foundations 
in law are set under the health and safety umbrella of ‘what is reasonable’ regarding the 
duty of care of your employees and the protection of the general public (Appendix 12).  
This has often led to decisions and has at times been difficult for on-site management to 
understand and implement, as with modern life the use of the internet is widespread, 
resulting in a dichotomy between information searched for and the contextual introduction 
of new policies and procedures.  Managers are not confident in being supported to take 
the right action, i.e. recruiting to the preferred Tesco Dot.com Structure. 
3.8 The Historical Background of the Case 
In this section I recap some of the facts presented in my Introduction and will relate these 
to the particularities of the case I am constructing. 
The considerable growth in the van population in the UK over recent years, fuelled partly 
by online shopping, has brought the safe employment of non-professional drivers into 
focus.  There are now over 4 million vans on UK roads driven by a preponderance of 
drivers who only hold a car licence (DVLA). 
Throughout Tesco Dot.com’s remarkable expansion over the last 23 years, increasing 
from  one  van  to  5500  delivering  to  1.7  million  customers  per  week (internal 
report),  the  senior management team has analysed its processes and developed 
innovative management solutions to allow the business to grow in a robust, controlled 
and sustainable fashion (Burke, Cooper and Antoniou, 2015). The guiding principle has 
been to ensure that profitability was achieved while ensuring that Tesco’s employees 
were fully consulted and able to operate in a safe environment. My intention is to 
investigate the success of many of the new guidelines, policies and procedures put into 
place since 2010 and how future development can be prepared for Burke (1989). 
At the end of 2004, van damage had reached a level of over £5000 per van per year 
(total of £10 million).  It was clear that prompt and decisive action was needed to reduce 
the exposure of Tesco Dot.com staff outreach workers to occupational road risk, whilst 
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executing a business plan to reduce and bring back under control the spiralling costs of 
running, maintaining and insuring the van fleet (DaCoTA, 2012). The increasing expense 
of van damage had not been anticipated and was adding to the unforeseen costs of running 
the operation. 
Since I started working at Tesco Dot.com in 2005 there have been many changes to 
working practices and processes that had manifested themselves throughout this period.  
The first major change to employment and driver development was the introduction of 
driver assessments (Appendices 13 and 16), validations, an accident review board and 
contextual speeding.  It was clear to the management team that the dynamic change in 
approach to our driving population had to be undertaken as soon as possible in early 
2006 (Meng et al., 2012). At that point, Tesco Dot.com’s employment criterion meant that 
you would probably get the job if you could walk, talk and claimed you had a driving licence.  
To turn around this disastrous strategy and the ever-increasing van damage costs 
aforementioned, four processes were introduced.  The concept of a driving standard when 
not legally required was a new one for Tesco Dot.com and many levels of management 
found it difficult to understand and implement.  The subsequent tracking of driver behaviour 
regarding workplace practices, speeding, van damage and general conduct was 
challenging to introduce in terms of design, structure and implementation.  There was a 
huge divide between the technology employed to gather data regarding driver behaviour, 
the subsequent training demanded as the result of understanding the data and the lack of 
ability/will of a store management team to impose performance management on the driver 
population. 
At that time, in store a manager was more than happy to dismiss a member of staff for 
eating on the shop floor; however, they would be reticent and dismissive if a driver were 
found driving dangerously and little performance management would be required after the 
incident.  The fundamental issue that prevented progress and development regarding the 
driver population was the fact that the Tesco Dot.com Department rarely appeared on the 
performance management scale of store managers. This in the world of Tesco was 
described as their performance management wheel.  Unfortunately, this meant that the 
Tesco Dot.com Department, let alone the performance of drivers, was not part of the store 
manager’s key performance indicators.  This lack of focus by Tesco Dot.com facilitated an 
elongated, painful journey of change and development as there was little influence on 
junior, middle or senior managers to take a stand over difficult decisions to underpin 
change that was required.  In recent years this has been rectified and senior managers 
are focused on the financial benefits that can be harvested from a successful Tesco 
Dot.com operation. 
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What was required in 2005-2006 was the introduction and development of a driver safety 
and compliance team that would be independent of all store activity.  They would report 
directly to the store director of Tesco Dot.com and would act as an independent 
police force to ensure that change was focused and beginning to take place.  The power 
struggle within Tesco Dot.com would of course always revolve around the dynamics of an 
independent group embarking on changing ways of working within Tesco, which had been 
embedded during the past 90 years.  This change after 11 years has now started to 
happen; however, the constant friction, battle, miscommunication, misunderstanding and 
preconceived ideas that come hand-in-hand with such a change are always present and 
never far behind the slow movement of expected change in innovation and the demands 
of a modern fast-moving business from a theoretical viewpoint there are three main types 
of leadership: authoritarian leadership, where the leader orders followers to do various 
tasks, democratic leadership, which allows the group share in decision making, and 
laissez-faire leadership, or ‘do it as you like’  (French and Lewin, 1939).  
In business there are many types of management styles; within retail they range from 
transactional, transformational, directive, autocratic, democratic and strategic.  There are 
also many variations of these main groups Kezer (2011).  Strategic Management is a 
process whereby the Leadership team renovate strategic ideas and make effective 
decisions for an aspiration and plans on how to achieve such a goal and objective to 
develop the future of the organisation Smith (2016).  This style is found in many large 
organisations. 
Much of the dynamics of change within Tesco Dot.com has been as a reaction to the 
changing demographics of modern retail methods.  It is only in recent years with the 
boom in online shopping and the general use of the internet fuelled initially by Amazon 
that there has been a marked increase in the need for home deliveries.  As part of this 
need, which has been recognised by the central government, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the number of vans registered on UK’s roads, now topping an estimated 4 
million.  Tesco Dot.com alone covers over 120 million miles a year to fulfil the needs of 
its online customers; however, this still does represent a marked decrease in the overall 
carbon emissions involved in such transactions. 
The regulations concerning online home shopping were very few and relatively sparse; 
these are covered in further chapters in this case study, but here it is important to note 
that the majority of the work and expense undertaken by Tesco Dot.com to develop and 
innovate the safety of van drivers has been the result of internal policy and decision 
making, and not demanded by legislation or government edict. 
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It has been a constant challenge to develop data collection, strategy policies, new vehicles, 
PPE and many other aspects to situate Tesco Dot.com as a ground-breaking organisation. 
To really understand and change the culture of a business, you need to become part of 
that business, understand its functionality, demands, culture, ethics and its vision.  As an 
outside company, training organisation or researcher, you will fall badly short of your 
expectations if you expect to stand on the side-lines looking in and produce research that 
is clear, defined, workable and based on reality within the culture of that company (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).  One of the key issues with having sponsored research, or for that 
matter external research, is that most large organisations are somewhat sceptical, timid or 
blinkered as to what is a reality, the best option or the worst option. The best example I 
can give of this would be effectively the emperor’s new clothes, an example of herd 
behaviour in ignoring the obvious and failing to challenge leadership arrogance. 
3.9 Physical and Temporal Setting: The Bounded Case Study 
The setting of my study will be internal, and this will determine the nature and scope of 
the case.  For example, documents will not have been published and are for internal use 
only.  I will also be keeping an eye on the external environment, e.g. policies and regulatory 
frameworks, and its impact on the internal organisational setting.  It is my objective to 
investigate how decisions have been made relating to Tesco Dot.com over the past 10 
years and the consequences of these actions so that I am in the position to analyse and 
develop organisational strategies as a result. 
Merriam (1988) and Yin (1994) outline a number of essential features of a case study that 
support my classification of this activity as a ‘bounded’ case study.  A case study tends to 
be bounded, which means that it is focused and intensive as well as narrow in scope.  It 
also means that the case has clear boundaries or limiters.  For example, measures such 
as the number of people who might be interviewed, the number of documents that may be 
reviewed or the number of observations that might be made, should all be finite. 
A benefit of using a bounded case study research method is that it usually applies 
frameworks to manage contextual variables, e.g. the use of Content, Context and Process 
(CCP) and with the Political, Economic, Social and Technological (PEST) models.  As 
described at the beginning of this chapter, my case study has been structured and framed 
to facilitate a holistic approach and it is my intention to describe the whole of the case 
as well as the relationship of the different parts in relation to each other and this whole.   
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3.10  Economic, Political and Legal Influences on the Case Study 
Tesco likes being seen by government departments and society as a whole as a ‘Blue 
Chip Company’. The company cherishes its brand reputation; a great deal of importance 
is placed on the dependability of a legal operation that is seen to be above and beyond 
what is expected of a smaller, locally run operation.  As with most major companies in the 
UK, Dotcom is either highly regulated or there is a governmental expectation that your 
house is in order and risk to employees and the general public is minimised as far as 
practicable. 
There is little effective legislation that controls the movement of van drivers, as their 
vehicles do not exceed the 3.5 tonne weight limit that would then activate the need for 
Tachographs and EU driving regulations, (Transport Act. 1968, Driver and Vehicle 
Services Agency, 2016).   What does have to be followed is GB domestic driving 
regulations, which are clear and unequivocal; the onus is still very much with the company 
to develop a compliant operation (Appendix 15).  A good example is the legislation 
which states that: ‘Periods of rest must be adequate’ but leaves the period open to 
interpretation! 
3.11 Other Relevant Cases Studies  
The use of the case study method to explore organisational change, including through the 
use of insider or ethnographic research methods, is well established Yin ( 2009). There 
are also a number of case studies that have already been carried out in relation to driver 
safety, including van driver behaviour, such as that of ( Rodriguez et al., 2006). While 
there are some studies which examine driver behaviour using naturalist data, such as 
(Dingus et al., 2016), no case studies of driver safety were found in relation to van-based 
operations that had been conducted by an insider researcher (see Chapter 2). The 
combination of approaches that makes up the present study must, therefore, be regarded 
as tentative and exploratory. Any similarities and differences between this and other cases 
will depend on recognising certain specific features of cases, some of which may be unique 
to the present context. 
3.12 The Informants who Show the Case 
A key benefit of a case study is that it facilitates the use of multiple sources of evidence 
allowing the investigation of a broader range of historical and behavioural issues (Stake, 
2002; Yin, 1993).  Having such a rich source of diverse data facilitates the development of 
converging lines of inquiry.  Where there is not convergence of evidence, it is compiled in 
a linear fashion, for example a site visit followed by findings and then conclusions.  
Convergence, on the other hand, has the effect of a spider’s web.  Around the spider’s 
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web would be your areas of interest, such as documents, records, interviews, focus 
interviews, surveys and observations.  The end result is in the centre with all the various 
avenues of data collection feeding into this central point.  
3.13 Ethical Considerations 
I am aware that in case studies and general research involving qualitative and ergonomic 
methodologies, in particular those that are work-based, ethics are key to a successful 
research project.  Although my project is in-house and only involves Tesco staff and 
personnel or third-party suppliers embedded within Tesco, the fact that I am having 
conversations and capturing data (through questionnaires with both individuals and 
groups) means that the awareness of potential conflict of interest and misunderstanding is 
foremost in my mind.  O’Reilly (2005) argues that ethical considerations should not be a reason 
not to conduct research but that such studies should be kept reflective and critical.  I intend to 
keep my role as an insider researcher clear so both parties, the subject of my research and 
me, are transparent with regard to my/their participation and role within my investigation. 
I am extremely mindful of the remit of the Data Protection Act that is enshrined in legislation 
and of keeping the anonymity of the participants in my research. Although there has 
been a migration of both staff and management throughout this process, all have 
received adequate training in the company’s processes and protocols that they are 
expected to adhere to.  I intend to keep to three key principles: 
• Respect the rights and dignity of those who participate in the research project 
• Avoid any harm to the participants arising from their involvement in the research 
• Operate with honesty and integrity 
A fundamental aspect of this case study which shapes ethical considerations is the fact 
that while one of the ultimate goals is to increase the safe driving behaviours of individual 
drivers, the in-depth investigation will be focused on data pertaining to group behaviour 
overall.  This will be related to management policy making and decision making, rather 
than that of individuals, regional groups or any other small grouping within the business.  
All data will normally be anonymised, except in cases where, for instance, an awareness 
of the part of the company or its location is vital for the understanding of the data. 
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It is my intention that the interests of participants should be protected; those who contribute 
to research as informants or as research subjects should be no worse off at the end of 
their participation than they would be at the start.  Their anonymity will be guaranteed and 
the feedback and information they provide will be invaluable regarding the larger scale 
of the project.  It is equally my expectation that I avoid deception and misrepresentation 
and every effort will be made to ensure that my research is open and explicit in its direction 
and structure.  Participants will give informed consent and all those involved in the research 
will be aware of the fact that they have the right to withdraw from the research at any point 
without this affecting them. 
Specifically, experience has taught me that within the context of my own work approach 
and set of behaviours, I would consider myself to have a strong, personal work ethic 
combined with a results-oriented attitude to change. Later I would come to recognise this 
as a commitment to the management principle of ‘Plan, Do and Review’ Rogers (2003).   
To anticipate the more detailed discussion in a subsection, this approach can be 
illustrated by a model of thinking about change that is common in the reviewed literature 
of this thesis, seen in Figure 20  in a visualisation from the Auto-Cycle Union (ACU).   Figure 
20. This model encapsulates an idea about the process of change which I can see in 
retrospect was exemplified in the way I adapted to and managed my recovery from 
personal injury. 
In Figure 20 we can see a typical development process starting with the plan, where you 
set your objectives, through to the implementation phase.  The next stage is pivotal as 
what has actually happened is reviewed.  The result of this review is the improvement 
phase where best practice, development and innovation can be implemented. 
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Figure 20  Example of the Development Cycle 
In an everyday commercial business context, this often translates into having a type of 
performance management predicated on managers and employees having a shared 
‘good enough’ grasp of the business.  This includes the organisational and communications 
strategies underpinning the business’s purpose and how these fit together into an overall 
process of improvement (DaCoTA, 2012). 
When working with external organisations at any given stage of the cycle, you must 
tailor how you communicate to your audience or customers and this may differ from the 
communications you apply internally.  The same principle applies to the strategic planning 
and implementation of staff training and development programmes, which need to be 
adapted depending on whether they are internal or external. According to Michael 
Armstrong: 
A motivation is a reason for doing something. Motivation is concerned with the 
strength and direction of behaviour and the factors that influence people to behave in 
certain ways. The term “motivation” can refer variously to the goals individuals have, the 
ways in which individuals choose their goals and the ways in which others try to change 
their behaviour. (Source:  Armstrong, 2014: p 182). 
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The core content of any particular type of training may stay relatively constant, depending 
on the task or job, but how you embed the understanding of that training will vary from 
organisation to organisation, as well as from region to region. A range of contextual factors, 
therefore, including culture, resources, technology and socio-political environments will 
have an effect on how training content should be delivered and will be received.  It may 
help to elaborate conceptually on this here, as these contextual factors have played an 
important part in my developing an understanding of my role and of the project I went on 
to design.  This makes these factors an important influence on its methodology. 
Home delivery is a relatively new concept within the UK and has only really developed 
over the last 15 years.  Although there has been a clamour to provide the public with a 
successful proposition, a concept even as inviting as home shopping will eventually be 
required to make an operational profit, or at least become an integrated format within the 
parent organisation.  The relationship between profit and best practice for safety and 
compliance can often seem a fractious one, especially a bespoke, UK-wide operation 
such a Tesco Dot.com.  Typically, an analysis is used to assess the effect of environmental 
factors on an organisation.  A well-conducted PEST analysis (which considers Political, 
Economic, Social and Technological aspects) helps you determine how these factors will 
affect the performance and activities of your business in the long-term, by considering 
those that help and those which impede progress.  These are subjects that I have referred 
to in the previous chapter, in addition to using McGrath’s study where I have used a 
diagrammatical image seen on the next page. From here, work can begin on how the 
organisation needs to respond to these factors or forces.  While all of these contextual 
aspects are important in relation to my project, ecological factors, legislative requirements 
and industry analysis assume greater significance and I touch on some of these later in 
this chapter. 
In addition to these strategic dimensions impinging on the workplace, what we might call 
‘the people factor’ (or human resource management) is critical, as it is through people and 
the workforce, they comprise that strategies, products and services are delivered.  Various 
types of workplace leadership and ‘people management’ have been construed (Bennis 
and Nanus, 1997), and I have either tried or been the recipient of several of these over 
the course of my career.  Without a doubt, one of the strongest models for leadership 
that I have come across has been that of leaders as influencers, as those who embody 
their values and behaviours in a highly self-conscious, deliberate and ethical way.    
( Bennis and Nanus, 1997) state, “ leadership is the most studied and least understood 
concept of any in the social sciences” (p4). 
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Figure 21  A typical example of a PEST framework, 2013.   
Source: McGrath, R 
That said, one of the keys to understanding is, I believe, reflection on practice.  I have 
discovered throughout my professional career that it is essential to observe and reflect on 
your own performance and act within the highest professional code of conduct.  Firstly, 
this allows you to secure the trust of your colleagues and then to enable them to work as 
individuals who are bound together by a common aim to achieve a common goal Robert 
(2006).  Within the workplace, l have worked with many well-intentioned colleagues who 
wish to execute their duties to a high standard; however, many have seen little or no 
need to challenge the standards of others or themselves.  This has had a negative knock-
on effect and in the lack of evaluative intervention, this approach becomes like a laissez-
faire form of leadership Brown (2002). Laissez-faire leadership, along with autocratic styles 
of leading, outnumbers the democratic model in business, which I believe is actually the 
most effective and to which I have aspired. In the circumstances described where no 
reflection is taking place, there is little or no motivation for an individual or group to aspire 
to achieve and maintain a high standard of performance and short-term individual career 
gains have tended to mar collective high achievement.   
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Variable experiences of different standards and styles of leadership over the years have 
been a cautionary lesson as well as an incentive to personal reflection and to develop a 
deeper understanding of what is required to facilitate change and innovation in self and 
others, a topic which is explored in this project. 
3.14 Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis is used in qualitative research and focuses on examining themes 
within data.  This choice of research is of interest to me as it lends itself to a holistic 
approach of a framed case study within a large organisation (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Qualitative data analysis operates through the systematic gathering of data and proceeds 
inductively; often drawing on whichever data comes to hand in order to explain 
phenomena. It differs from grounded theory Charmaz (2005) as it does not seek to work 
towards a theory. 
This method emphasises organisation and rich description of the dataset.  The thematic 
analysis which it encourages goes beyond simply counting phrases or words in a text and 
moves on to identify implicit and explicit ideas within the data.  Coding is the primary 
process for developing themes within the raw data by recognizing important moments in 
the data and encoding it prior to interpretation.  The interpretation of these codes can 
include comparing theme frequencies, identifying theme co-occurrence and graphically 
displaying relationships between different themes.  In this study, coding will be carried 
out manually. 
3.15 Documents 
One of the areas that I intend to acquire interesting data from is the exploration of 
documentation within the framework of the company.  As an online company, Tesco 
Dot.com has armed itself with a plethora of reporting suites.  The reports are detailed and 
comprehensive providing a rich harvest of qualitative and numerical data.  They range 
from high-level national reporting tools to the level of individual drivers.  In this research it 
is my ethical duty to ensure that the range of reports and associated data has a high level 
of anonymity attached to them. 
Documentary analysis can take many forms.  Prior (2003) suggests these forms can 
include content and thematic analysis but also analysis of documents in terms of their use 
and function as resources, that is, how documents are used in practice by human agents 
towards purposeful ends.  In this latter case, the focus is less on how the document has 
come into being or on the minute interpretation of meaning, but on how documents are 
‘recruited’ by people for specific purposes.  While what is contained in the various 
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documents is of importance, and may bear the hallmark of covert as well as overt 
messages including in terms of the ‘evidence’ they muster to guide action and decision 
making the emphasis in this case is on understanding how documents are used in 
episodes of social interaction within the company. For example, documents may help 
elucidate the train of events that are set in motion when an email is sent and received. 
Organisations and companies of all sizes are keen to make available strategic plans, 
mission statements and logos online so that they are openly communicating with the 
general public.  With the expansion of websites in particular, gaining information and data 
on companies and groups has become an easier activity.  This open environment for 
accessing documentation lends itself conveniently to an embedded action-researcher such 
as myself working on an in-house case study. 
It would be prudent to consider Platt’s (1981) suggestion for determining when a document 
is genuine or when its authenticity requires closer scrutiny.  According to Mogalakwe 
(2006), close scrutiny is required when the document: 
• Does not make sense logically or obvious errors can be observed 
• There are internal inconsistencies in terms of style and content 
• There are different versions of the same product 
• The version available is derived from a dubious, suspicious or unreliable secondary 
source 
• It has been in the hands of a person or persons with vested interests in a particular 
reading of it 
3.16 Observations 
In this research I will amalgamate the observations made around my management duties.  
I will observe the drivers when they are working in and around the operation.  In addition, 
I go out with drivers on their delivery routes to observe first-hand the complexities and 
challenges of their tasks.  Whilst in the van with drivers there is an excellent opportunity 
to interact and gain valuable insights regarding their thoughts, opinions and beliefs 
regarding the operation as a whole.  However, feeding this information and data back to 
respective management teams may be challenging.  My approach to managers and 
support staff will be very similar.  I will observe them in the general working environment, 
and, in addition, I will attend meetings and have conversations with small groups or 
individuals to gain as much in-depth information as possible.  I intend to extend my 
observations to our head office where I will be engaging with some of the senior 
management team. 
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It is important the findings of a case study are all inclusive and the results are shared 
openly with all stakeholders and participants within or affected by the case study. 





Documentation Stable so can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
Can be difficult to find and 
retrieve 
 Unobtrusive as not created as a 
result of the case study 
Biased sensitivity, if the 
collection is incomplete 
 Exact references, and details of an 
event, contains exact names, 
references, and details of an event 
Reporting bias reflects the 
unknown bias of the author 
 Broad coverage, long span of time, 
many events and settings 




Same as for documentation Same as for documentation 
 Precise and usually quantitative Accessibility due to privacy 
 
Interviews Targeted focus directly on case 
study topics 
Bias due to poorly 
articulated questions 
  
Insightful, provides perceived 
casual inferences and explanations 
 
Response bias 
 Inaccuracies due to poor 
 recall 
 
 Reflex response as  
 interviewee gives what  
 interviewer wants to hear 
Direct 
observations 
Reality covers events in real-time Time consuming 
 Content contextual, covers context 
of “Case” 
Selectivity as broad coverage 
is difficult without a team of 
observers 
 The reflexivity event may  
 proceed differently because it is 
 being observed 
 Cost-hours needed by 
 human observer 
 Same as direct observation Same as direct observation 
 Insightful of interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
Bias due to participant 
Observer’s manipulation of 
events 
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With the increase of information online being used as a source for data collection, there 
is a need for caution as unverified documents cannot be trusted as a verbatim record, or 
as unedited, or as edited by the producers of the document.  Such documents that fall into 
these criteria are: 
• Email correspondence, memoranda, letters, and other personal documents such 
as diaries, notes and calendars 
• Minutes from meetings and announcements, other written reports of events 
and agendas 
Progress reports and other internal records, proposals and admin documents 
• Formal studies or evaluations of the same case that you are studying 
• Articles appearing in the mass media or in community newspapers, news 
clippings and social media. 
Project Methodology Plan 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Investigate Database   
Survey of Drivers            
Interview DSC Managers            
Document Analysis   
CPC Training           
Work Place Observations   
Writing Up            
 
Figure 22 Methods Plan for the Project 
3.18 Questionnaires 
An integral part of my case study mixed-methods approach will be the use of data 
collected from interviews and survey questionnaires.  Some of this data, e.g. from surveys, 
will be collected routinely as part of my working role. 
I was hoping that questionnaires would be extremely useful as I intend to collect large 
amounts of data from many drivers who probably answer set standard questions honestly, 
facilitating the cross-reference and collation of replies, which forms an extremely useful 
data-gathering source.   
A well-designed questionnaire (Appendix 2) will facilitate the capture of macro, micro and 
meso level data and information. 
I was determined to utilise a planned training day to capture data via the use of a 
questionnaire.  The drivers in question are usually very vocal in the workplace in airing 
their criticism of the company and how it is operated.   That said, when offered the 
opportunity to voice their opinions in an open forum with management they would be 
reticent to have their opinions recorded. 
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This is why I decided to adopt the medium of questionnaire to harvest data from the drivers.  
The fact that I was able to introduce myself in person to the drivers clearly stating that the 
questionnaires are anonymous and that it was for my University project and not a 
management tool was met with great enthusiasm. 
I used a mixture of open and closed questions to keep the participants engaged, facilitating 
an environment that encouraged honest and open responses. 
An additional rationale for adopting the use of questionnaires was based on the recognition 
that there is a wide range of academic abilities within the driver work force, so asking for 
written answers would form barriers and minimise the opportunity of gaining valuable data. 
The response from the drivers of having their opinion valued was very positive and no 
papers were spoiled. I stepped back from getting the questionnaires disseminated 
nationally as I was sceptical of the approach some of my colleagues would adopt that may 
compromise the data collected.  The option of an online questionnaire was not robust 
enough at the time to make it a viable option for me to adopt. 
3.19 Interviews 
Interviews have been the mainstay of qualitative research for many years.  The challenges 
faced by interviewers are designing and carrying out interviews constructed with critical 
attention, and time.  Researchers face choices ranging from the interview content, 
conduct within the interview, the medium used to capture it,  to  how they will position 
themselves within the process. 
The origins of interviews date from the early 1900s with the development of anthropological 
studies and ethnographic approaches.  Some of the early researchers made observations 
while also conducting interviews (Bernard, 2017 and 2013; Stocking, 1983).  These early 
researchers used interviews to question the meaning of experiences and to provide access 
to the context of the participant’s behaviours Seidman (1991). 
I will structure my interviews along the lines of in-depth interviews (Appendix 1). I have 
set questions, which allow the interviewee to express both detail and their opinion on the 
effectiveness of what was being asked of them by the company and on their ability to 
function within the company.  I will be interviewing members of the DSCM whose role is 
to set and maintain the standards of driving that is expected within the company at 
each store or centre that they are responsible for.  The interviewees cover a cross 
section of operational sizes and geographic regions to avoid bias and provide a greater 
level of context. 
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3.20 Structured Interviews 
Within my case study, I intend to use structured interviews; each participant will be 
interviewed over a similar period of time using closed questions as much as possible, and 
every question that each participant is asked will be identified; each question will be 
identified that asked each participant. It is important to me that standardised questions 
are used to harvest as accurate a data collection as possible regarding the points of view 
of the participants in the interviews. 
I was concerned that throughout conducting interviews with my colleagues they may be 
concerned about the possible after-effects of their answers and responses to my questions 
from the management team.  My ethical challenge was to reassure my colleagues that 
responses would be kept within the confines of my project and would not be shared with 
managers or management or personalised in any way that would contradict the Data 
Protection Act. 
3.21 Documentary Quantitative Data: 
• Company reports 
• Road safety reports 
• Government reports 
• Company database 
The company now has a comprehensive reporting suite that can provide me with detail 
on every driver, van and event, each record to be interrogated in micro detail if required or 
to provide a national picture.  The only disadvantage is that at present all data is presented 
and structured in a style for Tesco Dot.com-only examination and contemplation. This 
information will be represented in the study in a way that can be understood by the reader 
and made sense of by people outside as well as inside Tesco. 
3.22 Combination of the Case 
When undertaking a quality case study, there are two critical components that any 
researcher will have to attend to, which is the case study approach (drawing upon other 
research approaches) and the case presentation. 
These necessarily work together in a coherent fashion in case study research.  Thus, as 
discussed here, the case study is an approach to research that focuses on a specific 
situation within part of a UK-based company.  It employs case study research methods 
that draw upon other research approaches.  When cast as case studies, the other 
approaches are generally more holistic, particularistic, contextual, descriptive and creative 
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than they would be if applied to a more extensive rather than an intensive study of a given 
phenomenon.  All this information is then documented in a contextualised ‘case report’.  
With this in mind, a well-constructed, bounded and holistic case study should provide the 
company with worthwhile recommendations and development for the future.  As 
explained earlier, the mixed methods approach adopted here derives in large part from 
the philosophy of pragmatism and in this final section I touch on some of the main issues 
relevant to my own application of this. 
3.23 Pragmatism Approach 
Pragmatism is widely understood to have developed as a philosophical movement 
beginning in the United States in the early 1870s.  Philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce 
is given credit for its development Haack (2006), along with later twentieth century 
contributors  (James and Dewey, 1931: Reck, 1984).  The first use in print of ‘pragmatism’ 
was in 1898 by North American philosopher and psychologist William James, who credited 
Peirce with coining the term during the early 1870s.  James regarded Peirce's ‘illustrations 
of the Logic of Science’ series (including ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877), and especially 
(1878)), as the foundation of pragmatism. 
Pragmatism is a paradigm that advocates the use of mixed methods in research, which 
‘sidesteps the contentious issues of truth and reality’ (Feilzer, 2015: 8) and ‘focuses 
instead on 'what works' as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation’ 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2001b: 713).  Research designs based on case studies tend 
to be more flexible than those in positive paradigms, for example, those used in a 
research laboratory.  McKernan (1991:20) indicates that practical action research 
promotes human interpretation, interactive communication, deliberation, negotiation and 
detailed description while reducing measurements and controls (Masters, 1995).  As 
McKernan suggests,” the goal of practical action researchers is understanding practice and 
solving immediate problems” McKernan (1991, 20). This resonates with my own stated 
research aims and goals, see also Heinze (2008). Goldkuhal wrote a distinctive work in 
2012 where he described admirably the benefits of a modern case study as an exercise 
in pragmatism: ‘Qualitative research is often associated with interpretivism, but alternatives 
do exist. Besides critical research and sometimes positivism, qualitative research in 
information systems can be performed following a paradigm of pragmatism’ (Goldkuhl, 
2012:  p 135-146). 
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Figure 23 Example of Thematic Analysis 
3.24 Summary 
I intend to undertake a case study that has now been defined as a longitudinal case study. 
I will be working as an insider participatory researcher.  Part of my methodology is to 
gain a better understanding of the effects of strategic change.  My intention is to collect 
data from five main sources: 
• Documents 
• Drivers database 
• Interviews 
• Questionnaires 
• In-work observations 
 
My career within Tesco Dot.com started in 2006 and continues to the present day.  During 
this period l have been instrumental in forging policies, processes and programmes that 
have benchmarked the company as a pioneer in van driver safety and best practice; part 
of my investigation is to gauge the effect of these systems. 
I will be entering the workplace to engage with as many participants as possible while 
carrying out my normal managerial tasks.  I will be focusing on two of our largest 
operations to gain as much detail and texture as possible by engaging with managers, 
support staff and drivers.  I am aware that in case studies and general research involving 
qualitative and ergonomic, in particular work-based, projects, ethics are key to a 
successful project.  Although my project is in-house and only involves Tesco Dot.com staff 
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and personnel or third-party suppliers embedded within Tesco, the fact that I am having 
conversations and capturing data through questionnaires with both individuals and groups 
means that the awareness of potential conflict of interest and misunderstanding is foremost 
in my mind. 
I am looking forward to the challenge ahead. 
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Chapter 4 - Project Findings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss, critically analyse and interpret the findings of my work based 
research project.  My position as an embedded professional practitioner    throughout the 
project has provided a framework for data collection enabling me to record patterns of 
thoughts and behaviours relating to all participating groups within the case study. 




• Interviews   
• Documents 
My data gathering was planned so that it would be collectable within a developing and 
dynamic business environment. I was aware that over the length of the study the business 
would most likely enforce changes, so I would need to be active and agile in responding to 
inevitable transformation and innovations in action.  I was able to differentiate between 
internal and external documents.  I designed and constructed interviews and questionnaires 
to allow for data collection in a non-threatening and relaxed environment, as drivers are 
historically sceptical of anything generated from management, and with a high level of 
ethical consideration to alleviate their concerns.   
I utilised internal reports and conversations to capture data as well as works-based 
observations.  By adopting a broad base of data collection methods, I have been able to 
give the project depth and texture. 
Whilst reviewing the effectiveness of the drivers’ risk database and engaging in 
conversation and interviews with managers, this opened a dialogue that was both 
informative and constructive. This is the case both in its criticism of the database and the 
suggested changes that would be recommended to the database. 
I structured my case study in the shape of the insert data collection methodology, identifying 
the groups that I wished to study (managers and drivers).  I designed a strategy that 
matched my position as an insider professional practitioner, and this facilitated my data 
capture and real-life observations. I designed and constructed interviews and 
questionnaires to allow for data collection in a non-threatening and relaxed environment, 
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with a high level of ethical consideration.  I utilised internal reports and conversations to 
capture data as well as works-based observations. 
Whilst reviewing the effectiveness of the drivers’ risk database and engaging in 
conversation and interviews with managers, this opened a dialogue that was both 
informative and constructive.  This is the case both in its criticism of the database and the 
suggested changes recommended. 
Over the course of the research changes did indeed happen, some expected and others in 
more serendipitous occurrences.  
My project started in the spring of 2012 and was expected to end in 2015-16.  The case 
study as my chosen framework of investigation remained constant throughout the life of the 
project.  Initially I had a clear vision that our drivers’ database would be the core of my case 
study.  However, approximately six months into the project it became clear to me that the 
database was not fit for purpose and was not the most suitable subject in isolation for my 
manager, I widened my investigation to cover driver safety within Dotcom, investigating the 
act of changing people’s perception of the value of driver safety. 
4.2 Observations Structured and Neutral 
I intended my observations of driver safety to be ‘structured and neutral’ as opposed to 
‘unstructured and artificial’.  I found that this approach in conjunction with researcher 
observation and practitioner mentoring/teaching in situ was advantageous.   Being a 
qualified driving instructor and being seen as the company expert in this field gave me 
great traction-particularly with the drivers. 
Fortunately, I was able to spend large periods of time working in four of our biggest 
operations, presenting me with many opportunities to be a first-hand witness and to actively 
become involved in the day-to-day operation.  These opportunities continued for the 
duration of my project.  My findings were conveyed to my line manager by phone on a 
regular basis.   I communicated rarely to a wider population by email (Appendix 22) as this 
usually created a negative response from the senior team managing the operation. 
I am specifically interested in the safety component of our drivers in the workplace.  This 
pre-existing interest in the safety of drivers and in particular outreach drivers naturally 
guided me to investigate the possibility of an existing divergence and contrast between the 
behaviour of the drivers and managers.  I would research whether this was the case both 
at store and in relation to the reports generated and developed within the company 
relating to each individual driver and operation on a macro, micro and meso level.  Whilst 
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working within the business I investigated the possible contrast in the data gathered as well 
as any effect that this data may have had on the drivers, local managers and the leadership 
team.  I observed in order to ascertain if there had been any marginal or significant change 
in the behaviour or focus of any group as a response to the data shared within the business. 
Throughout my investigation, I was careful to pay attention to the ethical implications of 
my role as an embedded workplace professional practitioner whilst also executing my role 
as the company’s Occupational Road Risk manager.  Although my job role has little 
effective rank within the company, the uniqueness of my knowledge allows me to be 
strategically influential within the business, often relied upon as a trusted consultant and 
knowledge reference point within Dotcom and the wider van-based industry.  It was 
because of this position as in-house expert that the company requested me to gain my 
doctorate in work-based learning.  This would allow me to become the recognised expert 
within my field, to support, steer and maintain the company within the highest levels 
of driver safety.  Whilst gathering my data I interacted with several hundred drivers and a 
cross-section of: 
• Senior managers and directors 
• On-site senior managers 
• On-site managers and team leaders 
• Local and national support teams 
• Trade union representatives of various levels 
I have structured the analysis and discussion by first providing an overview with a project 
timeline and then individual chronologies for the major components of the research in terms 
of four main areas of investigation: the database, telematics, influences on Tesco Dot.com 
and my life in Tesco.  Table 5 Project Timeline represents these main areas of investigation 
from the period between 2010 and 2016, although some of the history of the innovations 
dating from 2008 is also included. This period is before my project officially began and is 
drawn on to help make sense of unfolding events that continued to impact on the project. 
The use of temporally organised figures of this kind is an established practice in longitudinal, 
chronological case study research Rainer (2011) and Table 5 displays in expanded 
diagrammatic form an overview of the case compared to that in  
Figure 22, Methods Plan for the Project. Because this is a case study about innovation, it is 
important to stress that within the study there are two discrete, but interconnected 
innovations introduced at different but overlapping times, at differing time scales and with 
separate outcomes.  It is important to state therefore, that the start and end points of the 
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case study have been determined pragmatically, not least by my role in this research (see 
Chapter 3). 
Figure 25 has two axes: the horizontal is temporal and shows developments and changes 
over time, while the vertical shows the main sources of data and interpretation as well as 
the main influences impacting on the case.  Key aspects of the three main models of my 
methodology are brought together in Figure 25 as an organising device for presenting and 
analysing the data: The Content, Context and Process (CCP) model (Pettigrew and Whipp, 
1991), the diffusion of innovations Rogers (1983) and the innovation ‘journey’ (Van de Ven, 
1999). In the horizontal axis diffusion Rogers (2010), ‘journeying’ (Van de Ven, 2017) and 
patterns through time (the process dimension of Pettigrew and Whipp) are brought to bear 
on events and data, while in the vertical axis the content and context dimensions (Pettigrew 
and Whipp) and the individual as manager of innovation and change (Rogers) are brought 
to bear. 
The first major stage of data collection was my investigation into telematics and its use and 
possible misuse within the business.  A chronology of events is followed by a more detailed 
analysis relating to telematics and its use within driver safety initiatives in Tesco Dot.com. 
The second stage of data collection stemmed from my findings from an investigation into 
the database (Appendices 4 and 18).  The reflection on this process here commences with 
the chronology of events, followed by detailed analysis considering the benefits and 
disadvantages of the database as well as how it has impacted on the business and driver 
safety.  These stages are then followed by presentation of data from observations, 
interviews and a survey questionnaire, which were conducted at different periods, 
predominantly towards the end of the case study.  This data presents a series of snapshots 
on the journey of the two main innovations: the introduction of telematics and the driver 
safety database focused on here.  Specifically, they look at selected findings from: 
• Interrogating the functionality and effectiveness of our driver database 
• Observations of the safer driving report (partial product of the database) and its 
problematic use by managers 
• Interviews conducted with driver safety and compliance managers which explored 
at a given point how they viewed the database, its benefits, disadvantages and what 
improvements they might make  
• Results of a drivers’ questionnaire that I conducted in 2014 involving approximately 
122 drivers 
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4.3 Telematics from 2010 to Early 2016 
Table 6  Chronology of Events in Telematics 
 
Year Month Event 
2010 February Telematics launched in CFC south London 20 vans 
 March  Stop report launched 
 April Meetings with drivers to give visibility of their driving 
behaviour 
 June Continued instances of vandalising telematic black box 
 July Telematic data used for the first time resulting from 
fatal RTC 
2011 March Telematic black box moved from under the driver’s 
seat and embedded by the engine to avoid vandalism 
2012 August Telematic data used in fatal RTC in London 
2013 April Implementation of Safer Driving Report 
 
Telematics were first introduced to Tesco Dot.com in 2008 where initially it was used more 
as a fuel usage and driver behaviour report (Amarasinghe et al., 2015).  In 2010 the first 
attempt at the introduction of a driver behaviour report occurred and was trialled, initially in 
a London Customer Fulfilment Centre that I was responsible for. I then rapidly rolled out 
these changes across the entire estate (Azzopardi and Cortis, 2013).  I contributed to a 
report of this trial called the ‘Stop Report’ (Appendix 9), which in 2010 was presented to the 
management team.  Its scope of investigation was limited to analysing and reporting on 
speeding parameters rather than more comprehensive aspects of driver safety Wegman 
(1996).  Parameter one was based on the speed limit (+10% +2 mph): this is the basic 
equation used by the police across the UK when drivers fall into the area of endorsement 
points on your licence, resulting from committing a motoring offence (Ayuso, Guillen and 
Nielsen, 2018).  The second parameter was 20 mph over the posted speed limit, resulting 
in immediate suspension and disciplinary action that could end in dismissal.  




In 2008, over the first few months that telematics was introduced, drivers treated this 
technology with a great deal of scepticism (Baecke and Bocca, 2017).  Numerous sabotage 
events in which the telematics were deliberately taken off-line were discovered (Wahlström, 
Skog and Händel, 2015).  This was the first time that the company had such a form of 
indirect insight into certain kinds of van driver psychology and behaviour and it responded 
by mandating change and innovation Mikulski (2012).  The company’s initial reaction was 
to invoke a tightened performance management process of monitoring and review 
spearheaded by me.  This eventually included locating the telematics black box in vandal 
proof casing (Nilsson, Harms and Peters, 2001).  My initial investigation in the first six 
months of 2010 found that there was a reticence by operational and HR managers to 
suspend drivers who had breached parameter two, and this led to inconsistencies both in 
discipline and performance management which undermined the principles both of fairness 
and of controlling or improving driver behaviour.  I discovered that although prior to 2010 
the company had developed driver safety workforce management processes and policies 
that were robust, legally compliant and agreed to with trade unions, the individual store 
managers exercised total control over their implementation.  It was their decision alone as 
to who would be disciplined or suspended or ultimately dismissed.  One store manager 
stated openly to me: ‘I will never deprive an employee of their income through a traffic 
offence’.  
During the period between 2008 and 2010 a fundamental lack of understanding and 
consensus about driver safety was a powerful barrier to change in the organisation’s 
approach to improving behaviours in this area (Van Der Laan, Heino and De Waard, 1997).  
This lack of consensus about good driver and management practice led to wide 
discrepancies in leadership insurance approaches, ranging from the laissez-faire style 
evidenced in the store manager’s statement above to a more authoritarian, albeit benign, 
approach of managers issuing final written warnings to drivers who breached parameter 
one (Davidson and Olsen, 2013). Inconsistencies in the behaviour and interpretation of 
individual managers, department heads and the determinedly non-compliant attitudes of 
many drivers created a toxic atmosphere that impeded adoption of this technological 
innovation, especially during the period between 2010 and 2015.  
The drivers’ initial approach to telematics changed dramatically after a fatal accident in mid-
2010 when a young female cyclist died as a result of her colliding with one of our vans 
Green (2004).  This unfortunate and tragic event occurred approximately a year and a half 
after the initial pilot programme introducing telematics into our vans in 2008, (Valerio et al., 
2008).  Until this time, the telematics letterbox was seen as a ‘spy in the cab’ and created a 
very negative environment as far as the drivers were concerned Vakati (2015).  My director 




was made aware of the fatal incident when we attended a road safety event at the Millbrook 
testing ground.  I drove immediately from the Midlands to Brighton to supervise events and 
to communicate with the Police.  
However, during the first 48 hours of the investigation stemming from the fatality, police 
were able to inform us that unless significant new information came to light the driver would 
not face prosecution.  This rapid pronouncement was due not only to witness statements 
but also, crucially, the telematics data which confirmed the driver’s account of his behaviour 
(Husnjak et al., 2015).  This was a sea change in how telematics were viewed both by the 
driver safety compliance team and the driver population.  The period just described can be 
considered one of early implementation.  Rogers’ theory about the diffusion of innovations 
(see Figure 24) namely, the innovation itself, communication channels, time, and a social 
system can be applied to this early stage narrative up until 2010 (Dixit, Thomas and 
Agarwal, 2016).  It was evident to me that while the telematics innovation was in theory 
technically up and running, its characteristics were often poorly understood and not 
optimally implemented and acted upon.  Indeed, they were very often effectively blocked or 
applied less than optimally at operational level.  
Communication channels relied on a top-down and relatively opaque process of information 
sharing that enabled swift and accountable decision-making in some contexts but less 
effective and accountable decisions in others (Ampunan et al., 2008).  Moreover, I was 
aware that lateral, informal channels of communication via driver ‘grapevines’ about the 
value and purpose of telematics went unchallenged and uncorrected by managers and may 
have inadvertently encouraged sabotage (Grokop and Kuhn, 2016).  Time and habituation 
seemed to play relatively little part at this stage in embedding the innovation, as it was not 
forming part of accepted practice.  The social system, considered here as a culture of 
autonomous driver behaviour allied to autonomous decision-making at local level, evidently 
played a major part in the problematic diffusion of the innovation.  Equally evident to me 
was the relative lack of what Rogers calls ‘early adopters’ among managers sufficient in 
number to create a critical mass for change.  Despite my efforts in individual and team 
meetings and training programmes to cascade the benefits of telematics and recruit the ‘late 
adopters’, those who adopt the innovation once it has been tried and tested by others 
usually do so because not adopting it would simply be more trouble.  Rogerian ‘take off’ 
thus took much longer to achieve than the smooth trajectory set out in the schematic 
representation of innovation in Figure 24 . 
  




The telematics programme thereafter between 2010 and 2016 was predominantly a great 
technical success.  Reports were accurate and easy to use, with regular updates to enrich 
the quality of the reports.  However, technical functionality was not always equally matched 
by consistent take-up. 
 
Figure 24  Rogers’ Four Main Elements in the Diffusion of Innovations 
Events became more problematic when the DSCM in 2014 disseminated the content of the 
reports to the wider store team and these responses were varied and sporadic in many 
operations.  When I pressed the DSCM to provide a percentage of compliance within the 
operations contained in their groups, compliance varied from 20% to 80% across the UK.   
The early implementation of telematics seemed to illustrate some of the barriers identified 
by Rogers to early implementation (such as loss of control, loss of face and concerns about 
competence in a new context).  An unplanned event, in this case a crisis (a fatal RTA), 
became the initial trigger event for increased innovation adoption (Anderson et al., 2018).  
Rogers perhaps offers fewer insights here than Pettigrew and Whipp, who emphasise the 
importance of the influence of context and contingency, especially in transformative change.  
However, Rogers can still help us understand how individual change, however prompted, is 
embedded and sustained.  The event was unfortunate in the extreme but provided an 
opportunity to seize any momentum for change from a crisis to our advantage.  The event 
changed the opinion and perception of the telematics from a negative to a positive from the 
drivers’ perspective.  This argument perhaps gains credibility in the light of a subsequent 
untoward incident in location Z, (Appendix 14), (see discussion of database).  




4.4 The Database 
Table 7  Chronology of Events – Database 
 
Year Month Event 
2010 March Meeting with line manager to discuss the 
investigation into the database 
 May My initial concerns were proven to be 
valid, major discrepancies found in the 
database 
 June More discrepancies found in the 
database 
2011  On-going quarterly review of the 
database 
2012  Continued concerns with database 
accuracy 
2013  Differences in payroll numbers to drivers 
listed on the database 
2014  Continued concerns with database 
accuracy 
2015  Interviewed managers regarding the use 
and development of the database 
2016  No data input for the whole of Scotland 
for all of 2016 
2017  Flaw in the colour coding of the 
database came to light when I 
investigated how the company dealt with 
a fatal accident 
 
4.5 An Analysis of Some of the Data 
It had been intended that the drivers’ risk database would be developed into a dominant tool 
to be used by driver safety and compliance managers (Appendices 18 and 19).  However, 
the lack of supervision, monitoring and auditing of the database made the information 
contained within it incomplete and the following analysis is mostly about opportunities that 
were not taken and lessons for the future that arose from this inaction. 
In 2010 between July and December I conducted an initial investigation (Appendices 17 
and 18) interrogating the database on a monthly basis to identify any misuse, incorrect data 
or lack of use.   




This was a broad investigation initially embarked upon as a sense check to the database’s 
functionality and usability by the wider team.  The problems that I became aware of, also 
vocalised by the DSCM, could be seen to embody aspects of Rogers’ ideas about innovation, 
communication, time and social system as well as Van de Ven’s innovation journey.  While 
we had, as with the telematics, established awareness of the innovation among potential 
adopters and aroused a level of interest, the trialling and implementation of the database 
proved much more problematic than even the telematics had been. 
Throughout 2011 to 2012 I conducted an initial investigation examining the database on a 
quarterly basis, checking that training had taken place within the timeframes agreed with 
the unions.  During the observations I unearthed that there were significant variations in use, 
both in terms of how managers investigated database information trends and themes, as 
well as the readiness to input accurate information on a regular basis, which is an obvious 
threat and concern to its suitability.  In addition to the dubious use of the database, DSCM 
were sent various other company weekly reports that they were expected to act upon, 
something I will cover later in this chapter. 
A good example of lack of engagement with the database is demonstrated by when I 
became aware in 2016 that virtually no information had been uploaded for the whole of 
Scotland.  My enquiries further flagged up the fact there was no audit tool or data analysis 
carried out by the company at any stage during the practical use of the database.  Further 
observations and practical conversations within the workplace with managers unearthed a 
wide range of approaches to using the database.  This irregular approach to employing this 
tool was further heightened by vague guidance from the then management team in how to 
use and prioritise this activity over other forms of reporting.  Each DCSM was left to their 
own devices concerning the control and standard of the data uploaded; this was of great 
concern to me. 
Many managers explained in their defence that they had many data streams to work with, 
three of which caused a conflict of priorities: the driver risk database, ARB reports 
(Appendice 10 and11) that they received weekly and the new driver performance report 
(Appendix 12) that was derived from telematics data that also arrived weekly.  The perceived 
lack of clarity regarding prioritisation and focus of time and resources created an on-going 
issue, or possibly excuse, where managers would constantly fall short of the goals set when 
the database was first constructed and implemented.  The properties required to make 
innovation Rogers (1993) successful, notably its compatibility with existing systems, the 
complexity or ease of its use, and above all its trialability the extent to which the innovation 
could be tested by potential adopters without a major investment of time or resources were 
signally absent.  It was clear to me at the time that there needed to be a coming together of 




the various data streams available to the driver safety and compliance team.  My own 
analysis of its functionality combined with the feedback from those using it demonstrated to 
me that this could not be achieved by simply tweaking the existing database.  What was 
needed was a fundamental redesign and one that would involve end users in what Rogers 
(1993) calls, ‘the mental evaluation of the innovation’ as well as the trial.  This major change 
would need careful explanation and mustering of evidence and so in 2015 I started to have 
conversations with my line manager about my observations and how to develop a more 
comprehensive system, which would become Database 2 (Appendices 20 and 21). 
There was clear informal evidence that some managers were champions who diligently 
focused on both training and developing drivers in response to all three databases the driver 
risk database, ARB report and safer driving report.  These individuals could form the nucleus 
of a potential future cohort of persuaders and early adopters.  For example, two particular 
managers who worked in and around the M25 demonstrated to me in person in 2015-16 
how they were able to effectively amalgamate tasks and successfully undertake ARB, post-
accident training, upload all relevant new information onto the database and notify the 
system of personnel who had left.  Also, they used the driver safety report proactively, 
training those drivers who had been identified by it as exhibiting poor driving behaviour.  
This manager spent time with drivers on the road and would then monitor their behaviour 
using the safer driving report over several months post-training.  Finally, this manager would 
then evaluate any change in the driver's position within the database.  More often than not 
this resulted in long-term behavioural change and improvement.  Rogers argues that simply 
educating staff about a policy (‘vision knowledge’) is insufficient for the adoption of an 
innovation.  Employees must recognise that the innovation is compatible with their job and 
that underpinning its vision there is a relative advantage over existing ideas. 
Here at local level was also an excellent illustration of Van de Ven’s ‘life cycle’ mode of 
change (see Chapter 3).  An individual, in this case a highly motivated manager with a 
holistic view of driver safety process of regulation and compliant adaptation.  However, as 
Van de Ven observes, this life cycle mode is probably more appropriate for prescribed small-
scale innovations and may be less appropriate for more complex environments with multiple 
entities.  This was the case in this scenario since the excellent local practice I observed did 
not cascade across the culture of the whole store where this particular manager was based. 
Moreover, my role at this time precluded me from sharing more widely and directly this and 
other examples of good practice.  The learning produced from this source did not percolate 
outside its immediate context and the potential it had to educate other managers about how 
to manage competing priorities, develop a more compassionate culture of performance 




management, and use data and evidence for evaluating the effectiveness of interventions, 
was not exploited.   
It proved difficult for me to engage and maintain a sustained interest in driver safefty 
initiatives across all levels: operational, middle management and senior management.  
Attention from management occurred in peaks and troughs, often associated with crises or 
changes of senior management staff.  Although the driver safety and compliance team 
provide a pivotal role in the acquisition, training and development of drivers, their feedback 
and input to operational managers within Tesco stores was often received within an 
alarmingly high level of disinterest.  Equally, neither were compliance managers within  
operations supportive of the DSCM endeavours and I spent much time and energy during 
the case study seeking to understand the causes of this reluctance, articulating my ideas to 
my immediate line manager.  I can understand to an extent resistance to processes 
perceived as being ‘helicoptered in’ from head office and the way in which my role could be 
seen as being ‘the messenger’ for top-down approaches.  In the influencial The Fifth 
Discipline Senge (1990) distinguishes between commitment, enrolment and compliance in 
relation to change.  In Senge’s description, total commitment and willingness to change and 
adapt appears at one end, while total apathy is at the other. Enrolment and compliance 
(going along with a change because it is easier than resisting it) sit in the middle.  As 
discussed above, a Rogerian approach assumes that success in diffusing an innovation 
depends on the co-presence of commitment and enrolment.  Or in other words, what matters 
is ensuring that the critical mass of those behind the innovation outweighs the nay sayers.  
Clearly, compliance with health and safety is absolutely vital to saving lives and preventing 
injuries; my job is ensuring compliance with driver safety legislation and procedures.  I came 
into post convinced that any culture of driver safety is about more than mere compliance, it 
is also about the individual driver feeling valued.  I was therefore preoccupied with moving 
the workforce, or at least those champions I had identified, towards genuine compliance.  
Where this was not immediately possible the goal of formal compliance was at least an 
achievement.  What was more of a challenge was experiencing grudging compliance, which 
might easily revert back to the kinds of sabotage that had undermined the database.  On 
reflection, my then manager sat between formal and genuine compliance and further afield, 
the complexity of organisational structure and the various power relations within it made for 
overall poor compliance. 
In August 2012 there was a fatal accident involving a Tesco Dot.com van and a pedestrian 
in West London, an event that refocused the company’s approach to driver safety.  Being 
in the centre of a police investigation and having widespread negative press coverage 
brought driver safety back onto the main agenda of the business.  My previous argument 




gained credibility and it began to be widely considered that the first driver database was 
inadequate as a stand-alone tool to protect drivers and the company.  When I embarked on 
this project my main intention was to utilise information from the database to underpin what 
I imagined would be a much neater (and shorter) study of driver safety behaviour.  I soon 
realised that I had to widen my investigation, as discussed above, while aligning myself with 
a fundamental theme of the project, that of driver safety.  I soon recognised that any 
resulting analysis of key components within the database would provide misleading and 
corrupt results.  This was clearly evident as early as 2015 and two examples from this period 
illustrate the way this would be the case.  Firstly, as previously identified in this chapter, 
there was a distinct lack of data uploaded over the course of the year in Scotland, meaning 
that database analysis would be incomplete.  Secondly, comparing the number of currently 
working drivers on the risk database with the company’s HR payroll codes for drivers 
revealed a vast discrepancy.  There were over 3,500 more drivers active on the risk 
database compared with those present on the payroll, also signifying that analysis would be 
irregular. 
Tesco Dot.com employs a colour-coding system throughout its business with ‘red’ 
representing a fail, ‘amber’ a concern, ‘green’ good and ‘blue’ being excellent.  This system 
was employed throughout the database to allow quick and efficient interrogation, enabling 
managers to easily locate failing drivers who were filtered in a high-to-low format.  On first 
investigation, this methodology looked both practical and achievable.  However, many 
drivers would focus entirely on this database, identifying themselves within its ranking 
system.  The disadvantage of this is that they would then neglect both the ARB report and 
safer driving report and in doing so would replicate an unbalanced approach to minimising 
risk.  When investigating the most recent fatal accident, it became clear to me that the driver 
safety and compliance management team responsible for the related store had 
unfortunately changed several times as a result of company restructuring.  This prompted 
me to reflect whether these changes had led to a reduced capacity for oversight. 
I discovered that in this store there had been an unrealistic focus purely on colour-coding 
and not on a more holistic, detailed picture of individual driver behaviour.  Therefore there 
appeared to be systematic failing in training as well as performance.  When I first analysed 
the information stored in the database relating to the individual involved in the fatal incident, 
the entire report came up blue, which on initial investigation strongly implied that all training 
had been undertaken.  As a result, the company was in a good position to defend itself in 
court or if investigated by the Health and Safety Executive.  I discovered, however, that this 
was not the case and the driver in question had eight untrained contextual speeding events 
and four untrained ARB incidents.  The fact that these incidents had taken place over a 




relatively long period, and at the time the algorithm controlling the database had a time 
default that automatically showed an event as trained “blue/green”, conspired that to the 
casual user it appeared that all training had been completed. 
In further, closer investigation conducted in August 2017 resulting from another fatal 
accident, I found clear anomalies to the use and interpretation of the database.  I discovered 
that the individual concerned had eight outstanding speeding offences.  Although these 
events went back several years, the driver had not completed the associated training put in 
place to correct this behaviour.  My concern was that as a result of no training taking place 
over several years the algorithm within the database had automatically turned these events 
blue, masking the need for any initial investigation.  At the same time, I was able to discover 
trends and data relating to total numbers on the database between 2010 and 2017.  The 
table below illustrates the number of drivers that have joined and left the company since 
2010, as well as the volume of accidents and speeding events across the company.  The 
data in Table 8 is designed to help the reader get a feel and taste for the numbers and types 
of incidents that the Tesco Dot.com van fleet encounters. 
Table 8  Drivers, ARBs, Speeding Events and Facts from the Database 
 
Drivers on the Database 




 15,675 25,658 41,333 
ARBs 
 Total Number of 
ARBs from  




 13,376 10,517 2,859 
Speeding 
 Events Trained Dismissal for more 
than 20 miles an 
hour over the posted 
speed limit 
 10,042 3735 47 
253 drivers have no information about them on the database tool 
The police have prosecuted 267 drivers for various driving offences 
 



















In 2016 there were 4,120 accidents over 120 million miles, resulting in an average accident 
rate of one every 29,126 miles. 
Table 10  Total Number of Driving Incidents in the Database 
 










Table 11  Driver Age Profile 
 
Age of Drivers Female Male Total 
18 - 21 64 627 691 
22 - 30 387 3,079 3,466 
31 - 40 329 7,079 7408 
40+  267  3,935 4,202 
Total   15,767 




4.6 Driver Safety Reports (Telematics) 
Throughout the 2010 - 2016 period of my project, my findings would be passed on via 
telephone conversation on a day by day or week by week basis to my line manager for him 
to decide what action should be taken, if any.  Here I focus on the role of the safety reports 
in the final two years of the project, 2014 to 2016.  Equally, discussion of report findings 
formed part of my regular and routine observations with managers and drivers in the 
workplace.  I felt that this informal approach allowed me to get a clearer picture of both the 
functionality of managers and drivers alike (Basacik and Stevens, 2008).  I also interrogated 
these reports over a significant period of time, focusing in detail on one site (location D).  
This has allowed me to maintain an overview and to monitor the general driver population 
along with the responses of driver safety and compliance managers. 
The Microlise programme for collecting data from our vans and the drivers’ behaviour 
started in 2008 in our (location X) operation, where l was the driver training manager at the 
time. 
I have reviewed the progress and development of the data received from Microlise and 
have had in-depth discussions with drivers and management on the effect the data when 
displayed in report form has on the drivers and the management. 
I initiated the use of in-van telematics as a result of an accident where it was discernible 
that our driver had been speeding and not concentrating on his driving, meaning that they 
collided with a parked car with no other third-party involvement.  This incident highlighted 
the lack of focus that the company had on the safety of our outreach drivers and the general 
public.  At this point, if a driver were to be involved in any serious incident, blameworthy or 
not, the Health and Safety Executive would be critical in the extreme regarding our lack of 
‘duty of care’.  The company’s culpability in the situation was compounded when I 
interviewed the driver; his statement strongly implied that equipment retrofitted by the 
company was a major contributing factor. 
I was aware that there was no option other than to create a more inclusive safety culture 
that assisted in protecting the company, our drivers and the general public.  One of the 
biggest complaints from our drivers was that they felt alone when out on the road, and after 
researching potential avenues to take, the company chose to activate the option of fitting 
telemetry gathering equipment to all of our vans.  This would create a reporting process 
that would support both development and performance management of the drivers and 
improve our duty of care and allow drivers not to feel so alone.  However, this change was 
subsequently shown not be quite so warmly welcomed by the drivers. 




This form of collecting data from our vans and the drivers’ behaviour started in 2008 in our 
X location operation, where l was the driver training manager at the time.  We chose 
Nottingham-based Microlise as our telematics provider as they had had experience 
working with our partners in distribution.  Under my supervision the system went live for 
12 weeks, during which time the drivers were not informed of any of the data collected.  After 
the 12-week consultation period, drivers were shown their own report during a private 
one-to-one session with me and my team with no disciplinary action involved.  The results 
for some of the drivers, approximately 50%, caused a great deal of emotion amongst the 
drivers.  This was the first time for most of the drivers that they had access to a report that 
actually displayed what their driver behaviour actually was like. 
The majority of drivers (mostly those with a poor report) deemed the introduction of the 
telematics system as a spy in the cab.  This negative response was to be expected, so to 
help circumvent a total driver rebellion we entered exhaustive negotiations prior to piloting 
with the trade unions involved to obtain their approval relating to the driver safety initiative.   
During the first few months, I witnessed many cases of sabotage, due mainly to the lack 
of understanding throughout the company of the advantages of telematics.  The 
vandalism of vans resulted in tens of thousands of pounds of damage.  As previously 
mentioned, this wave of negative emotion diminished greatly when telematics were used 
to support a driver’s blamelessness when involved in a fatal accident involving a young 
female cyclist. 
I was aware that there was no option other than to create a more inclusive safety culture 
that assisted in protecting the company, our drivers and the general public.  In supporting 
the research into potential options, the option the company chose to utilise was to fit 
telemetry gathering equipment to all of our vans in order to create a reporting process that 
would support both development and performance management of the drivers and improve 
our Duty of Care. 
This unfortunate incident demonstrated the positive aspects of this technology.  For the 
first time, the company was able to liaise with the investigating police officers and furnish 
them with court admissible data that could either support our drivers’ innocence or lead to 
a successful prosecution.  Legal process involving a coroner’s court would normally take a 
minimum of six months and a prosecution of death by dangerous driving can take anything 
up to four years.  As stated previously, but important to reiterate, on this particular occasion 
as a result of the data provided by the company the police were able to inform us within 
forty-eight hours, unless new information became available other than that of the telematics 
and witness statements our driver would not be prosecuted. 




Although this was of no solace or relief to the unfortunate family of the cyclist or our 
driver, it did prevent a protracted stressful build-up to a court case that would have 
caused additional stress for our driver with a negative impact on his health.  The introduction 
of telematics and its subsequent benefit relating to road safety is one of our biggest 
achievements within Tesco Dot.com and is clearly traceable throughout the data capture 
of my case study. 
4.7 Safer Driving Report 
With the introduction of telematics, the company recognised the need to initiate acceptable 
limits of behaviour.  To achieve this, we first introduced a red warning light to indicate 
excessive speed (20mph) over the posted limit.  This would create a report to be opened 
at the beginning of each working day and drivers setting off the light would be suspended 
and probably dismissed. 
On observing drivers during this period of change there was an initial spike in offences, 
which almost immediately dropped to a trickle.  Very quickly it became apparent to me that 
the drivers would drive at speeds very close to the maximum limit without inducing a 
notification.  This would be interpreted by the HSE as the company consenting to poor 
driving behaviour and breaking the law inadvertently Tesco Dot.com had adopted a binary 
process for dealing with poor driving.  For example, if a driver went beyond a given threshold 
then a report would be generated, and appropriate action taken.  This only affected the 
worst 3% of drivers and my concern was that we needed to administer all of our drivers to 
constantly raise the safety level of the entire driver population .The ideal use of the driver 
safety report would be that it would be printed and displayed in the Tesco Dot.com area of 
Tesco for drivers to see.  Data would be presented anonymously by the use of payroll 
numbers rather than identifiable names so the drivers could gauge for themselves how the 
telematics had portrayed their behaviour and hopefully their pride in driving would 
incentivise them to improve without supervision or other ostensible interventions.  This 
approach chimed well with existing processes of fostering a culture of target-driven 
improvement in customer satisfaction.  However, in many stores the driver safety report 
would never be printed and displayed and would be used only by individual managers.  I 
discovered this discrepancy in early 2015 when I investigated how the report was being 
used by various members of the team.  Its potential as a tool for individual and team 
feedback, a celebration of success and continuous quality improvement was not 
consistently exploited. 
  




I also discovered early on that the use of this report was also affected by technological 
constraints in the context that drivers identified via the use of the company’s Serial Device 
Server (SDS) device (a handheld computer) in early 2016.  If the SDS device is not correctly 
uploaded with the drivers’ details, or there is difficulty downloading data at the end of the 
trip, the driver safety report run by the Microlise system will not recognise the driver.  The 
data will be dumped in a collective pot and this again caused the DSCM concern as valuable 
data was either corrupted or lost. 
I made a number of general observations in the workplace via line manager reports between 
2010 and 2016.  These reports enabled me over time to observe, mostly in the six big 
Customer Fullfilment Centres and the six DSCM, the likely relevance, strength and interplay 
of the five properties of an innovation likely to support or impede the innovation as identified 
by Rogers (1983): relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability.  
In order to analyse further the incomporation of the telematics innovation, I will break down 
Rogers’ points in relation to this particular case study here.  
Relative advantage, the degree to which a new innovation is perceived to be better than 
what currently exists.  Here, as with the telematics, the potential advantage of the database 
was incompletely understood.  There was the added disadvantage that the database in 
some instances provided data which was less than accurate or meaningful.  One manager 
voiced a common concern: 
I am not sure what I should be doing, working from the risk element of the 
database, using the safer driving report (neither are wholly accurate) or just 
concentrate on my ARBs.  Either way, the stores won't help performance 
manage the drivers, so what’s the point? 
Compatibility, the perceived ‘fit’ of the innovation with existing structures, processes and 
values.  Managers in several instances had to struggle to prioritise the driver reports; 
however, others found that the innovations chimed with existing values and processes of 
audit, feedback and performance management. 
Complexity, the degree of difficulty involved in learning about and implementing the 
innovation.  The telematics data was relatively easy to interpret and generally reliable. 
Trialability, the extent to which an innovation can be tried by potential adapters without a 
major investment of time or resources.  As discussed above, once the hurdle of driver 
acceptance had been overcome it was found to be  efficient in both cases. 




Observability, the degree to which outcomes resulting from the adoption of an innovation 
are visible.  This was paradoxically initially a barrier to adoption due to driver concerns about 
‘naming and shaming’.  However, this turned out to be one of its major assets. 
My observations overall suggested that the property having most impact was the 
innovation’s complexity or ease of use.  The more difficult to use, the less likely that the 
innovation will be taken up consistently.  
4.8 Change as a Result of Observations 
As a result of the implementation of telematics in our vans we were now able to develop 
our own bespoke report system, the Safer Driver Report (SDR).  On the 10th August 2012, 
we went back to Microlise and designed a major step change to our driver profiling and 
created the (SDR). 
It might be expected that the perception of the drivers was that telematics was just another 
management tool to beat the drivers with, indeed this was the case, however unintended 
when contemplating its conception. 
There was a need for a sliding scale to be introduced covering the fundamentals of 
driving practices that would allow both management and driver alike to have visibility and 
be able to compare performance on an individual, store, regional and national level, 
expressing standards and variations across the board.  To do so, New Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI) were introduced grading each element of the driver's behaviour. This 
driving output was ranked A to G and colour-coded like a washing machine display to 
show its power usage.  The banded grading was set so that ‘A’ is green, moving to red 
if showing at ‘G’.  The Safer Driving report was a big step change towards making and 
sharing driver data with our drivers expressed in a way that was easily understood by all. 
It has been noticeable throughout my analysis of the safer driver report that the vast 
majority of drivers are extremely competitive and once data is published anonymously 
amongst the drivers, usually on the wall in the driver delivery area, there is a marked 
improvement in performance.  Even in  the drivers most resistant to training who had 
entrenched poor habits and behaviours, there was an upturn in performance in relation to 
risk that could be positively tracked for many months. 
I am particularly interested in this effect as it supports the investment of practical driver 
training compared with online driver improvement packages readily available on the 
open market.  This may be as a result of a virtual parental effect based on the premise that 
the driver training manager or their successor effectively gave the opportunity of 




employment to the driver at the onset of their career.  Having a face-to-face conversation 
with the person who effectively welcomes you into the company creates a marked change 
in behaviour, which can also be tracked via the Accident Review Board process. 
4.9 Accident Review Board 
I launched the Accident Review Board (ARB) in 2008 in location X to help support our 
drivers and gain a better understanding of accidents and incidents.  More importantly, the 
board was initiated to make managers aware of their responsibilities in supporting our staff 
in relation to the expectations of the Health and Safety Executive.  On reviewing the 
company’s approach to accidents and incidents on the road, I became aware that there 
was a high level of deniability relating to disciplinary action resulting from poor driving 
behaviour.  In other words, it was arbitrarily accepted.  In my eyes, we were rapidly moving 
to the worst-case scenario of accepting fatalities as an operational by-product, a totally 
unacceptable situation in a blue-chip company such as Tesco (Appendix 12). 
4.9.1 How it Works 
This is a simple and impartial method that takes place via a conference call in order to 
determine whether an incident or accident was preventable.  If deemed preventable then 
the resulting training and performance management would be discussed.  The ARB 
process provided another excellent opportunity to gain insight and foresight into the drivers’ 
accidents and incidents.  For example, it is quite alarming when engaging in conversation 
with drivers to be given the insight that minor accidents and in some cases some serious 
accidents are considered an occupational hazard. 
The opportunity to share data with drivers both on a personal level and national level has 
gained great benefits relating to the reduction in the volume of incidents and accidents that 
can now be traced to our insurance company Sopp and Sopp, showing a 50% saving on 
accident damage over a ten year period.  The most beneficial insight I gained via my data 
collection relating to the ARB process was not the fact that a driver's approach to risk and 
danger was an insurmountable fact, as it can be tracked and traced to improve standards 
(Baecke and Bocca, 2017). Throughout my research more information relating to accidents 
and damage costs has been provided directly to the drivers.  It was the lack of conviction 
of the management team to support the driver training compliance team in the field of 
performance management. If a driver is deemed to be at fault as the result of a preventable 
accident or incident, then training will always be provided as a solution up to a limit agreed 
with the trade unions. Once this limit has been reached then it is no longer acceptable to 
sustain such a high-risk driver within the business.  To mirror this process there needs to 




be a level of performance management, which will build over a period of time and also 
could ultimately result in dismissal. 
In talking to and working with the drivers, they fully understand the concept of the need for 
development training and performance management and are bewildered with the 
performance management aspects of the ARB process receiving little energy from the 
management team.  This is not a localised problem, this is a national issue leading to 
some drivers on the database having been involved in up to 15 or sometimes more 
accidents, having received development training after each event and yet are still working 
within our company as a driver.  And this is not only isolated to the ARB process but can 
also been seen to leach into contextual speeding. 
4.9.2 Contextual Speeding Reports 
With the installation of telematics for the first time, I was able to gain an invaluable insight 
into the behaviour of our drivers.  During a period of growth since 2005 there was a 
significant rise in the volume and severity of the accidents involving our delivery vans.  I 
was aware that, unchecked, the proliferation of speeding that had developed would grow 
exponentially.  As a result, the company consulted with the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) and used their guidelines regarding speeding to form our policy regarding 
the disciplinary and behavioural outcomes as a result of speeding. 
We opted for a pulse system that interrogates the van for a telematics upload every five 
minutes or every mile, whichever comes first.  The objective was to capture behaviour and 
not isolated events, although extreme events would be automatically captured and acted 
on immediately.  When a speeding event takes place the telematics system will upload a 
grid reference.  This will reach the training managers in the form of a weekly report.  They 
are able to copy the reference into Google maps to see street level in order to print off an 
exact location and view of where each event took place.  We are then able to challenge the 
behaviour of the CDA with regard to time of day, day of the week and location to make 
them aware of their actions and the possible outcome of that event. 
It is our experience that when a CDA is confronted with hard data regarding their behaviour 
and the possible outcomes clearly explored, then there are few re-offenders.  This project 
has been a hugely positive step in the continuing reduction of Occupational Road Risk.  
When we first installed the system across the whole van fleet in 2011, we were in for a 
surprise: it was registering some 25,000 speeding events per month with a driver 
population of approximately 7,500 at the time.  Many were drivers moving at 32mph in a 
30mph zone. 




In working with the drivers, it was important to convey the relevance of the work contextually.  
I am aware that politically in many circles adhered to by most driver trainers and training 
organisations, speeding is speeding; however, to get the collective buy-in, utilising the 
ratios provided to us by the police, we endeavoured to work with the drivers in adopting a 
more pragmatic approach.  We wanted the drivers to question their own driving and that 
of others, considering how they would view an event if it had taken place outside their own 
home or in their community.  In this context we asked, ‘how would you see this through 
your eyes as an experienced driver?’ 
An example that was used in relation to our drivers was: the telematics system picks up a 
van accelerating from 30 to 37 mph in the process of leaving a village, progressing into a 
national speed limit section of road (50 mph) for a van at 9:45 on a winter’s evening, dry 
road surface clear visibility.  Compare this with a van leaving the national speed limit, 
entering into a village failing to reduce speed adequately at 8:45am on a school day 
morning, wet road surface outside of a school. 
In working with the drivers, they clearly showed an understanding of the difference between 
the two behaviours relating to the overall risk of the event.  Because this approach was 
taken as a result of data analysis and consultation with drivers in a workshop environment, 
the company has yet to receive a single grievance relating to a positive contextual speeding 
event as the jurisdiction over the outcome of each event was driver-orientated.  So 
effectively, in real terms by trying to approach this in a real-world outlook, although 
many may question this process it has led to a dramatic drop in overall speeding offences 
by up to 90%; this has been a major sea change in the improvement of overall driver 
safety, which is mirrored by a paralleled 90% drop in notices of intent to prosecution 
generated from both handheld and static speed cameras. 
4.9.3 Tracking Improvements 
One of the benefits provided by the safer driving report is that l am able to identify poor 
performing drivers and arrange for development training, monitoring any improvements.  
Recently I conducted a pilot to ascertain any benefits that could arise from the most basic 
of driver development, in other words general hints and tips rather than a comprehensive 
advanced driving course.  This was conducted in our location Y CFC and showed an 
immediate intervention at a low level was almost as effective as a full on-the-road 
training session. 
  




The results were very positive; out of 24 drivers 45.5% showed significant 
improvement.45.5% stayed the same or showed marginal improvement and 9% dipped in 
their performance. What was most interesting is the fact that those that improved the most 
continued demonstrating a sustained improvement.  For example, in recent months I have 
been able to track the performance of drivers who have received training as a ‘G’ grade 
driver, raising them to a ‘C’ grade driver, a level that they have maintained. 
As the training managers began to work with the CDAs these results dropped again to 
approximately 3,000 recorded poor driving events.  We are currently running at 
approximately 170 events per week; however, our van fleet has grown to over 5,500 with 
17,000 drivers.  When you express the improvement as a ratio, back in 2011 we were 
triggering one speeding event per driver per week.  Today this has improved to a figure of 
one speeding event per day for every 100 drivers on the road a phenomenal improvement. 
The roads covered are: 
• Motorways 
• The main road (Dual carriageways A – Roads) 
• Other A roads 
• Local and rural B roads 
Unfortunately, residential roads are not covered. 
When an incident was triggered to then be entered into the report, the report was able to 
give me the detailed data to work in conjunction with Google maps to provide the driver 
with map and pictorial evidence with their position overlaid on it to provide an indisputable 
evidential profile of the driver and the event. 
Details of incidents are sent to our Dotcom support in India, where information from drivers, 
our insurers and maintenance suppliers is collated, and a report is formed that is 
disseminated throughout the DSC teams.  There is a 30-day completion threshold attached 
to each training event to help support a punctual completion of this development. 
4.9.4 Sopp and Sopp Insurance Reports 
Each time that there is an incident, the company that deals directly with individuals who 
have been involved (Sopp & Sopp) in an incident involving a Tesco Dot.com vehicle 
generates a report covering many aspects beyond third-party motor incidents.  I receive 
this report via my line manager. 




The Sopp and Sopp insurance reports are invaluable, as they give a clear insight into what 
type of damage has taken place and the various circumstances that our drivers are involved 
in. 
This information distilled down to the three major component groups shows clear themes 
that help me to develop more efficient development in training.  Last year’s data (2017), for 
example, shows me where my attention needs to focus as over 60% of incidents involve 
a stationary vehicle.  The data from this report enables me to recognise common themes 
in driving behaviour and allows me to give the best advice to my line manager as to the 
most appropriate changes to make.  
I am able to track Notice of Intent to Prosecute (NIP), these are where the police have 
requested and given 28 days’ notice for the company to provide them with the details of 
the driver.  I am able to compare different regions in terms of the level of impact and the 
reason that the misdemeanour taken place.  If the police do not receive an appropriate 
reply within 28 days, the company will be fined.  NIP reports tell me: 
• Week 
• Store name 
• Driver name 
• PCN number 
• Van registration 
• Date of the offence 
• Time of offence 
• Location of offence 
• Offence description 
• Request sent to store 
• Reply received from the store 
• Driver’s name 
• Employee number 
• Driving licence number 
• Date of birth 
• Address 
• Response week number 
  




The current agreement with the trade unions is that the company will pay any fines.  There 
is a feeling within the company that although this stance supports our drivers, it can also 
lead to supporting poor behaviour.  This is an area that will need to be revisited in the 
near future. 
The capture of this data relating to committing traffic offences provides me with a view to 
how some of our drivers perceive risk and the potential to be prosecuted for work.  It also 
shows me which councils have invested heavily in speed cameras and speed enforcement. 
The current agreement with the trade’s union is that the company will pay any fines.  There 
is a feeling within the company that although this stance supports our drivers, it can also 
lead to supporting poor behaviour.  This is an area that will need to be revisited in the 
near future.  In 2016 Tesco Dot.com spent approximately £64 million pounds on fuel and I 
am now able to filter raw data from the Microlise reports and create an ascending report 
that clearly shows the differing driving styles of the drivers.  The report is taken from a four-
week period so provides a fair depiction of roads and distances covered by the drivers.  
Even with the distances taken into account, the variation in fuel efficiency of our drivers 
can be vast, some able to drive twice as fuel efficiently as others.  If each driver improved 
their mpg by one, then this would result in a saving £1.5 million pounds per year. 
4.9.5 Fleet Reports 
In the course of working on my project l have discovered that there are several high-level 
reports that show the following data: 
• Vehicle Utilisation Summary Report 
• Fuel and Emissions Report 
• Vehicle KPI Report 
• Detailed Performance Report 
These reports are extremely useful for helping to frame a business proposal of national 
strategy relating to training and development.  The fleet reports are an effective method 
of expressing van data to show the effective use of individual vans within a fleet and of 
the fleet as a whole. 




4.9.6 Fuel Usage 
I have access to the reports that are also generated via our Microlise partners who give 
weekly detailed reports on: 
• Overall summary 
• Miles per Order 
• Miles per Gallon 
• Litres per Order 
• Litres per Week per Vehicle 
I have full visibility of the varied areas of Tesco Dot.com: 
• Click and Collect 
• Enfield Gas vans 
• Top – Bottom stores 
• Average Mileage by vans 
• Same Day Delivery 
The report is extremely informative when comparing like-for-like van and delivery territories.  
Having a large van fleet covering 99% of the population within the UK, the variation between 
very similar geographic areas using the same model of the van can be quite fascinating. 
4.10 What Does the Report Show? 
For each offence, the report will show the Customer Delivery Assistant’s name, the date 
and time of the offence, the Vehicle Registration Number, the recorded speed of the vehicle, 
the location of the offence and the posted speed limit. 
4.10.1 Procedure 
1) Every five minutes, and every mile, the safer driving equipment cross-references 
the legal road speed of a van’s current location with its current speed. 
2) A speeding event will be triggered if a van is driven above the legal limit by 10% plus 
two miles per hour.  For example, 35 miles per hour in 30 miles per hour posted area. 
3) The information on each report is validated to ensure the details are correct 
(completed by CDA trainer). 
4) Once this has been established the information will be sent to stores in the weekly 
Driving Behaviour Report via the work plan. 




5) Any events shown on the Contextual Speeding Summary are investigated as per the 
existing performance management process (completed by Tesco Dot.com Manager). 
4.10.2 Data Capture Issues 
I am able to interrogate the Microlise reports on my laptop to capture information on 
individual drivers over any given period.  The report is invaluable in visualising who are the 
better drivers regarding their driving behaviour and those that display poorer behaviour.  
However, during this project, it has become clear to me that there is a fundamental flaw in 
how we capture data from various streams and amalgamate them into one coherent format. 
The data collated to produce a driver specific report is reliant on our two main data streams 
merging flawlessly, one from our Telematics supplier Microlise, capturing data from the 
vans CAN Bus. 
(The Controller Area Network (CAN, also known as CAN Bus) is a vehicle bus standard 
designed to allow electronic control units and devices to communicate with each other in 
applications without a host computer. As an alternative to conventional multi-wire looms 
CAN Bus allows various electronic components (such as electronic control units, 
microcontrollers, devices, sensors, actuators and other electronic components throughout 
the vehicle) to communicate on a single or dual-wire network data bus up to 1 Mb/s).  
This data has to be married up to the Tesco Dot.com REACH/SDS device where the retail 
data is captured, stating: 
• Time of delivery 
• Customer’s signature 
• Final products delivered 
• Any refunds 
The fact of the matter is, that if a driver does not take a REACH device on their trip and 
purely relies on paper to capture data, such as the customer’s signature, or if any data is 
lost in the download at the end of the trip, l am left with no telematics information relating to 
that trip. 
4.11 The Database 
The company was keen to oversee the behaviour of the drivers as well as the exposure 
of Tesco Dot.com to prosecution for not having its drivers trained correctly and an accurate 
record maintained.  The company commissioned the installation of a database in 2010 as 
a response to the ever-growing driver workforce (then approximately 10,000 drivers).  Now 




this figure has grown to 17,000 drivers, this decision is another example of the on-going 
step changes in our use of telematics data.  Tesco Dot.com was aware that there was a 
need to centrally store data concerning the drivers’ training and performance.   
At the time the only records available were paper training record cards held in each 
individual operation.  Yet it is imperative that accurate information is available to confirm 
training and provide evidence if required in a court of law.  In 2012, I embarked on a review 
of the database’s effectiveness and its impact on the business in the form of a case study.  
My initial concerns were that the database was not being utilised appropriately.  In addition, 
there was no coherent connection between the database and other reporting mechanisms 
already existing within the business. 
I employed questionnaires (Appendix 4), and structured interviews as well as quantitative 
data collection to investigate the database and my initial intention was to form and shape 
the major part of the case study around the database.  However, the conclusion of my 
research was that the database in its present form was not fit for purpose and that 
significant amendments would be required to facilitate a structured resolution of its inherent 
deficiencies.  As a result of my review, extensive modifications and additions have been 
made to existing processes and data streams, but substantial development or total 
replacement of the database is still required.  The development of a new database is now 
in progress. 
Having now examined the data streams uploaded onto the database and undertaken a 
wide-ranging review of internal company reports, training material and support programmes, 
it is clear to me that major and decisive changes are required if Tesco Dot.com wishes to 
identify high-risk drivers and action intervention training.  The new database would provide 
a comprehensive risk framework to support this activity. 
It was interesting to observe that the results from the database formed a key part of some 
DSCM work,  ye t  i t  formed very little or no part of their work in other cases.  In our desire 
to track every aspect of a driver’s world with reports and grades, a data overload was being 
inflicted on the DSCM team that resulted in either overworking or an abstinence from work.  
Some DSCMs responded saying, ‘what aspects do you want me to undertake and in what 
order, I can’t do it all.’.  Unfortunately, this meant that large amounts of work were not being 
attended to. 
My findings relating to the database are of great interest to me as it epitomises the 
dilemmas and complications that arise when a working framework becomes over 
complicated and lacks accountability.  Having continued to investigate the database 




remotely, I have discovered several key flaws in its operation and implementation.  A 
key weakness is the fact that the majority of the data uploaded is done so by the DSCM.  
Its effectiveness is entirely dependent on the DSCM data being correct and up to date. 
A driver was recently involved in a fatal accident; on first inspection they had a “Blue” 
exemplary record on the database.  As I investigated the data, the time algorithm alone 
had resulted in the driver's record being blue; he had in fact 12 outstanding untrained events 
all resulting from speeding and accidents. 
What was most worrying was the fact that if an event was left long enough the database 
considered it too old to be relevant so effectively overlooked it.  This fact would not look 
good in a court of law. 
4.12 Findings from Interviews with Managers 
In 2015 over a period of four weeks, I interviewed seven managers in Tesco Dot.com using 
a series of semi-structured questions (see Appendix 1).  I am fortunate that l have had a 
virtually un-challenged opportunity to interview any person who is relevant to my project.  
Managers were selected to cover each of the seven main regions of England and Scotland, 
but resource constraints did not permit me to include managers in Wales and Northern 
Ireland.  The purpose of the interviews was to establish what the Driver Safety Compliance 
Managers thought of the database and any recommendations they may have to improve it.  
Additionally, I wanted to see how company vision and goals regarding driver safety were 
applied at local or regional level.  
All interviewees were assured of complete confidentiality and anonymity.  Interviews lasted 
between 20 and 30 minutes and took place in private, in an informal environment within the 
interviewees’ workplace.  I recorded the interviews on a digital recorder and transcribed 
them myself.  While I approached the data collection and analysis with as high a degree of 
objectivity as I could, I am aware that responses to some of my questions may well have 
been influenced by people’s relationships to me as colleague, instructor, trainer and coach.  
At the same time, I was able to gain the confidence of colleagues in ways that might have 
been more challenging for an external researcher.  Choosing the four main elements and 
data sources that I did enabled me to weave together themes and general observations, 
enabling me to structure my findings and recommendations to the company that I am 
confident are beneficial, scalable and sustainable. 
The combination of Telematics data, data from our driver database, data harvested from 
my interviews and the questionnaires completed by some of our drivers provided me with 
clarity and insight into the functionality of the business, enabling me to not lose focus or 




clarity when conducting my investigation, also providing a balance of both quantitative and 
qualitative data streams giving my case study balance and depth. 
The purpose of the interviews was to gain an insight into how the DSR is used to drive the 
safety database and the drivers’  opinion of it, in addition to gauging how they felt about 
the job role as a whole and any improvements or changes that may need to be made. 
I wanted to use a structured interview strategy compared with that of an un-structured, to 
allow me to compare the results more readily.  I wanted to avoid changing the environment, 
but colleagues felt intimidated or threatened so the theme was based purely on the job role. 
Once these interviews were carried out, transcripts were analysed thematically (see 
Chapter 3 Methodology).  Themes were then compared with Rogers’ properties found in 
innovations that are likely to meet with success, as previously described in this chapter.  I 
was particularly interested in discovering the extent to which, largely unprompted, 
interviewees might describe some of these properties.  Armed with this knowledge, I 
presumed I would be better able to optimise the innovation process to maximise its chances 
of success.  My expectation was to be able to provide my line manager with a collective 
view of both positives and negatives from a cross-section of managers to help develop the 
operation as a whole. I transcribed 11 DSCM interviews, which asked the following 
questions: 
• How long have you worked for Tesco Dot.com and what is your history so far? 
• How often do you use the database? 
• What are the strengths of the database? 
• How does the database help you in your job? 
• What areas of the database would you change, and why? 
• What would you change regarding what could come of the database to improve it 
and why? 
• If you were in charge of the driver training team what would you change in relation 
to the database? 
• What is the recruitment and training process for CDAs from your perspective? 
• What would you change regarding the ARB process and how would this be 
beneficial to the database, and so ultimately yourself? 
• Should some assessors be ADIs? 
• How should the buddy system affect the database, at present and in the future if 
training were to be over two weeks? 
• What is the main weakness in the database? 
• Do you think the validation process is relevant today?  




I was aware that there would be a limit to the answers I was going to receive due to my 
position, so I used my judgement to structure questions that would facilitate an honest 
answer without negativity becoming the overarching tone of the discourse.  I was fortunate 
that the managers were open to my questioning and seemed to be responding frankly, 
as on comparison there were many similar themes running through the emotion and 
direction of their answers.  With more time and resources, I could have conducted follow-
up surveys or repeat interviews to see how events and perceptions had changed over time.  
The time spent interviewing some of the DSCMs was extremely insightful. They voiced 
concerns that resonated with mine and, more interestingly, with many of the drivers.  A 
compelling theme that arose from my case study was a common concern over the accuracy 
and cross-referencing of our telematics data.  This by default spread uncertainty about the 
validity of many other company reports linked to this data.  The results of the interviews 
are explained and demonstrated in full in the following ‘findings’ chapter. 
I have created a word map constructed from the replies I harvested from the interviews.  
Although the interviews were quite short the data collected has proven to be very insightful.  
 
Figure 25  Word picture generated from Interviewees’ responses 
The time the interviewees had spent working within Dotcom ranged from 8 to 24 years with 
a collective experience between the seven equating to 100 years.  I wanted to gain generic 
themes and concerns rather than specifics about a particular region from the interviewees.   
  




The geographic areas covered by the managers were: 
• North-east 
• North London 
• South London 
• Kent 
• Scotland 
• Central England 
• Norfolk 
In talking to the managers, most of my questions were open as it was my intention to gain 
generic themes and concerns rather than specifics that would affect their region but not 
others. 
A number of Rogerian properties emerged in the analysis of the data, for instance, 
complexity or ease of use and trialability. 
Most interviewees reported using the database sporadically, either several times in one 
week or none in others. One manager expressed this as follows: 
“For me, it needs to become more of a live device, so the information is fed centrally, 
whether it be accidents, speeding or whatever it needs.  So, all of its inputs should be living 
and be fed into the database as live data.  This would make the database more of a live 
tool, so it would show me immediately who the risk was.  I would like all that we do to be 
instantly up-loaded by tablet onto the database.  I would like the safer driving report added.  
This would predict risk as at the moment all we are doing is acting retrospectively”.  
This neatly encapsulates one of the main Rogerian requirements for successful innovation 
ease of use and also highlights the importance of trialability or the extent to which the 
innovation can be tried by potential adopters without major investment of time and resource.  
The manager in this instance wanted a ‘live’ tool, which could turn around inputted data in 
real time to aid decision-making.  Conversely, other Rogerian properties were relatively 
absent and possibly predicted lack of success.  For instance, the relative advantage of the 
database over existing manual procedures was not strong enough given that decisions still 
lagged too far behind data.  Indeed, relying on the database could provide a false sense of 
security, as discussed earlier.  Here, in miniature, was a clear example of the common pitfall 
of not involving the end user in the design of an innovation, and it betokened some of the 
problems lying ahead.  When I asked the same manager a question relating to what they 




would change in the database, the answer was as follows, again highlighting the value of 
trialability: 
“To me I want it to be live and real, it’s just like a big diary at the moment.  It’s hard to 
navigate, and there is a lot of repetition.  I think assessors should have access to it and I 
should be able to see what they have input to verify that the information is correct”. 
All interviewees expressed the concern that the database was technically difficult to use, 
not ‘policed’ and said that its functionality was difficult to merge with existing reporting 
systems.  Hence its degree of compatibility with existing structures, procedures and values 
another Rogerian property was low.  They all expressed grave reservations relating to the 
database being totally under the control of the training manager without any independent 
auditing or analysis, illustrating to my mind a concern over the Rogerian property of 
observability, or the degree to which outcomes resulting from innovation are visible to others. 
What I found interesting was that each one of the managers expressed the common desire 
to have all the main reporting tools merged into a new style database that would effectively 
give live information.  This still would not negate the need for training managers to upload 
data, so there was a common understanding of the need for some external auditing to take 
place, whether this was from the manager responsible for all DSCMs or a colleague tasked 
with regular monthly audits.  What was pleasing is the fact that the interviews supported my 
initial findings that the database needed to be replaced with a more user-friendly tool that 
included all of the main data feeds that DSCMs work with.  From the interviews the 
conclusion can be drawn that the new database needs to have more, comprehensive data, 
but expressed in a simpler up-loaded feed. It will need to be more closely monitored and its 
output audited for compliance amongst the DSCMs.  Fundamentally, the workload created 
from the database needs to be achievable and for action to be taken if that target is not 
achieved by the DSCMs. 
There was a collective reticence to go into details at a granular level. Culturally this was 
deemed being too critical, hence destructive within the business.  This, in fact, was one of 
the main underlying themes that were expressed to me, and most managers were reluctant 
to be seen to be too critical, as they themselves could be open to criticism. 
An opportunity for significant change at DSC occurred when in 2016 (chart 5.1) 15 members 
of the DSC team were made redundant.  
This change of personnel drew attention to the part played by rank and structure. Put 
another way, using the CCP model (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991), the predominant way of 
managing change within Tesco Dot.com had been largely structure- and content-driven. 




Much less attention was paid to process. Interviews showed that there was a high level of 
firefighting going on where interventions by the DSCM were ignored by the store 
management team resulting in operational failure.  This failure was compounded by the 
cultural divide between stores and Tesco Dot.com, the balance of power always lying with 
stores. 
Other key concerns voiced during the interviews were the lack of clarity and honesty in the 
use and application of our driver risk database.  It was communicated to me that the system 
was difficult to upload and use.  A driver could not be entered into the system until they were 
in possession of an employee number.  As the DSCM team were responsible for large 
groups and up to a thousand drivers, the communication to them from stores regarding 
employee numbers could be haphazard.  Although there were many entries to be made 
relating to each driver the collation of data and the time taken to upload data became 
constrictive or a reason for not undertaking the task with the energy that would be expected.  
Yet from the concerns that were expressed, it came as no surprise to me that a high level 
of anxiety was expressed relating to the lack of structure in interviewees’ work and little 
consensus about how best to go about achieving the best results.  As part of this change, 
managers had moved from being part of a big team where both praise and criticism were 
shouldered collectively to one that emphasised individual managerial accountability.  Given 
that responsibilities have also increased, and managers were now in charge of larger groups 
of staff, so too had their anxieties.  One manager said: ‘My group is too big now after the 
structure change, there’s no way I can get everything done.  The new database had better 
work!’. 
4.13 Drivers’ Questionnaires 
I had an opportunity in 2014 to carry out a questionnaire at our location X operation, which 
employed approximately 450 drivers at the time.  I was able to get 122 of these drivers to 
complete a survey questionnaire while they were attending a pre-planned company 
workshop being run by the DSCM team.  This questionnaire was the first opportunity that I 
was aware of where the input of drivers regarding their thoughts and expectations relating 
to driving was being captured.  My expectation was that drivers would respond well to a 
questionnaire if it was clearly explained to them what the purpose of the exercise was, that 
it was confidential and not leading or condescending in any way.  If the questions were too 
academic in structure or sounding that they may result in blame, then responses would be 
very poor. 
  




The responses were illuminating as they conveyed the true thoughts and experiences of the 
drivers, an exercise that I believe should be repeated on a larger scale.  Some of my 
research tools were designed more with a view to immediate utility and the task at hand, 
rather than producing generalizable validity.  For example, my survey questionnaire could 
have asked more nuanced questions, such as being more precise about speeding.  It was 
important to me that I gained a genuine insight into the understanding and expectations the 
drivers held regarding their job role and the business as a whole.  It was a rare opportunity 
to harvest information from a large number of drivers about purely driver related issues.  
The emphasis is normally customer service related when gathering data from drivers and 
this shift in focus felt important.  In fact, to date as far as I am aware, this has been the only 
questionnaire that has been driver specific. 
4.13.1 Survey Questionnaire 
Questionnaires 
My questionnaires (Appendix 2) were structured on a five-level scale ranging from ‘strongly 
agree’ through to ‘strongly disagree’.  In addition, there was a mixture of open and closed 
questions to facilitate more honest answers.  There was a mixture of yes/no answers 
with the facility to capture longer handwritten answers if required, as I was keen to 
capture fact and opinion.  The questionnaires (Appendix 3) were conducted over a short 
period of time for both drivers and managers; this was a one-off snapshot in the form 
of a cross-sectional survey.  Questions solicited data on: 
• Gender 
• Age group 
• How many years have you been a driver? 
• How many years have you been driving? 
• How many accidents have you had while working for Tesco Dot.com? 
• Do you wear a seatbelt? 
• Do you ever break the speed limit, if so by how much? 
• Has your driving changed since you started driving for Tesco Dot.com? 
• Has your driving improved since driving for Tesco Dot.com? 
• Has your driving got worse since driving for Tesco Dot.com? 
• If you have ARB Training, has it improved your driving? 




• Does Tesco Dot.com give you enough training and support to help you become a 
better driver? 
• Would you say that you take risks when driving a Tesco Dot.com van? 
• Does the safer driving report help you to improve your driving? 
• Do you think tracking driver behaviour helps improve road safety? 
• How concerned are you that you could be injured whilst driving a Tesco Dot.com 
Van? 
• Do you enjoy your job? 
I will fully discuss the results of the questionnaire in the next section; however, it is 
worth mentioning here the enthusiasm with which the drivers answered these questions.  
While I am aware of the potential ‘halo’ effect resulting from this survey being at the end of 
a training programme I had been involved in, the level of trust built up during this activity 
probably predisposed the drivers to offer more honest and open responses.  I feel confident 
that I would not have had this volume of respondents if I had administered a postal or email 
questionnaire (Appendix 2). 
Out of my sample driver population of 122 people, 119 were men (97.5%), and 3 were 
women (Appendix 5). This imbalance of gender is common in our large operations but less 
so in the other 335 operations throughout the UK.  This was an issue I was aware of but 
was still surprised at the extent of the imbalance.  The average length of time for each driver 
working at location X for Tesco Dot.com was three years and at that point in time the 
operation had been open for nine years.  The overall driver turnover was running at 40% at 
the time, a massive negative cost to the company. 





Do you ever break the speed limit, if so by how much? 
 
Figure 26  Result from my Questionnaire Regarding Drivers’ Willingness to Speed 
What was a concern to me was the apparent willingness of drivers to take risks while driving; 
54% were willing to speed on a regular basis.  Of even greater concern was that seven 
drivers were comfortable at driving at 20mph or more over the limit during their deliveries.  
If brought before the courts, this level of speeding is rated as an automatic ban.  Speeding 
has been a major worry within Tesco Dot.com and the wider industry as a whole and will be 
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Has your driving improved since driving for Tesco Dot.com? 
 
Figure 27  Graph Depicting the number of Drivers who feel that their driving has  
improved while working for Tesco Dot.com 
There was an overall positive response to this second question with most drivers (55.73%) 
feeling that they had improved their driving since joining Tesco Dot.com, while 37.7% stayed 
neutral and 4.9% expressed that their driving had got worse.  While responses were, of 
course, subjective and could be mistaken, the variation in responses was in itself an 
argument for increased driver improvement initiatives and further investigation into what we 
were doing that was effective.  Had a substantial number of drivers considered their driving 

















Has your Driving Improved Since Driving for Tesco Dot.com?





Has your driving got worse since driving for Tesco Dot.com? 
 
Figure 28  Graph depicting Drivers’ opinion relating to their  
driving getting worse while working for Tesco Dot.com 
 
What was interesting to discover was that the vast majority of drivers felt that their driving 
had not got worse while driving for Tesco Dot.com, and this finding corroborates the 
responses to the previous question.  While it is important not to attribute causality to this 
kind of subjective response, the data suggested that there could be an association between 
the structure and development of the driver’s workload and driver improvement processes 
that have been implemented over recent years and improved driver safety.  A very low 
proportion of the drivers, 3%, expressed a negative view relating to the standard of their 
driving.  It is worth noting that in my experience the driving population from this area of 
South London could be described as inhospitable to driver safety initiatives, so to receive 












Has your Driving got worse while working for 
Tesco Dot.com?





If you have Accident Review Board training, has it improved your driving? 
 
Figure 29  Shows the opinion of Drivers who have received post-accident training 
This question was optional and answered only by those who had ARB training (65% of the 
drivers).  It is of concern that the drivers did not appear to feel any substantial benefit from 
receiving professional training as a result of an accident or incident.  I was aware from 
observations and discussions with drivers that the majority of them, in the absence of what 
I would regard as effective safety training, tend to develop a personal construct Kelly (1970) 
so that the drivers carry the narrative that accidents are an inevitable consequence of 
delivery driving.  The influence of this kind of personal construct regarding driver safety is a 
commonplace finding in studies of risky driving behaviour in young people This was 
conducted in our location Y CFC and showed an immediate intervention at a low level 
was almost as effective as a full on-the-road training session. (Fergusson et al., 2003) 
but less evident in studies of high-risk older drivers (Stalvey et al., 2000).   
What this finding demonstrated was reduced self-efficiency even after remedial training had 
taken place.  Its continued appearance among experienced professional van drivers 
reinforced my determination to embark on a review of training in general (not just ARB) and 











Has Post Accident Training Improve your Driving?




There are many cultural influences in an operation such as location X, which will influence 
the effectiveness of such training, but it is important that the value of a qualified driving 
instructor delivering training is sustained.  A possible alternative to practical training would 
be online training, something I am developing at the moment, as the responses from the 
driver can be harvested and stored for further reference.   
  





Would you say that you take risks when driving a Tesco Dot.com van? 
 
Figure 30  Shows the response of Drivers to taking risks when driving for Tesco Dot.com 
Only 24% admitted to taking risks when driving for Tesco Dot.com.  It is still a big issue that 
in a population of nearly 500 drivers, approximately 125 are apparently content to take risks 
while driving a Tesco Dot.com van.  This is obviously unacceptable and has led me to 
innovate and develop an advanced driving qualification in conjunction with The Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA).  The qualification will be equivalent to an 















Do you take risks when driving for Tesco Dot.com?





Does the safer driving report help you to improve your driving? 
 
Figure 31  Shows the response from Drivers about whether the Safer Driving Report  
improves their driving 
Only 40% of drivers stated that the safer driving report displayed within the Tesco Dot.com 
department each month had a beneficial impact on their driving.  A concern is the fact that 




















Does the Safer Driving Report help you to Improve 
Your Driving?





Do you think tracking driver behaviour helps improve road safety? 
 
Figure 32  Shows the Response from Drivers Regarding their opinion on whether Tracking 
a Driver's Behaviour helps to improve driver safety 
The response from the drivers regarding the implementation of telematics was refreshing 
as only 19% registered a negative answer.  Their response probably reflects the 
fundamental change in the drivers’ attitude to telematics, as it was only four years since 
telematics had been introduced at location X, much to their initial dismay.  At the time I had 


















Do the drivers think that tracking driver behaviour 
helps inprove road safety?





How concerned are you that you could be injured while driving a Tesco Dot.com Van? 
 
Figure 33  Shows the Response from Drivers to the Concern  
of being injured at work 
Many drivers tend to be concerned about being injured at work.  I was both surprised and 
concerned to hear that 28% of drivers voiced a concern that they may come to some harm 
while working for Tesco Dot.com and this result will require further investigation.  I am aware 
that drivers are worried about their safety when delivering to certain parts of London, 
particularly in the evenings, weekends and when the schools are on holiday.  Fortunately, 


















How concerned are you that you may be injured at 
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Do you enjoy your job? 
 
Figure 34  Shows that the majority of drivers enjoy working for Tesco Dot.com 
It was pleasing that with all the concerns that drivers have expressed and the professional 
reservations that I hold, only 5% of drivers expressed a negative view of enjoying working 




















Do you enjoy your job?





Has your driving changed since working for Tesco Dot.com? 
 
Figure 35  Shows the number of Drivers who thought their Driving  
had changed since driving for Tesco Dot.com 
 
It was interesting to observe the fact that only 3% of drivers strongly disagreed and 6% 
disagreed that their driving had not changed since starting the job.  I am aware that the 
question is open to interpretation but, as previously stated, it was important that the drivers 
felt comfortable answering the question.  What it tells me is that there is a need to survey 
our drivers more often.  Our yearly delivering our best would provide a perfect opportunity 
to achieve this.  
4.14 Observations 
I found one of the key positive aspects of being a functional professional practitioner is that 
I was able to get involved with the workforce in a real-world environment as they undertook 
their normal duties.  I found one of the most productive ways of gaining true insights into 
how the workforce thought was to put on a high visibility jacket, go out into the yard with 
the drivers, work with them, buddy up and effectively spend an entire shift with them. 
This whole process has given me tremendous insight into both the drivers’ and managers’ 
perspectives on their expectation of professional behaviour and how these can contrast 
dramatically between these two groups, as well as in relation to the company’s 











Has your driving changed since you started to drive at 
Tesco Dot.com?




conversation and questioning.  This is important in order to gain an understanding of 
motivation and thinking, for  example  when a driver is undertaking their legally required 
roadworthiness checks of the van prior to starting a shift. By talking and working with the 
drivers and managers, I have become aware of some remarkable insights into the variations 
perceived by drivers and managers as to what is expected both professionally and 
behaviourally by each other and the Company. For example, the act of simply observing 
an activity needs to be enhanced by conversation and questioning, relating to the driver’s 
actions.  This is important, to gain an insight of what the driver’s motivation and thinking 
is when they undertake their legally required roadworthiness checks of the van prior to 
starting a shift. 
Exploring this disconnect in a driver’s priorities compared with that of the company’s is 
key to moving towards an understanding of why systems and policies in the workplace fail.  
A useful example of this would be a semi-deflated tyre on the van.  A driver may just 
question whether or not it could cause an accident, whereas the company will also be 
thinking about minimising unnecessary wear and tear as well as being very mindful of the 
expense of excessive fuel usage when driving a vehicle with such a tyre. 
Spending this time with the drivers over a significant period of time enabled me to gain a 
true insight into the fact that many drivers have a binary, black-and-white appreciation of 
risk and danger, and the majority would only question whether they personally could get 
hurt or have an accident as a result of a defect.  What was a surprise was the drivers’ 
general lack of concern regarding the possibility of being blamed by authorities for an 
accident and the subsequent impact that such an event could have on their ability to work 
and earn a living.  This occurrence conflicts with the training that drivers receive prior to 
starting work at Tesco Dot.com, where the various shades of grey are explored in detail.  
For example, why it is important to check a tyre and what to check for is all covered, 
ranging from a brand-new tyre to a dangerously defective one that would lead to 
prosecution or a possible accident. 
When you question a driver and ask their opinion on what to check for on a tyre, many 
would just look at a tyre and say: “It looks ok to me, it’s not really flat, so I will attend 
to that later”; as you can imagine this rarely happens.  This is a direct contradiction to the 
expectation of the company and that of the driver’s training when detailed information is 
given regarding: 
• Tyre tread depth 
• Uneven wear and its mechanical implications 
• Split cuts in tears 




When you take this information and are aware of attitudes to such a basic safety 
principle and then extrapolate that across the variety of tests and inspections that we 
request a driver to undertake, I am conscious of a concern for the general safety of our 
van fleet in between services and throughout the standard working day, week and month. 
While shadowing drivers out on their standard delivery routes, it has given me a tremendous 
insight into their attitudes and behaviour towards certain major aspects of driver safety.  
This manifested itself when comparing the telematics reports generated by the company 
and their software partners Microlise to that of the driver’s own personal behaviour and 
their interpretation of the telematics data. 
4.15 Influence on Tesco Dot.com and ‘My Life at Tesco Dotcom’ 
In this section I discuss the two bottom rows of  Table 5 in an understanding that the 
influences on Tesco Dot.com impacting on the development and reception of innovations, 
have at the same time been intertwined with my own changing role in the company.  The 
row relating to me shows my progress through a range of roles and responsibilities over the 
eight to ten-year period in which the case study has taken place.  During this period, I 
‘graduated’ from being perceived as an industry expert and trouble-shooter to becoming a 
more integrated member of the decision-making process Reck (1984). Even the change of 
job title from Occupational Road Risk Manager (2010) to Driver Safety Manager (2016 to 
date) is an indication of the shift towards an increasing acceptance of my view of driver 
safety as entailing more than risk management to encompass a more holistic change of 
culture. 
However, not all of the changes in culture can be attributed to my agency even in the 
relatively circumscribed area of driver safety.  Influences on Tesco Dot.com have included 
the wider legislative levers discussed in previous chapters (the external context) and 
significant organisational restructures (internal context).  Other major influences as 
described in this chapter have been fatal RTAs and a catastrophic failure occurring in the 
internal context, which caused a major shift in the company's readiness to be influenced by 
the external context.  These dimensions of change have threatened to destabilise my project 
goals as much as they have facilitated opportunities for change.  The events listed in  Table 
5 are merely representative of some 24 major additional events, which could have been 
listed.  The last three years of the case (2013-16) saw unprecedented change across the 
organisation as a whole, changes which at the time of writing show no sign of abating.   
My life in Tesco Dot.com has been varied and interesting.  My professional development 
has been sizable, and I am now recognised as the expert in my field and am consulted 
throughout the company.  My work outside the company has been influential in many areas, 




particularly in the development of The Freight Transport Association’s (2014) ‘Van 
Excellence Programme’, Driving for Better Business (I am one of six champions) and 
supporting an online training programme for transport managers.   
Initially, I was a driver training manager responsible for the recruitment and development of 
drivers in three successive customer fulfilment centres (CFC) positioned around the 
M25\London.  In early 2012 my role developed into the company’s Occupational Road Risk 
manager responsible for heading up a development team, the main role of which was the 
training and development of the driver safety and compliance team (DSC).  Early in 2016 
my role changed again to Driver Safety Manager, primarily a consultant to the head of driver 
safety and compliance team; my role is now focusing on the strategy and development of 
the policies and processes affecting both the driver safety and compliance team and the 
wider van delivery driver population. 
During the period of my studies, there are significant events that have been predesigned 
and planned for as well as unforeseen events that have both focused the minds of the driver 
safety compliance team and the leadership team based in Head Office.  A portion of my job 
role is the training of managers in obtaining their DVSA Approved Driving Instructor 
qualification.  Throughout this training and during my normal daily duties I am in constant 
communication with DSCT.  This time provides me with many different touch points to 
engage in fact-finding and data collection within the team.  During these sessions, much is 
communicated to me relating to operational concerns.  This facilitates in discovering themes 
and commonality that I can communicate to my line manager who has overall responsibility 
for drivers’ safety. 
Many of the concerns voiced by the DSCT stem from the tribalism make-up of many Tesco 
departments within a single operation, overseen by one senior store manager (SM).  The 
DSCM role is to advise and steer an operation on the correct path to maximise safety and 
minimise risk.  It is vital that drivers are recruited to the correct operational framework so 
that their shift patterns cover a broad span of both the working week and the working day.  
A typical strong structure would be a three-day shift and two evenings.  If this format is 
adhered to, then the minimum of drivers will be employed to provide cover for a seven-day-
a-week operation.  The additional bonus is the fact the driver is employed as full-time staff 
on a 36-hour week, making attracting staff easier to achieve.  This format would be the 
backbone of the operation forming approximately 90% of employee hours, with a few part-
time roles to fill in any gaps.  This format works well in Tesco Dot.com but flies in the face 
of the new company mantra of a flexible workforce. 




This dichotomy of main business structure and Tesco Dot.com stand-alone structure is a 
perpetual point of friction and discourse.  The result is that it has a major impact on some 
operations, such as location X, where last year over 1,000 driving assessments were 
conducted, yet location X has a current driving population of approximately 480.  The move 
to flexible contracts, in theory, is reasonable but often the contracts offered are 15 hours 
guaranteed, flexed up to 36 hours; this can become a very emotive position to place new or 
potential drivers in.  The bigger picture across the estate is of greater concern to me as I 
conservatively estimate that we have approximately 3,000 more flex drivers than we require.  
Although this fact does not impact on the overall wage costs, the recruitment process and 
uniform costs amount to over £6 million.  An interesting position to find yourself in, as the 
energy for the flexible contract is generated from our business finance managers, just one 
of many unforeseen hot spots within the company. 
Throughout my observations, it became clear to me that the dilemmas facing Dotcom 
mirrored closely that of Pettigrew and Whipp’s framework of CCP on the impact that content 
(i.e. the policies, objectives, targets) PLUS external context (PEST) has on the effort to 
promote an organisational culture of driver safety.  All the evidence from studies in this area 
(see Chapter 2) shows that energies for change cannot be conjured up over a short period 
or through the pulling of a single lever Serrat (2017).  The evidence I have to hand for the 
period of the case study suggests that the internal context was not consistently receptive to 
the kinds of cultural change needed; it is work in progress. CCP does not have the answers, 
but it provides a diagnostic tool. 
Following an analysis of the data I look at the influence of context and at my own role in the 
innovation journey Van de Ven (1993).  I was particularly keen to examine the effect of 
policies and procedures relating to driver safety in the lived experience of managers and 
front-line staff.  In parallel to this I wanted to explore: the extent to which compliance was 
part of the company culture; how compliance might be related to the relative success of 
innovations; the relationships between specific groups within the company; the perceptions 
of the importance of driver safety amongst these groups and the part that they could play in 
its development and sustainability; and finally, the impact of my own changing role.  
4.16 Lack of Van Drivers’ Understanding  
The fundamental problem with most of the van drivers within Tesco Dot.com is that they are 
car drivers that happen to hold the vocational rights to be the driver of a 3.5 tonne van on a 
standard car licence.  If you passed your driving test before 1997, you could drive a 7 tonne 
truck on a car licence. 




A tremendous level of investment into the training and development of drivers has been 
undertaken since 2006.  However, it is still challenging for the DSCMs to influence the stores 
to follow company process, which has been designed to minimise the risk of injury and 
prosecution to our drivers and provide the management team within the store legal 
compliance within the UK legislative framework.  On top of this, drivers are still failing to 
take their legalities seriously as part of their everyday duties and are regularly leaving 
themselves open to prosecution.  This apparent lack of concern leaves many of the DSCMs 
exasperated by the institutional abdication of responsibility (no one is particularly 
accountable), so the working environment appears to have a feeling of ‘no one cares!’ 
An observation that has stuck with me is that when you talk to individuals, either drivers, 
trade union reps or managers, they all show a concern and a level of care for the 
environment that they collectively work within but display little discernible collective drive to 
improve the overall safety and legal compliance within their control.  When confronted with 
or challenged over an event, the participant drivers all clearly vocalise their understanding 
of what is required of them.  When I escalate the problem to the management team, they 
also show an understanding of what should have taken place.  I can only conclude that 
there are too many elements involved in the running of the operation, so accountability is 
watered down to a collective malfunction.  This effect by no means is the norm in all 
operations, but there are a significant number of stores that fall short of a process-structured 
operation that forms the ideal model. 
4.17 Summary 
I went into the workplace and actively engaged with the drivers as they went about their 
normal daily duties.  I was able to witness first-hand how they went about executing their 
allotted tasks.  While doing so I engaged with the drivers, enabling them to express their 
views and opinions relating to the job and Tesco Dot.com as a whole.  The ability to engage 
with drivers throughout their working day whilst there were driving in and around the 
operation or at the customer’s address proved very insightful. 
In addition, the use of questionnaires at one of our South London operations proved 
extremely useful in collecting relevant data.  Being able to talk openly with managers, team 
leaders and general staff at varying times in periods throughout the years of my case study 
gave me an overall textured insight into the problems and pitfalls that constantly seem to 
reappear and have yet to be solved or rectified. 
Working side-by-side with managers of my own team throughout this period, again, has 
given me a fantastic opportunity to harvest information and data regarding these short-, 
medium-and long-term problems faced within Tesco Dot.com, specifically the lack of 




embedded change that has taken place throughout the timeframe of my case study.  Within 
this chapter I have identified and discussed the five main data collection areas that I wished 
to employ to achieve my research objective: 
• Drivers’ risk database 
• Company documents 
• Driver and manager questionnaires 
• Interviews with managers 
• Observations were taken within the workplace 
I structured my case study in the shape of the insert data collection methodology, identifying 
the groups that I wished to study (managers and drivers).   
I designed a strategy that matched my position as an insider researcher, and this facilitated 
my data capture and real-life observations. 
I was able to differentiate between internal and external documents.  I designed and 
constructed interviews and questionnaires to allow for data collection in a non-
threatening and relaxed environment, with a high level of ethical consideration.   
I utilised internal reports and conversations to capture data as well as works-based 
observations. 
Whilst reviewing the effectiveness of the drivers’ risk database and engaging in 
conversation and interviews with managers, this opened a dialogue that was both 
informative and constructive.  This is the case both in its criticism of the database and the 
suggested changes that would be recommended to the database. 
4.18 Reflections About the Case Study 
The case study enabled me to see and analyse processes occurring over time, which was 
a real benefit.  The use of specific models provided a structure for organising and making 
sense of the data.  Researching in the workplace, I was also able to identify opportunities 
to intervene and/or plan ahead well before all the data had been analysed.  This to some 
might constitute a limitation, but it was always my intention to see any emerging openings 
for change and act on these after discussion with colleagues.  Indeed, in some areas it was 
imperative that I act in the best interest of drivers and that of the company’s reputation.  At 
the same time, I lacked sufficient opportunities as I originally intended to triangulate my data 
and findings with colleagues in the workplace due to my sometimes marginal place in the 
organisational chart and the rapid turnover of senior managers. 




With regard to CCP, its main value was in helping me to be more sensitive about the context 
in which I operated and the extent to which this dominated the content and the process of 
change.  In order to create a receptive context for change I had to make sense of a range 
of variables, not all of which worked cooperatively.  For instance, maintaining the simplicity 
of goals and priorities, translating policy coherently at the operational end and coping with 
a range of environmental pressures.  The model struck me at times as more diagnostic than 
curative and it probably required input from more perspectives than were available to me 
over the life of the research. 
The way in which Rogers conceives of innovation I found both helpful and very practical in 
understanding the different propensities of individuals towards change.  This theory has also 
provided a framework for understanding the properties of innovations that will make them 
either more or less likely to meet with success.  While I did not set out to compare the two 
innovations studied here (the introduction of telematics and the driver safety database), 
given that they occurred simultaneously, partly by chance, being able to contrast the two 
has helped me to understand the unique and often unpredictable course of an innovation. 
Rogers’ ideas also gave me a deeper understanding of what would be required to make the 
second database a more successful venture. 
Van de Ven’s concept of the innovation journey showed me that the more comprehensive 
the change, the harder it is to predict with any degree of certainty.  This, together with the 
other two models, indicated the sheer complexity of managing the change caused by an 
innovation.  Of course, I chose these models partly because of my prior convictions about 
the holistic nature of change and the tasks ahead.  To an extent, the models demonstrated 
something that I already sensed intuitively based on my career trajectory to date.  At the 
same time, they challenged my thinking and assumptions and pushed me to delve beneath 
simple and simplistic explanations, encouraging me to avoid premature cause-and-effect 
solutions. 
Looking at my research methodology, I am perhaps now more aware of its limitations than 
I was at the start.  Perhaps the biggest caveat is that the period of the case study was not 
self-contained and is still ongoing.  I have chosen start and end points in a pragmatic way 
and so the case study illustrates innovation in progress and any conclusions must be seen 
as tentative, because evaluation and impact are topics for further study.  




Chapter 5 - Recommendations 
In this chapter I outline some of the main practical recommendations for change and 
improvement based on the findings of my case study.  These are recommendations targeted 
at the internal context of Tesco Dot.com, where I feel my findings are likely to be of most 
interest and to carry more weight.  While the case study analysis stopped in 2016, I have 
fine-tuned these recommendations in light of the current and anticipated conditions affecting 
the company, a process that will end in early 2019. 
Pettigrew and Whipp provide many clear insights into the dilemmas faced by a large 
organisation, and their ideas have been tested in several large organisations in the private 
and public sectors, including the National Health Service.  This influence can be seen clearly 
in an organisation the size of Tesco and their approach is commonly found in Tesco Dot.com.  
Pettigrew and Whipp focus on: 
• Content (Objectives, purpose and goals), or the ‘what’  
• Process (Implementation), or the ‘how’ 
• Context (The internal and external environment), or the ‘why’ 
It is clear that Tesco has opted for transformational change as a key element of its five-year 
change programme started in 2014.  A risk of this type of strategy is the loss of knowledge 
and skills generated by wholesale redundancies and forced amalgamations.  The long-term 
effects have yet to be recognised. 
 
I introduced Van de Ven’s metaphor for work in Chapter 2, which is useful to reintroduce 
here having depicted my research and showing the workforce’s responses to the two 
innovations investigated in this case study.  The metaphor is helpful in suggesting ways to 
increase the odds of manoeuvring the innovation through the entirety of its journey from 
concept to implementation.  Van de Ven states that on the uncharted river that is the 
innovation journey, most people cling to the riverbank, afraid to let go and risk being carried 
along by the river’s current.  This idea contrasts well with the concept of organisational 
change that assumes that when a company comes out of a cycle of change, then it will be 
in a far stronger position.  A company may look stronger on a balance sheet at the end of a 
financial year, but is it capable of sustaining change and not reverting back to how it used 
to operate, as this feels more comfortable to managers and staff? 
 
 




5.1 What I have learnt 
What I have learnt from this process is that the concept of one-size-fits-all does not work 
well in a very large organisation.  Flexibility has to be incorporated as part of an overall 
business strategy; delivering in central London cannot be compared to delivering to the 
central highlands of Scotland. I have discovered that if you wish to change and develop you 
need to look outside of your own organisation and see what specialist skills and knowledge 
can be copied or introduced into the business.  For example, in Tesco Dot.com, driver safety 
experts were brought in to help reduce driver risk.  When this was achieved, rather than 
sustaining this activity, all of these experts were made redundant and accidents immediately 
started to rise.  In addition, very little logistic knowhow was brought into the operation, so 
the same retail DNA was running what was effectively a logistics operation.  Something that 
has become clear to me is that certain by-products of organisational change in themselves 
minimise the effectiveness of an innovational change.  For example, the constant shifting 
sands of management, who works where and is responsible for what, diminishes the 
successful embedding innovation. 
Tesco Dot.com had a director for the first seven years I worked there and in the subsequent 
six we had eight different directors.  The constant change of management and direction 
could not have had a positive overall impact on the operation.  Decisions were rushed and 
the lack of any apparent long term strategy was challenging in the extreme at times. 
5.2  Enhanced Legal Compliance 
The company needs to adopt comprehensive occupational road risk management policy 
with full management and driver engagement to support best practice in occupational road 
risk. 
In an effort to reduce the potential for role ambiguity associated with shared ownership, the 
responsibility for work-related road safety management tasks and accountabilities need to 
be unequivocally stated in job descriptions across all driver safety-critical positions.  This 
would be designed to avoid the destructive process of delegation, which leads to abdication.  
All too often managers will delegate tasks to subordinates but are indifferent to the process 
of confirming that the task has been undertaken successfully.  This is an example of the 
threat induced by collective responsibility.  Colleagues included should be: 
• Store director 
• Store manager 
• Lead driver safety compliance manager 
• Driver safety and compliance manager 




• Dotcom manager 
• Lead driving manager 
• Operational staff 
• Drivers 
• General assistants 
A new unambiguous driver safety policy needs to be compiled, a copy given to all relative 
parties and openly displayed both online and in hardcopy within each operational site.  The 
DSCM should be invited by store directors to attend regular managers’ meetings, where 
issues and possible threats can be addressed centrally and at an early stage to gain the 
support and understanding of the senior managers attending the meeting.  This is to avoid 
the fragmentation of messages to increase commitment, to improve greatly sustained 
change and legal compliance.  This process will need to be constantly monitored as a 
culture of compliance can often lead to poor safety standards. 
5.3  Improved Driving Standards 
5.3.1 Assessments 
The company should continue with practical driver assessments but raise the standard of 
these assessments.  The DSCs should be trained to approved driving instructor standards 
(ADI and DVSA).  Too many opportunities to improve driving standards are missed through 
the assessment process; it would go a long way to addressing the quality of assessments 
if they were conducted by qualified ADIs able to give immediate interactive training, hints 
and tips as well as best practice guidance.  This may well be done through demonstration, 
which has been proven to be more successful than assessment alone. 
5.3.2 Advanced Van Driving Qualification. 
The company needs to implement the proposed advanced driving qualification for our van 
drivers in conjunction with Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA).  The 
development of this programme would demonstrate both to the drivers and the wider 
industry the commitment that Tesco Dot.com has to driver safety and occupational road risk.  
The implementation of the programme will also provide an excellent opportunity for further 
engagement with our drivers. 
  





Within each operation, a driver safety board should be displayed to encourage further 
engagement with drivers relating to the impact they can have on the company and the wider 
community they serve.  On this board/safety area should be displayed: 
• Any outstanding training required of the driver/development of new drivers 
• Store’s average mpg 
• Date since last accident 
• Working days lost through accidents or lifting and handling issues 
• Cost of accidents 
• Legalities affecting the drivers, drivers’ hours, Personal Protection Equipment and 
safe practice 
Safer manoeuvring  
The installation of reversing sensors and cameras would reduce the van damage costs 
considerably as approximately 50% of the company’s van damage is incurred while the 
drivers are reversing or manoeuvring.  
Training material 
A thorough review should be carried out of all driver training material with the inclusion of 
video-supported, student led learning programmes.  A blend of traditional classroom theory 
and practical, combined with E-learning. 
5.4 Different Delivery Tools and Methodology 
A working party needs to be set up to revisit the company’s unquestioned adherence to the 
use of 3.5 tonne vans.  Our delivery fleet needs to become leaner and more targeted to 
achieve greater efficiencies.  No longer should we depend upon the industry’s go-to mode 
of delivery.  Although a van gives great flexibility in the fact that any car driver is entitled to 
drive one, there are also some major drawbacks in:  
• Driver ability and behaviour 
• Poor payload 
• Operational profitability 
Instead, I would recommend a mixed fleet combining both smaller and larger options than 
the 3.5 tonne vans that we have grown so used to.  Smaller electric vans would be beneficial 
for inner city deliveries, particularly in London.  Larger 7.5 tonne trucks would be preferable 




for certain routes in both urban and rural settings (Highland and islands of Scotland) with a 
longer operational delivery window able to support additional click-and-collect at location.  
With this new array of vehicles, I would suggest keeping approximately 50% of the fleet at 
3.5 tonne vans. 
Structuring our drivers’ hours so that they are longer and fixed (44 or 56 hours) could reduce 
our delivery driver numbers from 16,500 to 12,000.  These numbers would easily be met by 
natural churn in staff and the retraining of others to drive larger vehicles.  This would result 
in a 4,500 reduction in drivers needed. 
 
Figure 36  Nissan Note Electronic Van 
 
Figure 37  Mitsubishi 7.5 tonne truck 
  




A move to bigger or regulated vehicles such a 7.5 tonne truck would give the following 
benefits: 
• Bigger payload 
• Longer route times 
• Greater compliance “Operators Licence” structure 
• Greater legal compliance operating under EU driving hours compared with GB 
domestic driving hours 
More professional drivers, fewer vehicles on the road, a mixed fleet would also facilitate the 
tie up with other areas of the business such as pharmacy.  An option available to the 
company is to utilise the existing delivery fleet in a more dynamic manner.  By this, in specific 
areas, I would use the ability of the van to tow a two tonne trailer, effectively tripling the 
combined units payload. 
 
Figure 38  Van and trailer combination, 3.5 tonne van and 2 tonne trailers (5.5 tonne) 
Although this combination of van and trailer would have to operate under EU driving 
regulations and have a tachograph, it would provide great flexibility in many areas, 
particularly in click and collect at location.  In my opinion this highlights one of the company’s 
historical weaknesses; we employ car drivers to drive vans and not professional drivers to 
drive trucks. 




5.5 New picking model 
The company may consider moving to a 48 hour delay in the picking up of an order after it 
has been placed. In other words, order Monday and pick up on Wednesday.  Although this 
is completely out of step in relation of the immediacy of internet shopping it will go a long 
way to curing substitutions and non-availability, one of the biggest frustrations to our 
customers (approximately 100,000 subs per week). 
5.6  New Database 
The implementation of a new improved database is of high importance.  However, the output 
of the database needs to be designed more closely to align with the professional practices 
of end users.  It needs to be simple, understandable and achievable by the driver safety 
and compliance team. This has always been the Achilles’ heel of the original database as 
explored in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  The new database needs to focus on no more than 
four main data streams, and these should include: vehicle speed, miles per gallon and 
incidents/accidents. 
5.7 Personal Safety 
A new driver’s uniform should be designed that is more driver friendly, practical and high 
visibility.  The uniform will be complete in one part rather than made up of several parts as 
it is today.  This will lead to greater safety compliance from the drivers and would help 
distinguish drivers from shop workers, giving a sense of professionalism.  
5.8 Better Driver Engagement 
The company goes to great expense each year in freeing up drivers for an improvement 
workshop described within the company as ‘delivering our best’.  For the past three years, 
there has been no worthwhile driver input relating to driver safety at these training 
workshops.  It is of great importance that this is now re-addressed with a greater focus 
placed on driver safety and occupational road risk.  A re-alignment of focus would 
immediately give a greater engagement between management, driver safety compliance 
managers and the drivers relating to driver safety. 




5.9 Who the DSC team reports to 
I have only admiration for the DSCM and support and the essential work they carry out on 
a daily basis within Tesco Dot.com.  It is my belief that their effectiveness would be greatly 
enhanced if the entire team, including my line manager, who currently report to our 
‘Fulfilment’ Director, reported to our ‘People Safety’ Director. 
There is no criticism of the directors themselves but an appreciation of the increased 
influence that the team would have when working within a store environment.  Too often the 
team is looked upon by the wider business as driving assessors rather than the gatekeepers 
of driver safety and compliance. 
5.10 Using our Size for Good 
In some more rural locations and larger housing estates there could be a need for the 
company to support the local ambulance service by having trained drivers with a defibrillator 
installed in the van to act as a first responder. 
  




Chapter 6 - Critical Reflections  
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a reflective account of my professional learning and journey, which I 
firstly describe in relation to my activity as a work-based, embedded professional 
practitioner and then to the DProf programme as a whole. 
I have found the entire process of undertaking a professional practitioner case study within 
Tesco Dot.com an exercise in reflection on my professional practice as well as that of 
colleagues who work around me as we all strive to achieve a common aim.  I feel that I have 
come a long way in my ability to conduct research and in the utilisation of academic literature 
and process.  I have gained a significant insight into how organisations function and the 
impact of organisational change, both operationally and personally.  One significant element 
of this research has been experiencing the development of processes and policies only to 
witness the systematic disregarding of these very same processes and policies, designed 
to place the company in a position of greater strength and resilience.  This was a great 
example to me in contrasting theory and practice in organisational change. 
Driver safety is held in very high regard at head office but there is a distinct disconnect with 
the managers at the coalface.  This fact is compounded by the DSC team having suffered 
two rounds of redundancies.  My main concern with my legacy is the lack of energy within 
middle management to take responsibility for their own day-to-day running of their 
operations and their legal compliance. 
At all times I have had the DNA of the company in mind to help me predict both 
organisational and individual responses.  This enabled me to prepare my position, readying 
myself for which kinds of advice and counsel I would offer when requested, or what I would 
directly suggest to my colleagues.  At times I found it hard to keep on the course I knew to 
be correct when those around me were either unconcerned or holding a different view point.  
An unfortunate by-product of holding an altering position, often perceived as different to the 
majority, is that you can be labelled as being negative and disruptive.  This can result in 
becoming isolated and unable to effect change.  Key learning that I would convey to others 
involved in an environment of change is that it is best to avoid confrontation where possible, 
instead becoming more of a political animal. 
It would be all too easy for me to paint a negative picture, but when I reflect on where the 
company was, particularly regarding driver safety, to where it is today, I can clearly see that 
both the company and I have come a long way and have created massive improvements.  
To move things further forward I would involve more key stakeholders, but more importantly 




I would keep ongoing and honest, open communication with all groups and individuals 
affected, including those at managerial level, the drivers and between the stores and Tesco 
Dot.com.  I feel that creating spaces and systems in which this can consistently take place 
in a productive manner is my biggest challenge moving forward. 
6.2 Reflections on the Work-based Research Project Process 
Undertaking this research programme has presented me until an opportunity to investigate 
an important aspect of my profession, the safety of our drivers.  In recent years health and 
safety within Tesco Dot.com have been accorded a much higher profile than in previous 
years.  Although the driver safety and compliance team have won many safety awards over 
the years, the general approach to safety within Tesco Dot.com was not prioritised in the 
way it is today.  Yet there is still a fundamental attitude from local management that ‘anyone 
can drive a van’ and ‘how hard can it be to find van drivers?’  This indicates we still have 
some way to go. 
Initially, when embarking on this programme, it was neither my expectation nor desire to 
pursue a doctorate.  The energy and direction to start these endeavours came from my 
director, who was keen to have a highly qualified person within his team who would be in a 
position to influence the behaviour and expectation of both the drivers and the senior 
management team within the company.  However, although the project timeline transpired 
to be significantly longer than I had anticipated for a multitude of reasons, the skills and 
understanding that I have gained throughout the journey have made me a far more rounded 
individual and driver safety practitioner. 
I have enjoyed the practical element of interacting with colleagues, driver safety and 
compliance managers and the extended body of Tesco staff.  The research has enabled 
me to enter the workplace and engage with colleagues, to have conversations and observe 
them while they are executing their work activities.  The energy and commitment of our 
drivers working in central London, with large fleets operating out of our CFCs as well as 
smaller rural operations, are admirable.  Based on my own experience on the job and 
reinforced by my research, I would strongly advise all managers to spend practical time with 
the drivers.  It would be invaluable for managers to experience first-hand the challenges 
that the drivers face and the ways in which, on the whole, they professionally overcome 
problems on a daily basis. 
What I observed about myself stems from the fact that up until recently, and certainly for the 
first ten years that Tesco Dot.com employed me, I was considered very much as an outsider.  
Having joined Tesco Dot.com as a driver safety practitioner, I found it hard to understand 
the company’s lack of focus on driver safety.  The fact that I was not accepted into the DNA 




of Tesco during the initial stages of my job was, on reflection, a great benefit as it enabled 
me to stand back and objectively consider the benefits and disadvantages of the processes 
and programmes that were already in existence and those that were being considered in a 
form of organisational and structural overview.  Equally, my ‘outsider’ status enabled me at 
times to exploit my position as a professional practitioner to pursue the project.  When 
reflecting back on my initial ambivalence about my outsider status, I realise that I tended to 
work too much in isolation.  I am well respected at work, but my role, particularly as a result 
of some of the structural changes in the company, has left me feeling at times removed and 
depressed.  Having become more aware of this, particularly over the past two years, I have 
made a great effort to bring myself closer to the wider national team and my line manager. 
One of the problems that I found in Tesco Dot.com is the way in which management and 
leadership teams within store operations are drawn almost exclusively from internal 
candidates.  With only one exception, all senior managers/board members are now made 
up from non-Tesco personnel.  Tesco Dot.com’s culture and the way that it functions is like 
a traditional Tesco operation, which overall could be said as being no bad thing Tesco’s 
success is there for all to see.  The quandary I have is that this style of management, in my 
opinion, is not the best fit for what I would describe as a logistic operation. 
My focus and energy have always been on reducing driver risk.  Although the wider 
organisation appreciates what I am trying to achieve, there is little energy to commit to 
organisational change that may appear to move away from what I would describe as ‘the 
Tesco way’.  A good example of where my philosophy would be in conflict with many present 
operations would be the way in which drivers are flagged on our safer driving report.  The 
process for a driver who is found to be travelling at more than 20mph over the posted speed 
limit is final written warning or possibly dismissal, depending on the circumstances.  Many 
store managers would be reticent to impose this practice, which they may consider as a 
draconian approach.  This steps out of line with what has been agreed with the Trades 
Union and what is clearly communicated to the drivers when they join the company.  This 
is an example of clash of practice between retailers compared with logistics, as the same 
store manager would have no compunction in dismissing a shop worker for eating a Mars 
Bar. 
The challenge is that in the store manager’s mind the dismissal of a shop worker would 
have little impact on the overall operation and the individual can be readily replaced with 
very little training.  This is compared with a driver who is increasingly difficult to replace and 
would require four weeks’ training before being independently operational.  This being said 
there have been considerable improvements made over the majority of the estate.   




However, it must be suitably acknowledged that one of our largest standalone operations 
failed to performance manage (discipline) 90% of incidents that had occurred as a result of 
poor driving.  There is a constant tension between managing poor behaviour and the 
perceived operational need, in other words, ‘the show must go on’.  Yet since Dave Lewis 
has become our new CEO there has been a noticeable move to colleague safety with a 
new mantra of ‘everyone home safe every day’.  This new focus on safety I would hope 
would lead to a better focus on safety from store managers in particular.  Trying to invoke 
organisational change with regard to driver safety at a local level could be compared with 
trying to change the direction of a super tanker with a rowboat.  I have undertaken his 
challenge while also stretching myself by beginning the DProf.  I have to admit to finding 
the academic requirements for achieving a doctorate a daunting proposition.  I would 
describe myself as a practical hands-on individual and not an academic scribe able to 
capture into descriptive English what I have seen and believe to be the case.  I have had 
to develop new skills I would not have anticipated learning or mastering. 
There were several interruptions that were unexpected throughout my investigations that 
lengthened the process.  I had several changes in university supervisor that hampered 
focus and direction; this was unfortunately compounded by a few bouts of illness and 
two major organisational restructures in the company. Throughout this project, I have been 
working as a sole professional practitioner.  Although my immediate line manager has 
always offered his support in conjunction with my original director, since this director's 
retirement I would be surprised if any party above my direct line manager was aware that I 
have been conducting investigations for my project.  The fact that I have been working 
alone on this project has made the task of completion even more challenging and I would 
have felt much more supported working as a group. 
I am fortunate that the principal element of my job role is the practical evaluation of 
processes and procedures, as well as their design and development.  As a result of this, 
both drivers and managers are used to me being in their working environment in a 
developmental and strategic standards function.  Whilst undertaking my observations I 
made every effort to not compromise or change others’ behaviour by my presence.  I only 
made an intervention if there was an issue with safety.  An example of this took place when 
observing a driver load his van who was then asked by a manager if he could take 
additional deliveries.  Both the manager and the driver had mis-calculated the overall 
payload, which would have resulted in an overweight van.  I intervened, clarified our 
parameters of operational weight, so facilitating that the operation could continue in a safe 
and legal fashion. 




Through the process of my observations within the workplace, one key aspect of which I 
have become very aware, is the need to be able to ask individuals and groups questions.  
Linked intrinsically to this is the ability and need to listen and not prejudge the responses 
you receive.  A good example is the company’s adherence to the Health and Safety 
Executive, so that drivers receive adequate rest between shifts and over a seven-day period.  
Interestingly, this is often misconceived as the company preventing drivers working desired 
overtime.  In some of our operations, this fundamental misunderstanding has caused 
ongoing friction between managers, drivers and trade union representatives.  When you 
investigate this phenomenon and analyse the behaviour of each of the individual 
stakeholders, this becomes an example of situational thinking.  I became aware that there 
was a need to have an open and honest conversation with all stakeholders in the situation.  
A workshop/meeting facilitated the development of a fundamental understanding from all 
parties by demonstrating how legal compliance and driver safety should be placed at the 
highest level.  This approach should be carried out in such a way that all are able to 
recognise the benefits so that safety is not compromised in the future. 
6.3 Sharing and Disseminating 
As previously described, throughout the process of studying for the doctorate colleagues 
have been aware to a varying degree that I was undertaking the DProf programme.  In the 
earlier stages my academic activity was more widely known about, which provided a level 
of support, yet over time as a result of some structural changes very few people were aware 
of my research.  In the latter stages of the project I found this lack of recognition and 
awareness of my academic commitments quite debilitating.  However, now this stage of the 
process seems to be coming to an end I feel in a far stronger position to share my thoughts, 
concerns and aspirations with a wider audience.  I now feel that I have been given, and 
have applied, the tools to communicate more effectively within the company, which I can 
now do far more efficiently in written emails, and particularly in producing new training 
material.  I will always be grateful for undertaking this programme and process (Appendix 
23).  The dissemination of my knowledge is more readily achieved outside of the company.  
Tesco Dot.com is widely recognised as being in the forefront of van driver safety.  Working 
with organisations such as Freight Transport Association, RoSPA and Driving for Better 
Business has given me an opportunity to talk and present to many companies and 
organisations ranging from Kent Fire and Rescue, Johnson and Johnson to Speedy Tool 
Hire.  To this end, I was pleased to be invited to be one of six Driving for Better Business 
(Appendix 8) ‘Ambassador Champions’.  This will give me a further opportunity to engage 
with the wider transport industry regarding driver safety and to reduce Occupational Road 
Risk. 




Throughout the time of my university studies, I have changed positions several times, 
moving me away from a hands-on role to that of a strategic consultant.  The principal 
predicament I faced when joining the company was the challenge of influencing the 
business to introduce policies and procedures that required amalgamating and cross-
referencing the following: 
• UK Law 
• EU Law 
• UK Health and Safety Guidelines 
• Industry best practice 
• Tesco Dot.com policies 
The majority of the changes that have taken place within Tesco Dot.com over the last ten 
years have been driven by adhering to a combination of Health and Safety legislation and 
GB domestic driving rules.  To achieve this Tesco Dot.com has effectively created the 
benchmark for van driver safety expressed by the company through its philosophy of, ‘it’s 
the right thing to do for our people’ rather than as the necessity of legal requirement.  This 
fundamental lack of understanding of how to look after drivers and manage correctly an 
ever-growing population of outreach workers formed the platform for my work within the 
company and my resulting project.  The problem resulting from this self-benchmarking 
strategy within Tesco Dot.com is the constant challenging back from other areas of the 
business, questioning ‘is this a legal requirement?’, as its implementation and maintenance 
require focus and energy from the local management teams.  
Maintaining and improving driver safety is in itself both challenging and fluid; it is a complex 
mix of balancing legal compliance with meeting the demands of a rapidly expanding 
business with no fixed operating model.  To keep a large group of outreach workers and the 
public at large (including other drivers and pedestrians alike) safe is far from an online 
monitoring and box-ticking exercise.  It requires a constant focus to maintain standards, 
linked with good communication with the drivers, which should often be conducted face to 
face.  The fundamental success of the whole process is reliant on appropriate performance 
management covering all levels of driver engagement to preserve the systems and 
processes in a fair and robust manner. 
The challenge is not just to innovate and create change but also to maintain the products of 
change over a considerable length of time.  Furthermore, there is the additional challenge 
of evaluating the change and modifying this in response to ongoing influencing factors, 
including those relating to process, content and context (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991).  When 
positive change does take place, there are great rewards to be gained in terms of the legal 




protection for the company and its employees as well as in bottom-line savings.  Conversely, 
poor practices lead to a greater negative legal and health and safety exposure.  This is most 
evident when employing someone who holds another job external to your own organisation.  
Employing a driver for only four hours in the evening will look totally innocuous to a retail 
manager.  However, if the driver in question started work at 4:30 am that morning they 
become a high-risk driver due to the hours worked, fatigue and lack of adequate rest.  They 
may not have actually broken any laws as such, but it is far from best practice.  This in turn 
forms a perfect storm with its potential to damage the company’s reputation, bringing into 
question its ethical practices and possibly endangering life or causing loss of life. 
I am confident in dealing with any conflicting or problematical issues that have arisen or may 
arise from my reflection over the last ten years.  Operational issues are and have always 
been challenging, but if people safety is at the forefront of our senior managers’ thinking, 
then the cycle of review, development, implementation and sustainability is more effectively 
adhered to.  Sustainability will only be achieved if the results of the two tectonic masses of 
change and implementation colliding can be controlled and monitored over time.  The aims 
and objectives of this project have been to capture and demonstrate the challenge of 
implementing change.  The research has endeavoured to show how this can be achieved 
and how to embed a positive, behavioural shift. 
6.4 Summary 
When initially embarking on my final project, the sole focus of my attention was the 
effectiveness that our driver risk database has on driver safety.  What I had not anticipated 
was that over a short period of time I would become aware of the actual ineffectiveness of 
the database and that driver safety was a subject that touched a wider audience than I first 
imagined within Tesco Dot.com.  
As I broadened the scope of my investigation, the relationship between various stakeholder 
groups developed into the most influential aspect of driver safety within the company.  I was 
drawn to investigating the influence that provincial management, support staff and drivers 
all had on reducing driver risk.  I wanted to understand why robust and well-structured 
processes and policies were regularly ignored and flouted, with little awareness of the 
impact of doing so either as an individual or to the company. 
Whilst conducting my investigation, Tesco underwent several major organisational changes 
and it could be expected that these changes would have a negative impact on operational 
issues.   
  




However, over the nine years of my insider practitioner research, I have discovered that the 
rationale for the apparent absence of focus on driver safety could be summarised by me in: 
An operation administered and managed by retailers, dependent upon car drivers 
operating in large box vans, instead of an operation administered and managed by 
logistic experts reliant on professional drivers. 
The world within a modern supermarket is a closely controlled safe environment.  When you 
leave that environment and effectively bring the supermarket to 99% of all front doors within 
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Appendix 5 – Questionnaire Statistics 
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